Peak Shift in Pigeon and Human Categorisation by Aitken, Michael R. F.
Peak Shift in Pigeon and Human Categorisation
A dissertation submitted for the
PhD Degree at the University of Cambridge
Michael R. F. Aitken
King’s College
Supervisor
Professor N. J. Mackintosh
ii
                                                                                                                      Contents
Declaration iii
Acknowledgements iii
Abstract iv
Chapter 1: Introduction                                    1
1.1  Definitions of Categorisation 1
1.2  Categories and Concepts 2
1.3  Experimental Study of Concept Learning in Humans 4
1.4  Rule-governed Categorisation 8
1.5  Categorisation in Non-humans 9
1.6  The Peak Shift 12
Chapter 2: The Peak Shift in Pigeons                                   15
2.1  General Procedures for Pigeon Experiments 15
2.2  Preliminary Results 18
2.3  Replication of the Preliminary Results 21
2.4  The Shape of the Positive Peak Shift 25
Chapter 3: Prototype Effects                                   36
3.1  A Failure to Find the Positive Peak Shift 36
3.2  The ‘Prototype Effect’ 40
3.3  Negative ‘Prototype Effects’ 45
Chapter 4: An Associative Model of the Peak Shift                                   61
4.1  Description of the Model 61
4.2  Operation of the Model 63
4.3  Representation of Stimuli 64
4.4  Experiment 7: Simulation of Experiments 1-6 66
4.5  Evaluation of the Model 78
Chapter 5: Human Categorisation                                   82
5.1  Preliminary Results 82
5.2  Rule Learning versus the Peak Shift 84
5.3  Strategy in Human Categorisation 90
Chapter 6: Implicit Categorisation                                 107
6.1  Categorisation and Implicit Learning 107
Chapter 7: General Conclusions                                 134
7.1  Summary of Experimental Results 134
7.2  Theories of Categorisation by Animals 136
7.3  Theories of Human Categorisation 138
7.4  A Two-process Analysis of Human Performance 140
Appendix   I: Stimulus Parameters I
Appendix  II: Transfer of Implicit Learning II
References XIII
iii
Declaration
The work presented in this thesis is my own, and, other than the pieces specifically
acknowledged otherwise, includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in
collaboration with others.
0LFKDHO5)$LWNHQ
Acknowledgements
I am indebted first and foremost to Nick Mackintosh, without whose support and
patience this work could never have been completed; his careful supervision and
theoretical insight has enabled me to avoid countless errors and misconceptions in
undertaking this research, and his comments on earlier drafts of this dissertation
prevented numerous errors and confusions.  Any inadequacies that remain are, of
course, solely my responsibility.
Further thanks must go to the staff within the department who have made this work
possible, especially Hutch and his erstwhile assistants for caring for the pigeons used in
the experiments, and Brian for his time and skill in creating and repairing equipment.
I would also like to thank Kate Plaisted and Sarah Wills for their patience whilst
sharing equipment during several experiments, with special thanks to Sarah for her
help with the running of Experiment 4; Ian McLaren, and his students Steve Graham &
Andy Wills, for their co-operation with my use of the human testing facilities in the Sir
William Hardy Building.  Without Ian’s enthusiasm, encouragement and help since my
time as an undergraduate, I would never have been in a position to undertake this
work. He cannot, of course, be held responsible for any deficiency in the outcome.
The final and greatest thanks of all must go to those people who made work in the 4th
floor laboratory so enjoyable: Nick Mackintosh, Tony Dickinson, Claire Bennett, Kate
Plaisted, Bernard Balliene, Mark Larkin, and last and most, Sarah Wills and Simon
Killcross. It has been a pleasure to have known, worked and visited ‘The Fountain’
with all of them.
iv
                                                                                                                       Abstract
In a series of experiments, both pigeon and human subjects were trained to categorise
two groups of confusable stimuli, with each category being made up of distortions of a
‘Prototype’.  Once the subjects had successfully learned to categorise the training
stimuli, they were tested on their responding to a variety of previously unseen stimuli:
these were distortions of the Prototypes towards (‘Closer’ exemplars), or away from
(‘Further’ exemplars), the other category, and the Prototypes themselves. Pigeons
responded more to positive Further exemplars that were close to the Prototype than to
the Prototype itself, or to exemplars even further away from the category boundary.
This result is an example of the peak shift (Hanson, 1959), and can be explained by
interacting excitatory and inhibitory generalisation gradients (Spence 1937).
When the pigeons were autoshaped using stimuli from the positive category before
learning the categorisation, they failed to show a peak shift; greatest response rates on
test were elicited by the positive Prototype.  This result could be explained by the
interaction of the autoshaping producing a ‘prototype effect’, i.e. a generalisation
gradient with a maximum at the Prototype of the positive category, which masks the
development of the peak shift.  Further experiments showed that a similar abolition of
the peak shift occurred when the pigeons were given prior experience of the negative
category in an extra-dimensional discrimination designed to produce an inhibitory
analogue of the prototype effect.
A connectionist model of categorisation learning is presented, based on representation
of the stimuli as sets of  independent features.  Simulations conducted using this model
showed that, with few assumptions, such an analysis was capable of accounting for all
the results found with pigeon subjects, some of which present a problem for alternative
instance theories of categorisation (e.g. Pearce, 1984).
Human subjects also categorised the Further exemplars better than the Prototypes, but
did not show a peak shift. Performance increased with greater distance from the
category boundary, consistent with subjects having abstracted and applied a cognitive
strategy. When trained in an incidental learning paradigm, designed to minimise the
opportunity for using such a strategy, subjects showed evidence of learning without
vany knowledge of the categorisation ‘rule’.  The performance in this ‘implicit’ task
followed. a similar pattern of results to the studies with pigeon subjects, i.e. a peak
shift.  These results indicate that similar associative processes may underlie
categorisation in both humans and non-humans, although higher-level ‘symbolic’
processes may control human performance in laboratory studies.
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For Rose, who always wanted her son to be a doctor.
“From the discrimination between this and that
A host of demons blazes forth.”
Huang Po
1Chapter 1                                                           Introduction
“He knows what’s what, and that’s as high
As metaphysic wit can fly.” Samuel Butler
1.1 Definitions of Categorisation
The environment in which an organism lives can be regarded as an effectively
infinite set of distinct stimuli. In order to maintain appropriate behaviour in
response to each novel situation, ‘...one of the most basic functions of all
organisms is the cutting up of the environment into classifications’ (Rosch, Mervis,
Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem, 1976a).  The term ‘categorisation’ has been used
in a variety of ways to describe this function: Rosch et al define it as an ability to
treat a variety of distinct stimuli as members of different categories, in such a way
that each member of a given category is equivalent; Herrnstein (1990) states that
categorisation is what ‘the stimulus control of behaviour [is] more often called
outside the behaviourist tradition’; and Anderson and Mozer (1981) describe the
term, somewhat more holistically, as being ‘the most frequently used word for the
interface [between a conceptual world and a physical world]’.  Before embarking
on a discussion of categorisation it is therefore necessary to establish a precise
definition of what is being discussed. I shall use the term specifically:
categorisation is a learned ability to make differential responses to different subsets
of physically distinct stimuli, with the same, or similar, responses made to any two
members of one subset, and different responses made to stimuli from a different
subsets.
Using the term in this more restricted sense, our ability to perceive different views
of an object as a single item is not ‘categorisation’; the perceptual properties of a
distal stimulus may vary with different levels of illumination or background noise,
or with variations in the position or behaviour of the organism, but these different
patterns of stimulation are not caused by physically distinct objects. Similarly, the
‘chewing’ responses performed when dry food is placed in an animal’s mouth, as
2opposed to the ‘lapping’ response to water or saline, is not ‘categorisation’ of
foodstuffs into ‘eatables and drinkables’, as  these different responses are
presumably innate, rather than learned.
This definition of categorisation includes situations in which stimuli from the same
category are not treated as precisely ‘equivalent’, in the sense of not producing
identical levels of the categorisation response.  In this sense, I differ from the view
of categorisation taken  by Rosch et al (1976a).  Only in certain situations will
subjects respond ‘equivalently’, as measured by the speed or accuracy of
responding to all members of a category, whether novel or trained.  These
situations have been interpreted as evidence for a particular type of categorisation
performance, based upon the abstraction and application of a ‘rule’ (see Shanks,
1995). This is a topic which will be discussed in detail below.
1.2 Categories and Concepts
Categorisation and classification of different stimuli is an integral part of a variety
of human cognitive skills, the clearest example being the use of a single word to
refer to a class of different objects or situations.  The learning of a verbal category
or concept such as ‘dog’ is a form of categorisation according to the definition I
have given, and many authors have described experimental investigation of human
categorisation as the study of ‘concept learning’.  In order to accept any type of
experimental situation as a valid paradigm for investigation of concept learning,
some form of evidence is required that the way in which subjects learn these
artificial categories is similar to the way they learn verbal concepts.
How could such evidence be found?  There are a variety of effects, which I shall
describe briefly below, which are found with many of our verbal concepts; if the
categories learnt in laboratory studies show similar effects, we can presumably
accept them as reasonable analogues of concept learning.
3‘Cluster Concepts’
Deciding whether a certain activity is a member of the concept or category labelled
‘sport’, or a certain object is an item of ‘furniture’, is a relatively simple task for
speakers of the English language.  Nonetheless, these and many other categories
which are represented by single words are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
define in terms of the properties an item must have before it is considered a
member of the category. Wittgenstein (1958) argued that no such ‘necessary and
sufficient conditions’ exist to determine whether an object is regarded as belonging
to the category or concept of ‘furniture’.  Similarly, a suitable definition of
‘knowledge’ which would exclude all items that are better classed as ‘beliefs’, has
occupied philosophical discussions from the time of Plato to the present day.
Although certain concepts such as ‘negligence’ and ‘harassment’, have clear
definitions by dint of their legal status, many of the concepts that humans learn,
and use in communication, cannot be simply delineated by means of a set of
principles for inclusion or exclusion of the various items they describe.
‘Typicality’
A number of the categories which are used to describe objects in the external
world do have clear definitions, such as ‘fruit’, ‘flower’, ‘bird’, or ‘mammal’.  By
application of such definitions, it is possible to decide for any novel item whether
or not it is a member of a certain category.  Despite the fact that such rules exist, it
is not clear that they always form the basis of human categorisation judgements for
these concepts.  Evidence from a variety of experimental studies on verbal
concepts (e.g. Rosch, Simpson & Miller, 1976b) has shown that ‘typical’ members
of such categories that have features that are common to many other items within
that category (but are irrelevant to the definition of the category), are identified as
belonging to the concept more readily than other items that have more unusual
features.  For example, a canary will be more rapidly identified as a ‘bird’ than a
penguin or an emu; these latter items possess features (flightless and swimming;
flightless and running) that are uncommon for members of the category ‘bird’.
4‘Expert effects’
As James (1890) described in his discussion of the skills of wine experts, those
with a greater experience of a concept (red wine) are able to make use of more
complex taxonomies with which to describe it than those which are available to a
novice.  Anecdotal evidence for such effects is common: expert ornithologists are
able to distinguish easily between many species which appear identical to non bird-
watchers, and only the dance music cognoscenti can distinguish ‘GangstaRap’,
‘Garage’, ‘Hip-Hop’, ‘Ambient’ or ‘Trance’ from ‘Jungle’.
1.3 Experimental Study of Concept Learning  in Humans
 A study of concept learning typically involves the subjects being asked to learn
which of a set of arbitrary responses is appropriate for each member of a set of
stimuli, which may be pictures, patterns or sounds.  The subjects are instructed that
the stimuli are taken from two or more different categories, and asked to learn
which stimuli belong in which category. Categorisation performance is then
indexed by measurements such as the accuracy, latency or confidence of the
responses to presentation of novel stimuli.
This paradigm has proved to be able to reproduce many of the effects which I
argued are required of an experimental analogue of concept learning. Subjects are
able to learn categorisations of abstract stimuli which cannot be defined in terms of
‘necessary and sufficient’ features for category inclusion (e.g. Homa, Sterling &
Trepel, 1981; Rosch, et al 1976b).  Novel stimuli that are highly typical of the
training stimuli from one category are generally classified more accurately than less
typical novel stimuli (e.g. McLaren, Bennett, Guttman-Nahir, Kim & Mackintosh,
1995; Franks & Bransford, 1971), and in certain circumstances, better than the
training exemplars (e.g. Homa et al, 1981), a phenomenon labelled the ‘prototype
effect’.  Superior discrimination between novel exemplars of abstract categories,
analogous to the ‘expert perception’ effects described above, has also been found
following categorisation training (McLaren, Leevers & Mackintosh, 1994b).
5It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that this paradigm represents a useful
model of the way in which human concepts are formed.  Most theories of concept
learning have been based on such studies, and can be evaluated in terms of their
ability to account for the data that these studies produce. These theories can be
divided in terms of the psychological mechanisms which they propose as
underlying categorisation performance: the abstraction and storage of ‘prototype’
representations, association between stimulus elements or features and the
category label, or memorisation of a large set of independent instances of the
category. I shall refer to these different types of account as ‘prototype’, ‘elemental’
and ‘instance’ theories respectively.
Prototype theories, in which each category is represented by abstraction and
storage of its central tendency, or prototype, clearly accounts for ‘prototype
effects’. Despite their obvious appeal in terms of parsimony, or ‘Cognitive
Economy’ (Rosch, 1978), these theories cannot give a full account of
categorisation performance in humans.  To illustrate, consider the category of
‘faces’:  we have a great deal of experience of faces, which results, according to
prototype theories, in our extracting a ‘prototypical face’, and thus identify items
as faces by their similarity to this prototype.  There is some evidence that is
consistent with this, for example the more rapid classification of faces that are
independently rated as ‘typical’ than those that are rated as ‘distinctive’ (Valentine
& Bruce, 1986).  Although this result can be taken as indication that the subjects
are comparing faces to a ‘prototype’, to which the typical faces are more similar,
this analysis makes further predictions that seem less plausible.
The hair colour of European adults is typically one of the following: black, brown,
blonde, red/ginger, or grey/white. It is difficult to see how a ‘prototypical face’
could have hair that is a more similar colour to all of these colours than it is to any
of the colours blue, pink, green or purple. However, hair colours of green, blue,
purple or pink (when obtained by the use of artificial colourings), seem highly
distinctive, and thus ‘less typical’ than any of the ‘natural’ hair colours. Direct
evidence against the prototype view is provided by a large variety of studies that
6show that subjects’ performance in categorisation tasks is sensitive to a larger
amount of information than is stored by a prototypical representation of each
category.  Responding to novel items can be shown to be sensitive to correlations
between stimulus features within the training exemplars (Medin, Altom, Edelson &
Freko, 1982), as well as influenced by similarity to individual training exemplars
(e.g. Homa et al, 1981).
Thus the evidence from experimental categorisation studies in humans indicates
that subjects encode specific, or ‘episodic’ information from individual training
items, as well as general, or ‘semantic’ information about the typical features of
members of a category.  ‘Instance’ theories, such as that proposed by Medin and
Schaffer (1978), and modified by Nosofsky (1984), propose that learning consists
of memorisation of all training instances, and categorisation of novel items is based
on the relative similarity of the novel items to encoded exemplars of one category,
rather than those from other categories.  As these theories propose the full storage
of all training exemplars, this type of account is able to account for the ‘exemplar
effects’ mentioned above, which are beyond the scope of theories based upon the
abstraction of prototypes, and yet can still account for ‘prototype’ effects.
Prototypes are, of course, highly similar to the set of stored exemplars, and are
thus likely to be categorised with greater accuracy than other, non-prototypical,
stimuli.
Using a multidimensional scaling (MDS) procedure, a ‘psychological distance’
between all the members of a set of stimuli can be estimated by means of their
likelihood to be confused in an identification task. Using such methods to calculate
the psychological distance between a variety of Munsell colour patch stimuli,
Nosofsky (1987) predicted classification accuracy for six categorisation problems,
on the basis of an instance model (the Generalised Context Model; Nosofsky,
1984).  The GCM was able to account for between 97.2% - 99.8% of the variance
in the observed scores for all the tasks. A prototype account was unable to predict
7performance to the same degree1.  Similarly high degrees of correlation between
observed performance and predictions of the GCM have been found in further
studies on categorisation (Shin & Nosofsky, 1992), categorisation and
identification (Nosofsky, 1986), and categorisation, typicality and recognition
(Nosofsky, 1988).
‘Elemental’ theories, in which learning is regarded in terms of associations between
individual elements or features of the stimuli and the category label, or response,
can also reproduce ‘prototype’ effects, as the prototype is made up of features or
elements that are highly typical of the category.  These prototypical elements are
therefore likely to be those to have acquired the greatest associative strength
(Knapp & Anderson, 1984; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985). Due to the fact that
all the features presented during training, whether ‘prototypical’ or not, are
capable of gaining associative strength, some information about the distribution of
training exemplars can be stored by such networks. As a result, this type of
account is also capable of accounting for some of the ‘exemplar’ effects that are
problematic for ‘prototype’ theories (Shanks, 1991).  However, simple associative
models based purely on a single layer of independent associations have been shown
to be unable to learn problems that are known to be soluble to human subjects
(Minsky & Pappert, 1969); nor have elemental theories been shown to produce as
striking a fit as the GCM to the considerable amounts of data collected by
Nosofsky and his colleagues.  However, unlike instance theories, they are able to
provide a mechanism for the type of perceptual learning found by Mclaren et al
(1994b), that may well underlie the ‘expert’ effects discussed above (McLaren,
Kaye & Mackintosh, 1989)2.
                                               
1
 An optimised prototype model was able to account for a significantly lower proportion (95.6% - 98.5%) of
the variance in four of the problems, yet could not predict performance on two of the tasks when using a
single prototype for each category (4.4% and 33.0% of variance accounted for in these two problems).  A
modified prototype account, with multiple prototypes abstracted for non-linear categories,  fared
somewhat better (98.2% and 91.4% of variance accounted for), but still some somewhat worse than
Nosofsky’s Generalised Context Model (GCM).
2
 The GCM does require that certain dimensions of variability, namely those that are relevant to the
categorisation, will receive greater amounts of ‘attention’ than those that are irrelevant.  As Shanks
(1995) points out, this could predict a ‘perceptual learning’ effect in terms of facilitating discrimination
on the basis of the attended dimensions. This cannot account for the results of the McLaren et al (1994b)
study.  Attention to whichever ‘dimension’ enabled the subjects to solve the categorisation task would
81.4 Rule-governed Categorisation
Although the theories outlined above can account for much of the data from
categorisation experiments with human subjects, some studies have produced
results which cannot be easily incorporated into any of these frameworks.  A study
by Regehr & Brooks (1993) contained a categorisation task in which a rule was
used to define two categories of cartoon animal; the rule was based upon three out
of the five binary dimensions along which the stimuli could vary.  Two groups of
subjects were trained, using different types of stimuli: in the ‘uniform’ group the
dimensions were ‘truly’ binary, in the sense that each animal was long-legged or
short-legged, with no difference between two different examples of ‘short legs’.
The ‘distinctive’ group, by contrast, were given stimuli that varied along irrelevant
continuous dimensions (i.e. had various styles of leg), at both the ‘long-legged’
and ‘short-legged’ ends of the binary dimension.
Once the subjects had been trained to categorise a set of study items, they were
tested on two types of novel item, along with some of the study items.  The novel
test items were of two types: good and bad transfer items.  Good transfer items
were designed to be highly similar to a training item from the category in which the
‘rule’ would place them, whereas the bad transfer items were constructed to be
more similar to an item from the category to which (according to the rule) they did
not belong. Instance theories of categorisation would therefore predict that the
subjects would be more likely to categorise the good transfer items into the
‘correct’ category (as given by the rule) than the bad transfer items.  In situations
where the individual study items were distinctive from one another, this is indeed
what happened.  However, for the ‘uniform’ group of subjects the study items
were more confusable, and these subjects categorised the bad transfer items
according to the ‘rule’ just as well as both the items that were originally studied,
and the good transfer items.
                                                                                                                               
not result in facilitated discrimination between were two novel chequerboard stimuli taken from the same
category, yet this is what  McLaren  et al found.
9The results from the subjects in the ‘distinctive’ group are consistent with the
elemental and instance theories of categorisation outlined above, i.e. the
categorisation response appropriate to each of the study items was learned, and
responding to novel items was determined by their similarity to the set of study
items.  The responding of the subjects in the ‘uniform’ group, however, indicates
that these subjects were able to abstract the rule that governed which category an
item was from, and were using this rule to respond to all stimuli, whether novel or
studied, on test.
Shanks (1995) argues that if performance is rule-based, there should be no
difference between the responding to old (i.e. trained) and new items.  In certain
types of categorisation task, however, there can be some difficulty in distinguishing
‘rule-bound’ and ‘similarity-bound’ categorisation, a point which I shall discuss at
greater length in Chapters 4 & 5, below.
1.5 Categorisation in Non-humans
Although the majority of the discussion I shall undertake on the categorisation in
non-human animals (hereafter animals) will concern studies investigating the
learning of visual categorisation problems by pigeons, categorisation per se has
been investigated in many different species: mammals, including  a variety of
monkeys (e.g. D’Amato and Van Sant, 1988; Neiworth & Wright, 1994; Schrier &
Brady, 1987; Judge & Candland, 1988), lemurs (Macedonia & Young, 1991), and
chinchillas (e.g. Burdick & Miller, 1975); a variety of avian species such as
chickens (e.g. Ryan, 1982), parrots (e.g. Pepperberg, 1983), blue jays (e.g.
Pietrewicz & Kamil, 1977), quail (e.g. Kluender, Diehl & Killeen, 1987); and even
bumblebees (Dukas & Waser, 1994).  In fact, Herrnstein (1990) states that
categorisation learning has been demonstrated ‘at every level of the animal
kingdom where it has been competently sought’. However, as noted above,
Herrnstein is here using ‘categorisation’ to describe a greater range of phenomena
than those covered by the definition I proposed.
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By far the most commonly used species for research into non-human
categorisation, however, is the pigeon. Studies of visual categorisation in pigeons
typically involve a procedure similar to the following: The subjects, who are
maintained in a mild food deprivation state, are placed in an operant chamber
which contains a response key upon which a variety of visual stimuli can be
presented.  The categorisation training consists of reinforcing responding (by
means of access to grain) whilst stimuli from one category is presented, with no
reinforcement for responding to the other category.  Following this training,
categorisation performance is indexed by the amount of responding elicited by the
presentation of novel stimuli.
Pigeons trained in this manner have learned a variety of categorisations based upon
natural categories: including different genera of birds (Poole & Lander, 1971;
McLaren et al, 1994b), oak leaves vs. other leaves (Cerella, 1979), human faces,
torsos, and groups of people (Malott & Siddall, 1972); categorising  photographs
on the basis of whether they contain fish (Herrnstein & de Villiers, 1980), trees,
areas of water,  or a particular person (Herrnstein, Loveland & Cable, 1976), and
to group together ‘natural language’ categories such as cats and flowers (Bhatt,
Wasserman, Reynolds & Knauss, 1988); they have also learned several purely
‘artificial’ categories such as geometric shapes and cartoon characters (Cerella,
1980), schematic faces (Huber & Lenz, 1993), the character “A” in a variety of
typefaces (Morgan, Fitch, Holman & Lea, 1976), chairs and cats (Bhatt et al,
1988) and pseudo-random chequerboards (Aitken, Bennett,  McLaren &
Mackintosh, 1996).
The categorisation performance of animals is less frequently described as ‘concept
learning’, presumably because animals do not use verbal concepts. Nonetheless,
the effects that I argued provided support for the claim that categorisation studies
in humans were a reasonable model of ‘concept learning’ have also been
reproduced with pigeon subjects:
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1)  A detailed investigation into the features controlling responding in a group of
pigeons after they had learned to categorise typewritten “A”s from “2”s led
Morgan  et al  (1976) to conclude that ‘no single feature could be called
necessary and sufficient’ to define the categories.
2)  Initial investigations (e.g. Lea & Harrison, 1978; Pearce 1987) failed to provide
evidence for ‘prototype effects’ with pigeon subjects; however, more recent
studies have shown evidence of such effects: Von Fersen and Lea (1990) and
Huber and Lenz  (1996) have shown that pigeons respond most strongly to the
‘prototype’ of the positive category on which they were trained, with less
responding to stimuli less similar to the prototype.
3)  Aitken et al (1996), using a task similar to that used by McLaren et al (1994b)
with human subjects, found that pigeons which were trained on a discrimination
between two categories of chequerboard stimuli were able to learn a subsequent
discrimination between two novel members of the negative category more
rapidly than a control discrimination.
Despite these similarities, I do not wish to suggest that the categorisation
performance of pigeons described here is therefore best described as ‘concept
learning’. Although categories are, in a sense, ‘concepts’ there are certain
reservations in using this terminology with animals. Learning categorisations on
the basis of such features as ‘person present’ is not equivalent to possessing the
concept of person (see Herrnstein, 1990; Pearce, 1994a), and pigeons have had
difficulty learning concepts based on more abstract relationships such as
‘insideness’ (Herrnstein, Vaughn, Mumford & Kosslyn, 1989). These are matters
to which I shall return in greater detail in Chapter 7.
There is an obvious parallel between categorisation learning in animal subjects, and
discrimination learning. In discrimination learning paradigms, subjects learn
different responses, (which may be the production or omission of the same
response), in the presence of each of two distinct stimuli (or the presence or
absence or a single stimulus). Categorisation training can be regarded as equivalent
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to discrimination training with a set of stimuli, rather than a single stimulus, acting
as the discriminanda.
For this reason, many authors (e.g. Pearce, 1994a) have argued that theories of
categorisation by animals should be based upon those that have been put forward
to account for the performance of animals in discrimination learning procedures.
Before discussing these theories, I shall first describe one of the empirical
observations found in many discrimination learning experiments, that forms the
starting point for the experimental work in this thesis: the ‘peak shift’.
1.6 The Peak Shift
Hanson (1959) reported a study in which  pigeons were trained to discriminate
between two similar wavelengths of light, and were then tested by presentation of
a variety of different wavelengths.  The original S+, that is the frequency of light
that was the discriminative stimulus signalling the availability of reward during
training, was not the stimulus that elicited most responding.  Rather, another
stimulus (S’) that was close in wavelength to the S+, but shifted slightly away from
the S- (the wavelength of light that had operated as a discriminative stimulus for
the non-availability of food during training) was responded to at the highest rate
(see Figure 1.1).  This result was labelled the positive peak shift, as the ‘peak’ in
responding (which would be found around the S+ following non-discriminatory
training) is shifted away from the S-.
Early theories of discrimination learning in animals, such as that of Spence (1937),
were based on the acquisition of excitatory conditioning to the S+ (due to its
history of reinforcement), and inhibitory conditioning to the S- (due to its history
of non-reinforcement).  The peak shift is easily accommodated by this theory,
provided that certain assumptions are made about the shape of generalisation
gradients.  So long as generalisation gradients are ‘convex’, so that the slope of the
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gradient increases with distance from the central point, the difference between the
amounts of generalised excitation and inhibition will be greater at S’ than at S+
(see Figure 1.2).
Such an account is not the only way to explain the peak shift, however. Rescorla
and Wagner (1972) proposed a theory of Pavlovian conditioning in which a
stimulus becomes conditioned to a US according to the degree to which the US
was ‘unexpected’ on a trial on which that stimulus was presented.  This approach
differs from that taken by Spence, and is able to account for other findings that are
problematic for such a theory, e.g. that a stimulus that is presented in conjunction
with a better predictor in a feature positive (A0 | AB+) design will, after a period
of discrimination training, elicit little responding (Wagner, 1969).
Blough (1975) showed that with the addition of a further assumption, namely that
experimental stimuli are composed of a set of independent features, all of which
are capable of entering into associations, the Rescorla-Wagner theory is able to
account for increased generalisation between more similar stimuli, and for the peak
shift.  The Rescorla-Wagner theory is formally equivalent to the ‘LMS’, or delta-
rule (Widrow & Hoff, 1960) used in a variety of ‘elemental’ connectionist theories
of human categorisation.
Although the original theory of Spence (1937) has proved inadequate to explain a
variety of  selective association effects such as overshadowing and blocking,
Pearce (1987) has proposed a more sophisticated theory similar to Spence’s,
capable of explaining such effects.  Pearce’s theory of discrimination assumes that
configurations of elements (rather than the elements themselves) enter into
associations, and that generalisation from one configuration to another is based on
the proportion of elements they share in common. It can account for some data
that seem problematic for an elemental theory; Rescorla-Wagner theory predicts
(incorrectly) that an AB+ ABC0 discrimination will learned more rapidly than an
A+ AC0 (Pearce & Redhead, 1993). The similarities between the theories
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accounting for categorisation learning in humans and animals is clear: Rescorla-
Wagner theory is formally identical to many of the theories of human
categorisation that I described as ‘elemental’, whilst connectionist implementation
of Pearce’s theory (Pearce, 1994b) is very similar to the ALCOVE model of
instance-based categorisation in humans theory  proposed by Kruschke (1992).
Despite the similarities between theories of categorisation in humans and
discrimination-categorisation in animals, few studies investigating the peak shift in
human experiments have been undertaken, and no clear examples of a peak shift in
human categorisation have been published (although see McLaren et al, 1995).
There is, however, recent evidence to suggest that a peak shift may be found
following training on a variety of ‘dimensional’ categorisation problems (McLaren,
personal communication).
One aim of the experiments that will be described in this work is to investigate a
categorisation task that is similar for both human and pigeon subjects.  If the
stimuli are relatively confusable, and the two categories similar, a peak shift would
be anticipated with pigeon subjects. If a peak shift is found in human subjects, this
could be taken as an indication that the underlying processes in these
circumstances are similar to those operating in the pigeon.  Conversely, if a peak
shift is not found, it could be taken as evidence that the mechanisms underlying
categorisation performance in the two species are somewhat different, despite the
similarities in current theoretical accounts.
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Chapter 2                                             The Peak Shift in Pigeons
2.1 General Procedures for Pigeon Experiments
The experimental work involving pigeon subjects reported in this, and the
following chapter, is derived from a preliminary study conducted by Bennett and
Mackintosh (1992; reference note 2). The general procedure used in this study,
and in my own subsequent experiments, is described below.  Details specific to
each study are noted later.
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of three light and sound attenuating pigeon chambers
supplied by Campden Instruments Ltd. One end of the chamber was a response
panel on which a single response key,  house light and food magazine were
mounted. On the opposite wall was an electric fan for both ventilation and the
masking of external noise.
The response key was a single 7 x 5cm piece of clear perspex, with an LCD TV
monitor of the same size situated directly behind it. A 2cm deep  aluminium collar
surrounded the perimeter of the key, and prevented the birds from viewing the
screen from an angle that would distort the appearance of the display. The
magazine was mounted below the centre of the key,  and was internally illuminated
whenever the hopper was up and food was available. The houselight was mounted
above the key.  It was switched on at the start of the session for 30-sec, during all
inter trial intervals (ITIs), and again at the end of the last trial.
The operation of the houselight and hopper,  the display on the TV screen and the
recording of all responses were controlled by an Acorn BBC Master Series
Microcomputers, fitted with SPIDER real-time control software supplied by Paul
Fray Ltd.
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Subjects
The subjects were domestic pigeons (Columba livia), supplied by Abbott Brothers,
Norfolk.  They were kept in individual home cages with grit and water freely
available. Controlled amounts of grain were provided at the end of each
experimental session to maintain the pigeons at 85% of their free feeding weight.
The pigeons were maintained on a 12hr/12hr light/dark cycle, and the experimental
sessions took place near the end of the light half of the cycle.  Before the beginning
of each experiment, the subjects were trained to eat food from the magazine.
Stimuli
The discriminative stimuli for the pigeon experiments were black filled 'wedge'
shapes (see Figure 2.1) on a white background, which were presented to the birds
on a television screen.  These stimuli varied along two dimensions, radius length
and subtended angle, and were divided into two categories: 'long-thin' (long radii
with narrow angle) versus 'short-fat' (short radii with wide angle).
The distribution of the 24 training stimuli used for discrimination training is
illustrated in Figure 2.2, with the filled squares representing the training stimuli
from category 1, and the hollow squares representing the stimuli from category 2.
The two sets are symmetrical distortions around two prototypes or central
tendencies; these prototypes were not presented during training. The measure of
length shown in Figure 2.2  is screen units, where 100 units = 75mm. Thus
Prototype 1 measured  17.5mm [23 units] by 53° (radius length * angle)  and
Prototype 2 measured 20.5mm [27 units] by 37°, and each  category was made up
of 12 stimuli which were distorted from the prototype in one of four 'directions':
longer or shorter radii, wider or narrower angle. The 'step size' between
neighbouring stimuli shown in Figure 2.2 was thus 0.75mm in length and 4° in
angle.  As can be seen, there was significant overlap on both these dimensions
between the two categories.
Six test stimuli were used: the prototype and two novel exemplars from each
category.  These exemplars were distortions of the prototype either towards or
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away from the other category, as illustrated by the circles in Figure 2.2. The three
test stimuli from each category are hereafter referred to as the 'Prototype', 'Closer'
(to the other category)  and 'Further' exemplars.
Procedures
Autoshaping and pre-training sessions
On each autoshaping trial an autoshaping stimulus was displayed on the key  for a
maximum of 1 min, followed immediately by 3-sec access to grain. A peck during
the presentation resulted in the immediate delivery of grain, and the termination of
the trial. Each autoshaping session consisted of 20 trials,  separated by a 10-sec
ITI.
Once pecking was reliably established, the birds were transferred to a variable-
interval (VI) 10-sec schedule of reinforcement.  On each trial, the autoshaping
stimulus was presented on the key, and the first peck after the variable interval was
rewarded with immediate 3-sec access to grain. Trials lasted 1 min, and multiple
reinforcements could be earned in each trial. As during autoshaping, the VI
training sessions consisted of 20 trials with a 10-sec ITI. This VI schedule was
increased over a number of sessions until reliable responding on a VI 30-sec
schedule was established.  All subsequent sessions began with a single 1-min
‘warm-up’ presentation of the autoshaping stimulus, during which reward was
available on the same VI 30-sec schedule.
Discrimination training sessions
These consisted of a series of 1-min stimulus presentations, with a 10-sec ITI. On
the first session, all birds received 24 trials on each of which reward was available:
a presentation of each of the 12 stimuli from their positive set in random order,
followed by a second presentation of the same 12 stimuli, again in random order.
On subsequent sessions the birds were trained on a discrimination between their
positive and negative training sets. Responding to the stimuli from the positive set
was rewarded on a VI 30-sec schedule and no reward was delivered for
responding to negative stimuli. Each session consisted of 48 trials,  with each of
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the 24 stimuli presented twice. As before, each stimulus was presented once during
the first 24, and once during the second 24 trials of the session,  with a random
order of presentation within each  half of the session.  Performance on the
discrimination task was evaluated by calculation of a discrimination ratio (DR)
[DR = positive response rate / (positive response rate + negative response rate)].
Test sessions
These sessions consisted of 48 trials. The first 24 were discrimination trials
identical to the first half of a discrimination training session. The last 24 were test
trials in extinction,  consisting of four presentations of each of the six test stimuli,
with each stimulus occurring once, in a random order, in each block of six trials.
2.2 Preliminary Results
The results of Bennett and Mackintosh (1992) need to be discussed in some detail
as they form the starting point for the work that follows. (A significance level of
0.05 is taken for alpha  in the discussion of the results of this study, and
throughout the remainder of the work presented in this thesis.)
Eight subjects were used, of which five were trained with category 1 positive, and
three with category 2 positive.  Preliminary training was conducted as described in
the General Procedures, with the autoshaping stimulus being a black circle in the
centre of the key, against a white background.  Following this, the subjects were
given a series of discrimination training sessions as described in the General
Procedures above, and then a single test session.
The discrimination was acquired over a number of sessions, by both groups of
birds. The mean DR on session 1 was 0.45 for those birds whose positive set was
category 1, and 0.46 for those for whom it was category 2. All three birds whose
positive set was category 1 discriminated reliably between positive and negative
stimuli (mean DR >0.7) by the seventh day of training, after which they were
tested. Birds whose positive set was  category 2 learned the discrimination more
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slowly, and were tested after the tenth training session (mean DR = 0.65, range =
0.57 to 0.74).
Mean response rates to the six test stimuli during the test session are shown in
Figure 2.3. The left panel presents responses made to the Prototype, Closer and
Further exemplars from the positive set, for birds from each of the category
conditions. The right panel shows the same data for the negative test stimuli. These
data were analyzed using separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for the positive
and negative stimuli, each with category and stimulus type as factors.
Analysis of responses to the positive test stimuli alone revealed a marginal effect of
stimulus type (F(1,6) = 3.706; p < 0.08; εG = 0.53)3. No other effects were
significant (Fs < 1).  Comparison of responding to the different exemplars was
conducted by means of two matched-sample Student’s t-tests, which revealed
significantly more responding to the Further exemplars than to the Prototypes
(t(7) = 3.10); responding to the Prototypes was not significantly greater than to the
Closer exemplars (t(7) = 1.49; p > 0.15 two-tailed).
The analysis of the responses to the negative test stimuli revealed no significant
effects (largest F(1,6) = 2.61; εG = 0.52). However, as the right panel of Figure 2.3
shows, there were signs of a floor effect on the negative responding, thus the
ANOVA was repeated using the square root of the mean response rates for each
subject. This revealed a significant effect of stimulus type (F(2,11) = 6.63;
εH = 0.87). No other effects were significant (larger (F(1,6)=2.08). Planned
comparisons4 of the responding to the different stimulus types revealed that there
                                               
3
 Significance levels of main effects and interactions involving within-subject (repeated measures) factors
were evaluated according to df levels modified by a correction factor ε, to accommodate possible
deviations from the assumption of covariance sphericity. The factor ε was estimated in the (conservative)
manner suggested by Greenhouse and Geisser (1959), denoted εG.  For values of ε close to, or above,
0.75, the modification of εG recommended by Hunyh and Feldt (1976) was used, denoted εH. Where ε <
1.00, it is reported, and modified dfs are shown in italics.   See Howell (1992, pp 446-7).
4
 
A priori
 comparisons of the means of different levels of a within-subject variable having a significant
main effect were conducted using an error term based on the contrast alone, rather than a pooled error
term, in order to avoid increases in αEW (type I) error rates due to violations of assumptions of sphericity
and unequal between-subject sample group sizes.   See Howell (1992, p 452).
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was marginally more responding to the negative Closer exemplars than to the
negative Prototypes (F(1,6) = 5.44; p < 0.06), but no significant difference was
found between the responding to the negative Prototypes and the negative Further
exemplars (F(1,6)=3.52; p = 0.11).
Figure 2.4 shows these results presented as discrimination ratios for each stimulus
pair [e.g. Prototype DR = (response rate to positive Prototype) / {(response rate
to negative Prototype) + (response rate to  positive Prototype)}].  An ANOVA,
again with stimulus type and category as factors, was conducted on the DR for
each test stimulus pair for each subject, using an arcsine transformation (as
discrimination ratios produce a positively skewed distribution of scores). This
revealed a main effect of stimulus type (F(2,12) = 22.92). No other effects were
significant (largest F(1,6) = 1.62). Planned comparisons between the
discrimination performance on the three test stimulus types revealed that there was
significantly better discrimination between the Further exemplars than between the
Prototypes, which were in turn better discriminated than the Closer exemplars
(smaller F(1,6) =  6.54).
Discussion
The results show superior categorisation performance, in terms of more differential
responding, elicited by novel exemplars further from the category boundary
(Further exemplars) than by the Prototypes themselves. Hence discrimination
training on a set of confusable stimuli based on two (non-presented) prototypes,
results in responding to novel test items that follows a pattern similar to the peak
shift found in post-discrimination gradients, where responding is greatest to novel
stimuli shifted a small distance from the S+, away from the S-
Although no significant differences were found between the test results of subjects
in the two different category conditions, there was a marked tendency for the birds
in the category 1 positive condition to learn the discrimination faster than the birds
for whom category 2 was positive.  One possible reason for this is that the circle
stimulus, used on autoshaping and VI schedule training trials, could well be more
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similar to the stimuli that are members of category 1 (‘fat’ wedges) than to those
that are members of category 2 (‘thin’ wedges).  It could therefore have required
more training in order for the category 1 stimuli to become ‘inhibitory’, i.e. to
become associated with non-reward,  than for the category 2 stimuli.
2.3 Replication of the Preliminary Results
Two methods can be used in an attempt to determine whether the difference in
categorisation performance between the subjects in the two category conditions
was due to the nature of the autoshaping stimulus.  One method is to use a pre-
training stimulus that is presumably ‘neutral’, in the sense of being no more similar
to exemplars from one category than to those from the other.  Experiments 1 & 2
were conducted in this way.  A different approach to controlling the similarity of
training exemplars to the pre-training stimulus is to use the positive training stimuli
themselves for autoshaping and VI training trials.  However, a study which was
conducted in this manner produced a surprisingly different pattern of results, and
will thus be discussed later, in Chapter 3.
Experiment 1 was conducted as a direct replication of the Bennett and Mackintosh
(1992) experiment, with a pre-training stimulus that would, it was hoped, be no
more similar to members of one category than the other.
Experiment 1
Subjects & Apparatus
The subjects were ten experimentally naive pigeons, run in the original apparatus.
Five birds, selected at random, were run in the category 1 positive condition, with
the remaining five being run in the category 2 positive condition.
Procedure
The procedure was as described in the General Procedures section, with two slight
differences. The autoshaping stimulus, presented during autoshaping sessions and
22
warm-up trials, was an upright cross. This consisted of black vertical and
horizontal arms, which were 20mm wide, crossing in the centre of the screen. The
remaining background of the screen, outside the cross, was white.
The discrimination sessions and test sessions were exactly as described in the
General Procedures, with the exception of the warm-up trials. The birds were
given a single test session after they had performed for two consecutive days with
DR > 0.75, or had completed 20 days of training.
Results
Two of the five birds trained with category 1 positive showed no sign of learning
the discrimination. One of these birds responded at a very low rate, and had
achieved a discrimination ratio of only 0.47 after 18 sessions, and was not tested.
The other bird responded with a DR less than 0.50 on the last three training
sessions, and the test data from this bird were therefore excluded from the analysis.
All remaining birds showed a mean DR > 0.55 over their last two training days.
Of the remaining three birds for whom category 1 was positive, two reached the
criterion before the limit of 20 training sessions, the quicker being after 12
sessions. A third bird from this category learned the discrimination without
reaching the test criterion (mean DR on final training session = 0.71). Those birds
who were trained with category 2 positive tended to learn the discrimination more
rapidly, with the quickest bird reaching criterion after six training sessions, and
only one bird receiving the maximum 20 training sessions (mean DR on final
training session = 0.80).
The preliminary results reported above showed significantly better discrimination
during the test session between the Further exemplars than between the
Prototypes. The results from this study, in terms of discrimination ratios
(calculated as above) for each test stimulus pair, are illustrated in Figure 2.5.
Better discrimination was again found between the Further exemplars than
between the Prototypes, which were in turn discriminated better than the Closer
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exemplars. An ANOVA was conducted, with positive category as a between-
subject factor, and stimulus type as a within-subject factor, on the (arcsine
transformed) discrimination ratios.
This revealed a significant effect  of stimulus type (F(1,7) = 10.17; εG = 0.56), and
a marginal effect of positive category (F(1,6) = 5.44; p < 0.06); birds who were
trained with category 2 positive discriminated better between the test stimuli than
those trained with category 1 positive.  No interaction between the two factors
was found (F < 1). Planned comparisons of the mean transformed discrimination
ratios revealed significantly better discrimination between the Further exemplars
than between the Prototypes, and significantly better discrimination between the
Prototypes than between the Closer exemplars (smaller F(1,6) = 7.50).
Figure 2.6 shows the results in terms of the mean response rates to the six test
stimuli. These were analysed by means of two ANOVAs, conducted on the
response rates to the positive and negative stimuli separately.  As before, category
(between-subject) and stimulus type (within-subject) were used as factors.  The
analysis of the responding to the positive test stimuli revealed a significant effect of
stimulus type (F(2,12) = 11.19). No significant effect of category was revealed
(F < 1), but a marginal interaction between the two factors was found
(F(2,12) = 3.75; p < 0.10).  Planned comparisons between the response rates to
the different stimuli revealed significantly greater responding to the positive
Further exemplars than to the Prototypes (F(1,6) = 11.26), with no significant
difference between the response rates to the Prototypes and Closer exemplars
(F(1,6) = 3.20; p > 0.10).
The analysis of response rates to the negative stimuli revealed a significant effect of
both positive category and stimulus type (smaller F(2,9) = 13.96; εH = 0.77), with
a significant interaction between these two factors (F(2,9) = 9.09). A simple
effects analysis of this interaction was conducted, which revealed that positive
category had a significant effect on responding to the negative Closer exemplars
(F(1,6) = 35.19), a marginal effect on responding to the negative Further
exemplars (F(1,6) = 5.48; p < 0.06), and had no significant effect on responding to
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the negative Prototypes (F(1,6) = 1.83). A significant effect of stimulus type was
found for the birds from the category 1 positive condition (F(2,12) = 18.13), but
not for those birds for whom category 2 was positive (F < 1).  Planned
comparisons between the response rates revealed that there was significantly more
responding to the negative Closer exemplars than to the negative Prototypes
(F(1,6) = 8.17), but no significant difference between the response rates to the
Prototypes and the negative Further exemplars (F(1,6) = 1.94).
Discussion
In general, the test results of Experiment 1 replicate those of the original
experiment, with better discrimination between the positive and negative Further
exemplars than between the positive and negative Prototypes, largely caused by
greater responding to the positive Further exemplar than to the positive Prototype.
However, the results of initial discrimination training differed to those in the
Bennett and Mackintosh (1992) study, in which birds trained with category 1
positive learned the discrimination more rapidly, and responded more differentially
on test, than birds trained with category 2 positive. There was  a tendency towards
the opposite trend in Experiment 1: birds trained with category 2 positive learned
the discrimination more rapidly and accurately than those trained with category 1
positive.
The significant difference in discrimination performance on test between the two
categories found in this study seems to be due to greater responding to the
negative test exemplars by subjects trained with category 1 positive, as there were
no significant differences between the amounts of responding to the individual
positive test exemplars across the two category conditions.
This difference could be attributed to the new autoshaping stimulus, which was
used in the hope that it would be ‘neutral’ with respect to the two categories. As
mentioned above, Bennett and Mackintosh autoshaped responding to a circle
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stimulus, from which excitation may have generalised more to category 1 (‘fat’)
than to category 2 (‘thin’) exemplars.  The autoshaping stimulus in Experiment 1,
by contrast, was a dark cross shape (containing a horizontal line), excitation from
which may have generalised more to category 2 (‘long’) than to category 1
(‘short’) stimuli.
A simple interpretation of the finding that the positive Prototype, which is the
central tendency of the previously reinforced stimuli, did not elicit the maximum
responding may be found in terms of the explanations (outlined in Chapter 1) of
the peak shift in post-discrimination gradients found by Hanson (1959). For
example, these results can be accounted for by Spence’s (1937) theory, i.e. by
assuming that the reinforcement history of the training stimuli produced gradients
of excitation and inhibition along both the dimensions of variability.  The
prediction of this theory would be a peak in responding at the point along the
discriminatory dimensions at which the net excitation is greatest, i.e. the point at
which there is the largest positive difference between excitation and inhibition of
the response mechanism. Providing that these gradients of excitation and inhibition
are assumed to be somewhat flatter at their peaks than at their edges (see Figure
1.2), and that the S+ and S- are relatively close on the dimensions of
generalisation, the peak in net excitation will be at a point close to the S+, shifted
away from  the S-.
2.4 The Shape of the Positive Peak Shift
The results of these two experiments, in which pigeons categorised Further
exemplars better than the Prototypes of each category,  are therefore consistent
with the peak shift (even if the response rate to the positive Further exemplars was
not significantly greater than that to the positive Prototypes).  Yet the gradient
interaction account leads to a further prediction.  Although the response rates
should increase for Further exemplars shifted a small distance from the positive
Prototypes, one would expect a decrease in categorisation performance for test
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stimuli even further from the boundary.  In Hanson’s (1959) experiment, the rate
of responding increased, and then decreased, as birds were tested with stimuli
shifted progressively further away from the S+.
Experiments described in Chapter 5, below, in which human subjects were trained
with similar ‘wedge’ stimuli in a two-choice categorisation procedure, also
produced evidence of Further exemplars being better categorised than Prototypes.
This advantage increased, however, for stimuli shifted even further away from the
category boundary, and thus can be described in terms of the application of a
‘rule’.  In contrast, studies of the peak shift in pigeons have shown that the
advantage over the original S+ stimulus for novel stimuli shifted a small distance
away from the category boundary decreases with further movement away from S+
and S-.  Thus, to show that the results of this categorisation paradigm can be
regarded as an example of the peak shift, it must be shown that there are Further
exemplars which are responded to at a higher rate than not only the Prototypes,
but also exemplars even further from the category boundary.
A pilot experiment attempting to investigate the nature of responding to exemplars
even further from the category boundary was conducted, based upon the previous
experiments.  A group of birds was trained on the discrimination between the two
categories,  and tested on a wide range of stimuli.  The six test stimuli from
Experiment 1 were used, along with two new Further exemplars.  These exemplars
were distortions of the prototype even further from the other category, and are
illustrated in Figure 2.7, labelled ‘FF’ and ‘FFF’, with the Further exemplars used
in Experiment 1 labelled ‘F’.
As this produces 10 test exemplars, the design of the test session was changed.
The procedure used in the previous experiments would be unlikely to reveal any
subtle effects due to stimulus control of responding.  Such effects could be masked
by the extinction of responding across the trials, as there were now ten, rather than
six, exemplars in each trial block.  A somewhat modified test procedure was used,
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therefore, in which the stimuli were presented for only 30-sec each, with a 5-sec
ITI.  The stimuli were presented in a pairwise order, according to type, with the
negative test exemplar first.  Thus the Prototype of the positive training set was
always presented immediately after the Prototype of the negative set, and so forth.
In this way, it was hoped, discrimination between the positive and negative stimuli
could be measured whilst controlling for the effects of extinction.
The data from this study were first investigated in terms of mean discrimination
ratios across each positive / negative stimulus pair, which are shown in Figure 2.8.
These data can be calculated in two ways; one way is to take the discrimination
ratio on each 60-sec trial pair.  The mean DR calculated in this way from all trial
pairs on which some responding occurred, is shown by the unshaded columns.
The alternative method of calculating the DRs is to use the mean response rates to
each of the positive and negative stimuli across the whole session.  This was the
method used in the previous studies, and the DRs calculated in this way are shown
by the shaded columns in Figure 2.8.
The results are without any clear trend, and they fail to replicate the previous
findings of significant improvement in discrimination performance, across the
Closer, Prototype and ‘F’ exemplar pairs, with movement away from the category
boundary.  These data were not analysed for statistical significance, but a further
investigation into the failure to replicate the previous studies was conducted by
means of an inspection of the response rates.
These data are shown in Figure 2.9.  The mean response rates to each of the test
stimuli are shown by the line graphs, with the circle symbols showing the response
rates to the negative stimuli, and the square symbols showing the rates elicited by
the positive stimuli.  The subjects tested in Experiment 1, and those in Bennett and
Mackintosh (1992), showed good transfer of discrimination performance to the
novel test exemplars, with markedly more responding to the positive test stimuli
than to their negative counterparts. Although the subjects in this study were
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discriminating well between the two training sets, the discrimination ratios for all
types of stimuli were low, and the advantage for positive stimuli in terms of
response rates was minimal.
An explanation for the somewhat unexpected pattern of responding in this study
presumably lies in the construction of the test session, which was the only major
difference between this study and those conducted previously.  Throughout the
discrimination training phase of all three experiments, the birds were presented
with stimuli for 60-sec, with a 10-sec ITI.  During the time a stimulus was
displayed,  reward for responding was either available on a VI 30-sec schedule, or
unavailable, depending upon the category from which each stimulus was taken.
Thus the onset of a ‘clearly negative’ stimulus during discrimination training could
have been regarded as a signal that reward would not be available for another
70-sec.  If this were the case, then the control of responding across each stimulus
pair in the modified test procedure could have been controlled primarily by the
negative stimulus of each pair; if the stimulus is ‘clearly negative’, the subject may
have learned that reward is unlikely until at least 70-sec had passed.
Investigation of the overall response rate to each of the stimulus pairs was done by
calculating the mean response rate over the combined 60-sec of presentation.  This
is equivalent to the arithmetic mean of the response rates to each of the two stimuli
within that pair, shown in Figure 2.9 by the columns.  These data showed a more
orderly pattern than that obtained from discrimination ratios across each pair; a
pattern of a minimum in responding at a point further from the category boundary
than the Prototype, and an increase in responding beyond this point. This is exactly
the pattern that would be predicted by a peak shift account if the behaviour was
being primarily controlled by the first presented (negative) stimulus of each pair.
Therefore, although these data are clearly not sufficient support for the claim that
the pattern of results found in Experiment 1 is best characterised in terms of the
peak shift, there is some encouragement that such support could well be found
using a different test procedure.
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A further study was thus planned, again using the five test exemplars of each
category.  The problem of how to test all ten stimuli in extinction was resolved by
only testing the five test exemplars from each subject’s positive category.
Significant control by the positive test stimuli has been clearly demonstrated in the
previous experiments, whereas control by the negative stimuli has not, although
this may be due to floor effects from the very low response rates to the negative
test exemplars.  By using only the five positive test exemplars, the test session can
be kept as similar as possible to the previous experiments in which the advantage
for the Further exemplars over the Prototypes has been demonstrated.
Experiment 2 was also designed to investigate a separate issue, namely the overlap
of the training stimuli in each category on the two dimensions of variability.  The
analysis of the experiments presented thus far has been in terms of the physical
variation of the stimuli along these dimensions.  Although previous studies have
shown that pigeons are capable of discriminating on the basis of (and are therefore
capable of representing) both the length (e.g. Fields, Reeve, Adams & Verhave,
1991; Fujita, Blough & Blough, 1993), and rotational angle (e.g. Hearst, 1968;
Honig, Boneau, Burstein & Pennypacker, 1963; Bloomfield, 1967) of lines, it is
possible that only one of these two attributes of the wedge stimuli was controlling
responding in the studies reported thus far.
The analysis I presented of the results of Experiment 1, in which the test exemplars
were described in terms of their relationship to the two Prototypes, would be
unjustified if the pigeons were representing the stimuli as varying along only one of
these two dimensions.  If the stimuli were represented as varying only along the
length dimension, for example, then the problem would reduce to that illustrated in
Figure. 2.10. The positive and negative exemplars with intermediate, or
overlapping, values on the ‘visible’ dimension are indistinguishable.  All stimuli in
this range will thus be effectively rewarded on a VI 60-sec schedule (i.e.
intermixed VI 30-sec and extinction trials) as the overlapping values of each
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dimension occur equally often in the two categories.  This would mean that the
two ‘always positive’ and ‘always negative’ categories that could be distinguished
by the subjects, as defined by VI 30-sec vs. extinction reinforcement contingencies,
are not equivalent to category 1 and category 2 as designated by the experimental
analyses above.  These two categories now involve only 9 of the 12 exemplars
from each training set, and the ‘Prototype’ is not in fact the central tendency of
these 9.  Rather, the ‘most typical’ stimulus from each of these single-dimension
categories (marked as S+ and S- lines on Figure 2.10) would be that of an
exemplar that was moved ‘away’ from the Prototype, i.e. a Further exemplar.
Although it seems most unlikely that the subjects in Experiment 1 were responding
purely on the basis of one dimension, given their very accurate discrimination of
the training stimuli, this would represent nothing other than the limit of a case in
which one of the two dimensions of variability is very much more salient than the
other.  It did, therefore, seem important to control for this possibility, and a second
condition was introduced in Experiment 2 which involved training on a slightly
different set of training exemplars.  These exemplars were smaller distortions of
the same Prototypes, chosen in such a way as to ensure that there was no overlap
between the exemplars of the two categories on either dimension.  In this
condition, the issue of whether variation of both the length and the angle of the
wedge stimuli were controlling behaviour is irrelevant;  the categories are linearly
separable on each of the two dimensions.
As the categories are in this case both symmetrical and separable, my analysis of
the test exemplars as ‘Prototypes’, ‘Closer’, and ‘Further’ exemplars would be
justified even if the subjects were representing only the length, or only the angle, of
the training stimuli.
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Experiment 2
Subjects & Apparatus
The subjects were 16 pigeons, who had had previous experimental training on a
two-choice discrimination, run in different operant chambers with stimuli quite
different from those used in the present experiment.   The pigeons were maintained
as described in the General Procedures, except that they each received two daily
sessions separated by approximately 3hrs (both within the light half of the
illumination cycle). The apparatus was exactly as described in the General
Procedures, with the exception that the control system was again replaced by an
Acorn A5000 computer running Paul Fray Ltd’s  ARACHNID.
Stimuli
The training sets for half the birds (group 1) were identical to those described in
the General Procedures. The training stimuli for the other birds (group 2) were
taken from the same two categories, but were lesser distortions of the Prototypes.
The group 2 training stimuli are shown by the triangle symbols in Figure 2.11, with
the original (group 1) training stimuli shown by the shaded squares. For birds in
group 2 there was thus considerably less variability within each category, and no
overlap between the categories on either the length or angle dimensions.
Figure 2.11 also illustrates the test stimuli used in this experiment. There were five
stimuli from each category. These consisted of a Closer exemplar, the Prototype
and three Further exemplars which were progressive distortions of the Prototype
away from the other category. The Further exemplars were labelled  ‘F’, ‘FF’ and
‘FFF’. Exemplar ‘F’, the Prototype and the Closer exemplar were the three test
exemplars of each category described in the General Procedures.
Only the five test stimuli from their positive category were presented to each bird,
and the same test stimuli were used for both groups.  For half of the birds in each
group, stimuli from category 1 were positive, and stimuli from category 2 were
positive for the remaining half.
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Procedure
Preliminary training was as described in the General Procedures, with the trial
duration reduced to 40-sec. The autoshaping stimulus was also changed; during
autoshaping and warm-up trials the response key was illuminated by a plain white
screen. The warm-up trial used at the start of subsequent sessions was the same as
that used described in Experiment 2, with the first response to the presentation of
the stimulus producing a reward, and terminating the warm-up trial.
The discrimination sessions for both groups of birds were exactly as described in
the General Procedures, with the trial duration reduced to 40-sec. Discrimination
performance was again evaluated by calculation of discrimination ratios. These
were calculated in a slightly different way to Experiment 1, due to the shorter trial
duration. All responses to the positive and negative stimuli were used,  and DRs
were estimated by the following:
(Total S+ presentation time * Positive pecks) /
(Total pecks * S+ presentation time when food was unavailable)
Training continued for up to 24 sessions, depending on the birds’ individual
performances.  Birds were transferred to the test sessions after they had achieved a
criterion of two sessions with DRs above 0.7, or, if this criterion was not reached
within 12 sessions of training,  following the first session with a DR above 0.7.
All birds received two test sessions, of 49 trials each. The first 24 trials were
identical to the first half of a discrimination training session. After these trials, 5
blocks of 5 test trials were given in extinction. The order of the stimuli within each
block of five trials was taken from a different pseudo-random sequence prepared
for each bird,  to counterbalance the effects of extinction over the session.
Results
Three birds reached criterion before the end of 24 sessions: two from group 2, and
one from group 1. For all three birds the stimuli from category 2 were positive.
Equipment failure during a test session resulted in test data not being collected for
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one bird (group 1, category 1).  The test results recorded from the remaining
fifteen birds are shown in Figure 2.12, panel A.  Prior to analysis,  the data from
five birds were excluded, since these birds failed to show clear evidence of having
reliably acquired the discrimination;  the excluded birds failed to discriminate with
mean DR > 0.55 on the final two training sessions.  Two of these birds were in
group 1, both with category 2 positive. The three other excluded birds were from
group 2, and were all trained with category 1 stimuli as positive.
Figure 2.12, panel B,  shows the response rates to each stimulus type by the ten
birds who had successfully learned the discrimination (mean DR on final training
session = 0.63).  The pattern of responding to the Prototypes, Closer and Further
exemplars in both groups clearly bears out the prediction made by the peak shift
account; responding increased with movement from the Prototypes away from the
other category, reached a maximum, and then decreased.  A preliminary  ANOVA,
with group, positive category and stimulus type as factors, revealed no effect of
either group or category, nor any interaction between these factors (largest
F(4,24) = 1.30). Thus there was no significant difference in responding between
the birds trained on overlapping, variable categories and those trained on less
variable categories with no overlap, nor did this factor interact with stimulus type.
A second ANOVA was thus conducted, with stimulus type as the only (within-
subject) factor.  This revealed a significant main effect of stimulus type
(F(3,29) = 2.88; εH = 0.81). Planned comparisons between mean levels of
responding to the different stimulus types revealed that there was significantly
more responding to the ‘FF’ exemplars than to the Prototypes or the Closer
exemplars (smaller F(1,9) = 5.78). The differences between the response rates to
the ‘F’ Further exemplars and the Prototypes, and between the Prototypes and the
Closer exemplars were both non-significant (larger F(1,9) = 1.35). Here, as in
Experiment 1, there was thus more responding to stimuli on the far side of the
Prototypes than to the Prototypes themselves, although this increase was
significant only for the ‘FF’ exemplars.
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Planned comparisons of the mean response rates to the Further exemplars revealed
that the response rate to the ‘FF’ exemplars was significantly higher than that to
the ‘F’ exemplars (F(1,9) = 7.73), and marginally higher rate than that to the ‘FFF’
exemplars (F(1,9) = 4.38; p < 0.07).  No difference was found between the
response rates to the ‘FFF’ and ‘F’ exemplars (F < 1), and thus the statistical
significance of the ‘peak’ in response rates at the ‘FF’ exemplars could be
evaluated by a comparison of response rates to this exemplar with the mean of the
rates to the ‘FFF’ and ‘F’ exemplars.  This revealed significantly more responding
to the ‘FF’ exemplar than to the adjacent Further exemplars (F(1,9) = 7.36).
Discussion
The results show a peak in responding, further away from the category boundary
than the Prototypes, with less responding to stimuli on either side.  This result is
analogous to the peak shift results typically found in post-discrimination gradients,
and can be explained associatively, that is in terms of interacting gradients of
excitation and inhibition.  The process by which these gradients may occur, and the
representation of variation along a dimension, will be discussed later, and a simple
model based upon one possible analysis will be presented in Chapter 4.
A second conclusion that can be drawn from the results of Experiment 2 concerns
the construction of the two categories as varying along two different perceptual
dimensions.  As outlined above, if the birds trained on the categorisation problem
by Bennett and Mackintosh (1992), and those in Experiment 1, had solved that
problem purely by reference to one of the two dimensions (presumably because
variation along one of those dimensions was less salient than the other and was
therefore overshadowed) the results of these studies could be explained without
reference to the peak shift.
However, the animals in group 2 received a similar problem to that presented in
the earlier studies, in which the categories were fully separated on both
dimensions.  The analysis of the discrimination problem in this condition would be
equivalent whether a subject was responding on the basis of only one, or on the
basis of both, dimensions.  The animals in this condition did not produce a different
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pattern of results, indicating that the overlap of the training sets in the previous
studies was not a critical factor.
Unless the stimuli of Experiment 1 were represented in terms of their positions
along both dimensions, the Prototype test exemplars could not properly be
regarded as the subjective central tendency of each category.  This is equally true
for the stimuli shown to group 1 of Experiment 2, but it is not the case for the
stimuli shown to group 2. Yet no difference was found in the pattern of test
responding between the two groups.  It is therefore possible to conclude that the
original analysis of the results from the Bennett and Mackintosh (1992) study, and
from Experiment 1, was correct; subjects did categorise Further test exemplars
more accurately than the Prototypes.
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Chapter 3                                      Peak Shift and Prototype Effects
3.1 A Failure to Find the Positive Peak Shift
As described in Chapter 2, there was a general tendency in the original Bennett and
Mackintosh study for birds to learn the category discrimination faster if they were
trained with stimuli from category 1 as positive.  One possible account of this
difference is that it was due to the nature of the autoshaping stimulus. This
stimulus, a dark circle on a white background, could quite plausibly have given rise
to more generalised excitation to the stimuli of category 1 than to the stimuli from
category 2.
Experiments 1 & 2, reported in the previous chapter, were conducted using more
‘neutral’ autoshaping stimuli (a black cross and a plain white screen respectively).
The subjects in these experiments showed the opposite tendency, i.e. the
categorisation was learned more rapidly by those who had category 2 positive.
Experiment 3, below, was conducted with a somewhat different autoshaping
regime, using the training stimuli from each subject’s positive category as the
autoshaping stimuli.  The results found were of a rather different pattern from that
which was expected, however, and thus introduce a new theoretical issue.
Experiment 3
Subjects & Apparatus
The subjects were six experimentally naive pigeons, with maintenance, and all
details of apparatus, as described in the General Procedures.
Procedure
Preliminary training was similar to that described in the General Procedures, except
that each autoshaping session consisted of 24 trials, with the positive training set
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used as the autoshaping stimuli.  Each of the 12 stimuli from the bird’s positive
training set was presented twice during an autoshaping session. The trials were in
random order, constrained in such a way that one of the two presentations of each
stimulus occurred in the first half of the session, and the other in the second half.
Thus the first 12 trials of each session consisted of all the stimuli from the positive
set, in random order, and the last 12 trials consisted of the same 12 stimuli in a
different random order.
Four autoshaping sessions were given, after which the subjects were given three
sessions of VI training.  The VI training sessions consisted of 24 trials, consisting
of two 60-sec presentations of each of the 12 stimuli from the positive training set,
ordered in the same manner as the trials in the autoshaping sessions.
Reinforcement was available on a VI 10-sec schedule during each trial on the first
of these sessions, and on a VI 30-sec schedule for the next two sessions.
The discrimination sessions were exactly as described in the General Procedures,
except that no warm-up trial was given at the start of the session.  Once the birds
reached a criterion of DR > 0.75 for three consecutive days, or had completed 20
days of training, they were given two test sessions.  The test sessions were exactly
as described in the General Procedures.
Results
Two birds reached the discrimination criterion before the end of the 20 training
sessions.  The first, who was tested after 14 training sessions, had category 1 as
positive during training, and the other, tested after 15 sessions, had category 2
positive.  One of the four remaining birds, for whom category 1 was positive,
failed to discriminate reliably (as measured by DR > 0.55) by the end of training
(mean DR on last 2 training sessions = 0.53), and was excluded from the remaining
analyses.  The mean DRs on the final training session were 0.67 for the remaining
two birds with category 1 positive, and  0.63 for the three category 2 positive
birds.
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Figure 3.1 shows the performance on test trials, in terms of the discrimination
ratios (calculated as in Experiment 1) for the three test stimulus pairs.  Analysis
was conducted by means of an ANOVA, with category as a between-subject
factor, and stimulus type as a within-subject factor, on the (arcsine transformed)
discrimination ratios.  This analysis revealed a significant effect of stimulus type
(F(2,6) = 7.11), but no significant effect of category (F<1) or interaction between
the two factors (F(2,6) = 1.30). Planned comparisons between the means of the
transformed DRs revealed significantly better discrimination between the Further
exemplars than between the Closer exemplars (F(1,3) = 10.97).  The
discrimination between the Prototypes did not differ significantly from that
between either the Further or the Closer exemplars (larger F(1,3) = 4.55;
p > 0.10).
These results are similar to those found in both Experiment 1, and the original
Bennett and Mackintosh study.  However, as can be seen in Figure 3.2, the
analysis of the results in terms of response rates to each of the different stimulus
types revealed a very different pattern. Although the pattern of responding to the
negative stimuli suggested a negative peak shift, with greatest responding to the
negative Closer exemplars and least to the negative Further exemplars, there was a
quite different pattern of responding to the positive test stimuli.  The positive
Prototypes, rather than the positive Further exemplars, received the most
responding.
Analysis of the response rates was conducted as before, by means of separate
ANOVAs for the positive and negative stimuli, each with positive category and
stimulus type as factors.  The ANOVA on the response rates to the positive stimuli
revealed a significant effect of stimulus (F(2,6) = 12.93), but not of category
(F(1,3) = 1.14), and a marginal interaction between the two factors
(F(2,6) = 4.51).   A simple effects analysis of this interaction revealed that the
effect of stimulus was significant for birds with category 2 positive
(F(2,6) = 20.31), but not for the two birds for whom category 1 was positive
(F < 1).
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Planned comparisons of the mean response rates to the different stimuli revealed
significantly more responding to the positive Prototypes than to the positive Closer
exemplars (F(1,3) = 33.13), and marginally more responding to the Further
exemplars than to the Closer exemplars (F(1,4) = 6.67; p < 0.09).  The difference
between the response rates to the Prototypes and the Further exemplars was not in
the predicted direction, and a Scheffé test revealed no significant difference
between these two exemplars (F(2,3) = 2.44).
The analysis of the responding to the negative stimuli was conducted in the same
way. The ANOVA performed the response rates to the negative stimuli, with
category and stimulus type as factors,  revealed no significant main effects or
interaction (largest F(2,6) = 1.36).
Discussion
The results of this experiment are in sharp contrast to those reported in the
previous chapter. Although the advantage for the Further exemplars over the
Prototypes was maintained in discrimination performance, there was no suggestion
of a higher rate of responding to the positive Further exemplars than to the positive
Prototypes. Rather, although it was not significant, the trend was clearly in the
opposite direction;  the positive Prototypes were more strongly responded to than
the positive Further exemplars. What explanation can be offered for this
difference?
One possibility is that this is an appearance of a genuine ‘prototype effect’, that is
of better categorisation of the hitherto unseen central tendency of a category than
of other test exemplars. However, whilst the positive Prototypes elicited the best
performance, i.e. the most responding, the negative Prototypes did not elicit the
least responding.  Any ‘prototype effect’ that occurred during this experiment is
thus restricted to the positive category for each subject.  The obvious difference
between the treatment of the two categories, as well as the main difference
between this experiment and those in the previous chapter, was the use of the
positive training set in the non-discriminatory pre-training.
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Reinforced presentations of the positive training set, in the absence of the negative
set, presumably led to the formation of associations between these stimuli and the
representation of food reward.  Since the positive Prototype is the central tendency
of the 12 positive stimuli, this could have resulted in this stimulus acquiring more
generalised associative strength than the other two positive test stimuli.  This
would thus be an example of a prototype effect, with the central tendency of the
category of stimuli being capable of eliciting more responding, i.e. better
categorisation performance, than non-prototypical stimuli.  As discussed in
Chapter 1, above, such effects have been widely reported in other studies of
categorisation using human subjects and, more recently, with pigeon subjects.
If the pre-training regime employed in this study did produce such a prototype
effect, and this effect was relatively robust, it is plausible that it could mask the
later peak shift effect which would otherwise have produced greater responding to
the positive Further exemplars during the test sessions (as found in
Experiments 1 & 2). The advantage of the Further exemplars on discrimination
performance can be explained by the negative peak shift, i.e. lower response rates
to the negative Further exemplars than to the negative Prototypes.  This
explanation would then regard the results of this study as an interaction between
two effects: the prototype effect caused by non-discriminatory pre-training, and the
peak shift caused by discriminatory training.
3.2 The ‘Prototype Effect’
The first stage in evaluating the explanation of the results from Experiment 3 as an
interaction of two different effects, must involve showing that the different types of
training, when given in isolation, will produce the effects attributed to them.  The
result of discriminatory training has already been shown, in Experiments 1 & 2, to
be a peak shift, with the Further exemplars eliciting more differential responding
than the Prototypes. What is needed, therefore, is a study to confirm that the non-
discriminatory pre-training used in this study can produce the ‘prototype effect.’
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A study was conducted to investigate this possibility, in which six birds were given
identical pre-training to that given to the subjects in Experiment 3.  When these
animals were responding reliably to the 12 stimuli from their positive training set
on a VI 30-sec schedule, they were given two test sessions. These consisted of a
60-sec presentation of each of the 12 training stimuli on the same VI 30-sec
schedule, followed by 12 test trials in extinction, during which the three stimuli
from the test set of that category were presented in four randomised order blocks.
The birds responded marginally more strongly to the Prototypes (57.0 responses
per minute) than to the Further (56.4 responses per minute) or the Closer
exemplars (53.5 responses per minute).
Although the overall pattern of results found was (just) that of the ‘prototype
effect’, with the Prototype of the reinforced stimuli being responded to at a higher
rate than either of the other test exemplars, this effect was not significant.
Inspection of the performance of the subjects across the test trials indicated very
rapid extinction, with a great deal more responding to the first presentation of each
of the test stimuli than to the later test trials.   This indicates that the pattern of
results found must be regarded as possibly artifactual; the stimuli were presented in
a random order, and any non-significant trend in the data could merely be due to
the effect of extinction across trials.
Experiment 4 was therefore a replication of this study, with minor procedural
changes intended to make the test results more reliable.  The animals were trained
on a leaner VI schedule which, it was hoped, would reduce the rate at which
responding would extinguish during the test session.  The order of presentation of
the test stimuli within each block of trials was controlled, rather than generated
purely at random, to counterbalance as much as possible the effects of extinction
across trials.
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Experiment 4
Subjects & Apparatus
The subjects were eight experimentally naive pigeons. All maintenance and
apparatus details were as described in the General Procedures. The birds were
divided at random into 2 groups which would determine which category of stimuli
they would receive.
Procedure
The subjects were given extended preliminary training, similar to that given in
Experiment 3.  The autoshaping sessions consisted of 24 trials, each trial being
conducted in the same way as the autoshaping trials described in the General
Procedures. The first autoshaping sessions were conducted with a plain white
illumination of the key during trials.  As soon as a bird made more than 12
responses during a session, the stimuli for the subsequent sessions were changed to
the positive training set. Autoshaping sessions continued using these stimuli,
ordered as described in Experiment 3, until the birds were pecking reliably (as
measured by three sessions during which more than 20 responses were recorded).
Following autoshaping, the birds were trained to respond on a VI schedule, as
described in the General Procedures, which was lengthened over a number of
sessions until the birds were responding to a VI 60-sec schedule.  The birds were
then given 14 sessions, each consisting of 24 trials, each trial lasting 60-sec with a
10-sec ITI, on this VI 60-sec schedule.  The same stimuli, namely the 12 training
stimuli from the relevant category, were used, ordered as before.
The birds were then given two identical test sessions, each consisting of 24 trials.
These sessions were constructed in a way similar to that described in the General
Procedures, with the first half being the 12 stimuli from the training set, in random
order, with reward available on the same VI 60-sec schedule that was used in
training.  The following 12 trials consisted of  four presentations of each of the
three stimuli  from the test set of the trained category, in pseudo-random order to
counterbalance the effects of extinction over the test trials.
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Results
The mean response rates to the three test stimuli are shown in Figure 3.3, panel A.
Responding was greatest to the Prototypes, with similar, and somewhat lower,
levels of responding to the Closer and Further exemplars.  For the purposes of
statistical analysis, the response rate to the Prototypes was compared to the mean
response rate to the other two (Closer and Further) exemplars.  The right-hand
panel (B) of Figure 3.3 shows the mean response rate to the Prototypes and to the
other exemplars, for each of the four trial blocks, averaged across the two test
sessions.  The Prototypes were responded to at a higher rate in all blocks, with a
marked reduction in responding across the test trials within each session.
Analysis of responding was again carried out by means of an ANOVA, conducted
on the response rates to the Prototypes and the mean rates to the other test
exemplars, with category as a between-subject factor, and test session, trial block
and stimulus type as within-subject factors. This analysis revealed significant main
effects of trial block and stimulus type (smaller F(1,6) = 6.99), but no effect of
category or test day (Fs < 1), nor any significant interactions (largest F(1,6) =
3.06).
Discussion
The results of this study confirm that the excitatory pre-training, in the form of
autoshaping and VI training to the positive category, produced greater associative
strength generalising to the central tendency of the pre-trained stimuli (the
Prototypes) than to the other novel stimuli (Further and Closer exemplars).  The
training regime was not identical to the pre-training regime used in Experiment 3,
in which the animals were given less extensive training on the 12 exemplars from
their positive training set, on a richer (VI 30-sec) schedule.  A further analysis,
combining the results from Experiment 4 with the study described above (in which
the training was identical to that in Experiment 3) was carried out, to confirm that
the pattern of results did not differ significantly when the VI schedule used during
training was altered.  This was done by means of an ANOVA, again comparing
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response rates to the Prototypes with the mean response rates to the other test
exemplars, with replication and category as between-subject factors, and test day,
trial block and stimulus type as within-subject factors.  This analysis revealed
significant overall effects of stimulus type and trial block only (smaller
F(1,10) = 5.80), and no significant interactions involving the stimulus type factor
(largest F(1,10) = 3.30).
It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the pre-training in Experiment 3 would
indeed have caused a prototype effect, with generalised excitation being greatest to
the positive Prototypes. This gives credence to the explanation offered above for
the failure of Experiment 3 to replicate the positive peak shift pattern found in
Experiments 1 & 2.  The procedure of Experiment 3 can be divided into non-
discriminatory pre-training (leading to a positive prototype effect, as in
Experiment 4), followed by discrimination training (producing the peak shift, as in
Experiments 1 & 2).  The test results of Experiment 3 could thus be regarded as a
‘summation’ of these two results, with the positive prototype effect masking the
peak shift on the positive test stimuli.
To test whether this analysis is reasonable, some modelling was undertaken in the
form of an implementation of an ‘elemental associationist’ account of pigeons’
performance on these categorisation tasks. A simple connectionist model was
constructed, within which the stimuli were represented as overlapping patterns of
activation in a population of input units, in a similar manner to that proposed by
Blough (1975), and by Shanks’ (1991) in a demonstration of ‘exemplar effects’
within an associative network. Learning was implemented by the individual
elements of a stimulus entering into independent associations with the outcome of
each learning trial.
The construction of this model, and the results of a series of simulations, will be
reported in detail in Chapter 4, below.  It is worth stating here, however, that when
the model was trained in an analogous way to the training regimes used in
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Experiments 1 to 4, it was able to simulate not only the peak shift result from
discrimination training, but also the prototype effect from non-discriminatory
training, and the results found in Experiment 3, following a combination of non-
discriminatory pre-training and discrimination training. Thus it seems that an
account of generalisation based on excitation and inhibition accruing to the
individual elements that make up each stimulus is sufficient to explain the results
found thus far.
The next stage of investigation to be undertaken was based on a simple premise: If
the positive peak shift can be masked by a pre-training procedure that results in an
excitatory generalisation gradient centred around the positive Prototype (i.e. a
‘positive prototype effect’), without thereby affecting any negative peak shift,
would a symmetrical result be found following inhibitory pre-training to the 12
stimuli of  the negative category?  Such inhibitory training should, presumably,
produce maximum inhibition to the central tendency of the negative set, i.e. a
‘negative prototype effect’.  Would this then abolish the trend towards the negative
peak shift found in Chapter 2, without affecting a positive peak shift, if the birds
were subsequently trained to discriminate between the two categories?
3.3 ‘Negative Prototype Effects’
The predictions derivable from my analysis are as follows:
The positive peak shift should be unaffected by inhibitory pre-training involving
only the 12 stimuli from the negative category.  The positive stimuli are not
presented during such pre-training, and any generalised inhibition from the pre-
trained negative stimuli would be in the direction of the positive peak shift.
The negative peak shift should, however, be reduced or removed by such
inhibitory pre-training, as inhibition from the pre-trained stimuli will generalise
more to the negative Prototypes than to the negative Further exemplars.
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Thus a pattern of results somewhat like an ‘upside-down’ version of the
Experiment 3 results would be anticipated; the positive peak shift should be found,
as in Experiments 1 & 2, but the negative peak shift should be reduced or removed
entirely.  In order to test these predictions, an inhibitory pre-training regime is
needed.  A simple solution is to use the negative stimuli as the S- in an extra-
dimensional discrimination, i.e. a discrimination in which the S+ differs from the
negative training stimuli along a different dimension from those differentiating
between the positive and negative categories. The following experiments describe
two attempts to achieve an inhibitory prototype effect using this type of procedure.
Very low rates of responding to the negative test stimuli were found in the
previous studies, during which the negative training exemplars were presented as
S- trials in a VI 30-sec | EXT schedule.  If the inhibitory pre-training was
conducted such that the negative training stimuli were presented on the S- trials of
a VI 30-sec | EXT schedule prior to categorisation training, even lower rates of
responding could result, and thus any variation in responding across the negative
test exemplar would be presumably masked by a ‘floor effect’.
Previous studies with pigeons have shown that a multiple schedule with richer and
leaner VIs to the S+ and S- respectively, can produce both positive and negative
peak shifts (Guttman, 1959; Terrace 1968) and extra-dimensional inhibitory
gradients around the S- (Weisman, 1969).  It was hoped that this type of schedule
would lead to a greater level of responding to the negative training and test stimuli
than was found in the previous studies, and thus allow any variation in responding
to the negative test stimuli to be observed.
Experiment 5
Subjects & Apparatus
The subjects were eight pigeons with previous experimental training on a two-
choice discrimination, run in different operant chambers with stimuli quite different
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from those used in the present experiment. The control system described in
Experiment 2 was used in place of that described in the General Procedures.  As
before, for half of the birds (selected at random), the stimuli from category 1 were
positive, whereas for the other half, the category 2 stimuli were positive.
Procedure
Preliminary training was as described in the General Procedures, with the response
key illuminated by a plain white screen during autoshaping trials, as in Experiment
2. The warm-up trials at the start of each subsequent session also followed the
pattern used in Experiment 2, with up to five 30-sec presentations of the white
screen, terminated by the first peck response.  The birds were not, however,
moved on to a discrimination phase as soon as they were responding reliably on
the VI 30-sec schedule. All subjects were given extended preliminary training, in
the form of ten sessions of VI 30-sec training to the white screen, with 30 trials in
each session.
After completing the preliminary training, the birds were moved on to Phase 1 of
the experiment, a multiple VI schedule discrimination between the white screen
and the negative category. The Phase 1 sessions were similar to the discrimination
sessions described in the General Procedures, except that the stimuli on positive
trials were replaced by the ‘white screen’ illumination of the response key, and
negative trials were reinforced on a VI 180-sec schedule.  Each session thus
consisted of 48 trials: 24 presentations of the white screen on a VI 30-sec
schedule, and 24 presentations of the negative training exemplars on a VI 180-sec
schedule. In this phase of the experiment, the stimuli from each bird’s positive
category were not presented.
The trials were ordered with the same logic as in the discrimination sessions
described in the General Procedures.  The first 24 trials were made up of 12 white
screen trials and one presentation of each of the 12 training exemplars from the
negative category, in randomized order; the second  24 trials were a repeat of the
first 24 trials, in a different randomized order.  It was hoped that this training
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regime would result in an inhibitory gradient around the negative Prototypes
analogous to the excitatory prototype effect that was found in Experiments 4 & 5.
To investigate this, the subjects were given three test sessions following the 10
sessions of the Phase 1 discrimination.  These sessions consisted of 36 trials, the
first 24 of which were identical to the first 24 trials of the previous multiple VI
schedule sessions.  The final 12 trials of the test sessions were made up of four
presentations of each of the three exemplars from the test set of the negative
category.  These 12 trials were in extinction, and the test stimuli were presented in
a controlled pseudo-random order, to counterbalance effects of extinction across
trials.
Following these test sessions, the birds were moved on to Phase 2, during which
they were trained on a discrimination between the two categories. This
discrimination was not, however, a VI|EXT discrimination as used in the previous
experiments, but rather the multiple VI|VI discrimination schedule used in Phase 1.
These sessions were the same as the discrimination sessions described in the
General Procedures, except that reward was available for responding to stimuli
from the negative category on a VI 180-sec schedule.  Hence these sessions were
similar to Phase 1 discrimination sessions, with the white screen on positive trials
replaced by presentations of the stimuli from the positive category.
Two birds, one from each category, were responding at very low rates after nine of
these sessions.  In order to increase the responding of these birds, they were given
sessions of modified autoshaping training to the positive training exemplars only.
This training took the form of a 24 trial session, similar to the first ‘positive trial
only’ session of discrimination training described in the General Procedures.
Responding on each trial was rewarded on a VI 30-sec schedule, and a ‘free’
reward was given at the end of any trial on which no response was made.  One
bird, for whom category 2 was positive, continued to respond at a very low rate
even after five sessions of the modified autoshaping procedure, and was discarded.
The other bird to received the modified autoshaping procedure  responded at a
reasonable level after one such session, and therefore continued with the Phase 2
discrimination sessions.
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The birds discriminated more poorly than in previous experiments (see Results
section below), and thus all the birds received a full 20 sessions of the Phase 2
discrimination, after which two test sessions were given.  These were similar to the
test sessions described in the General Procedures, except that reward was available
on a VI 180-sec schedule during the negative trials within the first (discrimination)
half of the session.  Thus the logic of the test sessions was maintained, with the
first half of each session being identical to the first half of the previous training
sessions.
Results
The discussion of these results, including the preliminary stages, excludes the data
from the bird that was discarded during the Phase 2 discrimination.  The subjects
responded at similar rates to the white screen (71.2 pecks per minute) and the
negative training set (51.6 ppm) during the first session of Phase 1 discrimination.
All birds learnt the Phase 1 discrimination well (mean DR on final session = 0.84;
mean response rates = 83.0 ppm to white screen; 18.2 ppm to negative stimuli).
The results of  the first test, Test 1, carried out at the end of the Phase 1
discrimination, are shown in Figure 3.4.  The mean response rates to each of the
three test stimuli during each of the three test sessions are shown by the columns,
and the line graph represents the mean response rate across the three sessions.  It
was hoped that the Phase 1 training regime would produce an inhibitory post-
discrimination gradient around the Prototypes in a manner analogous to excitatory
prototype effect found in Experiments 3 & 4.  However, there was no suggestion
of this effect in the Test 1 data.  An ANOVA on the total responses to each of the
test exemplars, with test session and stimulus type as the two within-subject
factors, was conducted. This revealed no significant effects or interactions (largest
F(2,10) = 1.45).
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The Phase 2 discrimination between the positive and negative training sets, on the
VI 30-sec | VI 180-sec schedule, was not learned well over the 20 training
sessions.  Only one bird, for whom category 2 was positive, attained a DR > 0.7
for a single session, on the twentieth and final day of training. Two of the
remaining birds, both with category 2 positive, failed to discriminate above chance
by the end of training (mean DR < 0.5 on last 2 sessions).
The criterion for reliable discrimination used in all the previous experiments was a
mean DR on the last two training sessions greater than 0.55; two other birds, one
from each category, failed to reach this criterion (mean DR = 0.52). The
reinforcement contingencies were somewhat different in this experiment, however,
with responding to the negative stimuli being occasionally, rather than never,
rewarded.  As a result it was decided to include these birds in the analysis, thus the
results of the final test sessions are based on the data collected from five birds,
three of whom were trained with category 1 positive, and two for whom
category 2 was positive (mean DR on final training session = 0.60).
It would have been inappropriate to analyse performance on Test 2 in terms of
discrimination ratios for each of the test pairs, as was done in Experiments 1 & 2.
Non-symmetrical patterns of responding were anticipated across the positive and
negative test stimuli: the maximum level of responding was predicted to occur at
the positive Further exemplars, whereas the minimum level of responding was
predicted to occur at the negative Prototypes.  Comparison of the DRs for the two
stimulus pairs would thus be impossible to interpret, as this measure combines the
levels of responding to both the positive and negative exemplars.
The results of Test 2, in terms of the response rates to each of the six test
exemplars, are shown in Figure 3.5.  These results did not confirm the predictions:
there was no suggestion of a positive peak shift, nor a negative prototype effect.
On the contrary, the results were similar to those of Experiment 3, with the
maximum level of responding found to the positive Prototypes, and the minimum
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level of responding to the negative Further exemplars.  However, it is also clear
that rates of responding to the negative test stimuli were not very much lower than
those to the positive stimuli.
An analysis was performed, to investigate whether the subjects in this study were
in fact discriminating reliably between the positive and negative test exemplars.
This was done by means of an ANOVA on the mean response rate to each
exemplar, with stimulus type, session and contingency (positive or negative
exemplar) as within-subject factors, and positive category as a between-subject
factor.  This revealed no significant main effects, nor 2-way interactions (largest
F(1,3) = 2.58), but a significant 3-way interaction of the effects of test session,
contingency and stimulus type (F(2,6) = 5.85).  This interaction is difficult to
interpret, and subsequent analyses were conducted for the two test days separately.
These were done by means of two ANOVAs, on the mean response rates to the six
test exemplars on each test day, with contingency (positive or negative) and
stimulus type as within-subject factors. Neither analysis revealed a significant effect
of either factor, nor a significant interaction (largest F(2,8) = 1.94 for day 1; all
Fs < 1 for day 2).
Discussion
The results of both Test 1 and Test 2 were somewhat unlike those that had been
anticipated.  No negative prototype effect was evident after the Phase 1
discrimination, and the results of the final test sessions, although not significant,
were relatively similar to those found in Experiment 3, where excitatory pre-
training was given to the positive category.
How are these results to be interpreted?  The absence of any U-shaped inhibitory
gradients, of the type found by Weisman (1969), around the negative Prototypes
following Phase 1 training, and also of a positive peak shift following the Phase 2
discrimination, could be taken as an indication that the negative training stimuli
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failed to acquire inhibitory control over responding in either phase of
discrimination training.
However, the subjects were in fact discriminating very well between the white
screen and the negative training stimuli (DR > 0.8) at the end of Phase 1, and the
training schedule is very similar to that used by Guttman (1959), in which a
significant positive peak shift was found.  It therefore seems plausible that the
negative training stimuli were indeed functionally ‘inhibitory’ by the end of Phase 1
training, but that this inhibition generalised evenly across all the test stimuli.
One possible explanation for this could have been the ease of the discrimination
between the negative stimuli and the white screen.  The nature of this
discrimination was such that it could have been solved purely on the basis of the
presence or absence of a dark shape on the screen.  In this sense the shape, i.e. the
length and angle, of each wedge was not relevant and as a result may have
acquired little control over responding.  It is plausible, therefore, that any inhibition
that did accrue to the negative stimuli during Phase 1 may have generalised
approximately equally to any dark shape, and thus have produced a flat inhibitory
gradient.
The highest response rate to any of the stimuli in Test 2 was that elicited by the
positive Prototypes, rather than the positive Further exemplars.  This failure to find
the positive peak shift is somewhat surprising, as this effect had been clear in all
previous studies other than Experiment 3, in which the positive stimuli had been
extensively pre-trained.  There are several differences, however, between this study
and those reported earlier in which the  positive peak shift was found.  The most
obvious differences are the Phase 1 pre-training experience that the subjects were
given, and the reward schedule used for the negative stimuli during training of the
Phase 2 discrimination.
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The inhibitory pre-training was not anticipated to alter the pattern of responding
across the positive test stimuli, since excitatory pre-training did not change the
pattern of responding to the negative test stimuli in Experiment 3.  The change in
training schedule from VI | EXT to multiple VI 30-sec | VI 180-sec, is a potential
explanation for the difference in results.  However, the discrimination performance
of the subjects at the end of Phase 2 training (mean DR = 0.60) was comparable to
that found in Experiments 1 & 2, as well as the Bennett and Mackintosh study.
A replication of Experiment 5 was therefore conducted, with some procedural
modifications.  The extra-dimensional discrimination in Phase 1, designed to make
the negative training stimuli functionally inhibitory, was altered so as to make it
more difficult, and the Phase 2 discrimination was conducted using the VI 30-sec |
EXT schedule used in Experiments 1 & 2.
Experiment 6
Subjects & Apparatus
The subjects were eight pigeons with previous experimental training on a two-
choice discrimination, run in different operant chambers with stimuli quite different
from those used in the present experiment. The control system described in
Experiment 2 was used in place of that described in the General Procedures.  The
subjects were given two experimental sessions per day, separated by approximately
3hrs, both of which were within the light half of the illumination cycle.
Procedure
The preliminary training was similar to that described in the General Procedures,
except that the stimulus displayed during autoshaping and preliminary VI training
trails was a ‘stubby’ cross shape, as shown in Figure 3.6. This stimulus was also
used in warm-up trials at the start of every session, which were otherwise identical
to those given in Experiments 2 & 5.  After the subjects were responding reliably
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on the VI 30-sec schedule, they were given a further six sessions of VI 30-sec
training, with the same ‘cross’ stimulus presented on each trial.
The aim of the Phase 1 discrimination, as in Experiment 5, was to produce an
inhibitory gradient around the Prototype of the negative category prior to
discrimination training.  In order for this effect to be demonstrated, the amount of
generalized excitation from the positive stimulus (the cross) to the negative stimuli
must be evaluated.  For this reason, a single preliminary test session was given
prior to the Phase 1 discrimination.  This test session was 24 trials long, the first 12
of which were presentations of the cross shape, with reward available on a VI 30-
sec schedule.  The final 12 trials were 4 presentations of each of the three test
stimuli from the negative category, in extinction.  These 12 trials were ordered
with the same logic as the test trials described in the General Procedures, i.e. in
four blocks of three trials.  The order of the trials in each block were taken from a
pseudo-random sequence to control for the effects of exctinction.
The birds were then trained on a VI 30-sec | VI 180-sec discrimination between
the cross stimulus and the stimuli from the negative training set.  These sessions
were identical to the Phase1 discrimination sessions described in Experiment 5,
with the cross stimulus replacing the white screen on all VI 30-sec trials.  Each
subject received ten sessions of this type, and then two test sessions to investigate
any inhibitory gradient around the negative prototype.  These test sessions were
identical to the Phase 1 test sessions given in Experiment 5, with the cross stimulus
again substituted for the white screen on positive training trials.
There was a trend (see Results section, below) of higher response rates to the test
trials during the second of these test sessions than during the first, an effect that is
somewhat surprising given that the test trials were all conducted in extinction.
However, this could have been due to the fact that the birds received two
experimental sessions per day, and the first of these two test sessions occurred as
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the second session of one experimental day, with the second being the earlier
session of the following day.
Following the Phase 1 test sessions, the subjects were trained on the discrimination
between the positive and negative training stimuli.  These Phase 2 sessions were
exactly as described in the General Procedures section, with presentations of the
negative stimuli now being in extinction, rather than rewarded on the VI 180-sec
schedule used in Phase 1.  Fifteen sessions of this discrimination training were
given, after which the birds were given two Test 2 sessions, involving
presentations of all six test exemplars.  These sessions were as described in the
General Procedures section, with the exception of the warm-up procedure.  Test 2
sessions were conducted on separate days, and were the only experimental sessions
that the subjects received on those days.
Results
Two of the birds, both from category 1 (i.e. trained with category 2 negative),
failed to learn the Phase 1 discrimination between the cross and negative training
set (DR < 0.55 on the final day of Phase 1 training), and were thus excluded from
the following analyses.
The mean response rates to the positive (cross) stimuli and the negative training
stimuli on the first day of Phase 1 were 59.3 pecks per minute, and 56.7 pecks per
minute, respectively.  On the final day of Phase 1 training, the rate to the positive
stimulus had increased to 68.2 pecks per minute, and that to the negative stimuli
had reduced to 25.6 pecks per minute (mean DR on final day of training = 0.74).
The performance on the test sessions before and after the Phase 1 training are
shown in Figure 3.7. The columns represent the response rates to the three test
stimuli on the Test 1 sessions, with the responses during session 1 shown by the
unshaded columns, and those during session 2 shown by the shaded columns.  For
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the purposes of analysis, the response rates to each of the stimuli during these two
sessions were combined, and their means compared with the response rates to the
same stimuli during the pre-test session.  This comparison is shown by the two line
graphs in Figure 3.7.  The open squares represent the mean response rates during
the Test 1 sessions, and the filled circles represent the response rates to each
stimulus during the pretest session.
The analysis of these data was conducted via an ANOVA on the mean response
rates during the test trials, with test (before or after Phase 1) and stimulus type as
the two within-subject factors.  The data from one of the ten birds were not
included, as this subject responded at a very low rate throughout all three test
sessions, making only one response to any of the extinction test trials.  The analysis
revealed no effect of either factor, nor any interaction between them (Fs < 1).
Thus Phase 1 training, during which the negative stimuli were ‘inhibitory’ (in the
sense that responses to them were rewarded at a much lower rate than the birds
had previously experienced in the same context), produced no evidence of an
inhibitory gradient around the Prototype of these stimuli.
One subject, for whom category 2 was positive, reached the discrimination
criterion of 2 sessions with DR > 0.70 after 13 sessions, and was tested the
following day.  Two of the remaining nine birds, for both of whom category 2 was
positive, failed to learn the discrimination to the minimum criterion used in
Experiments 1-3 (mean DR on last 2 training sessions > 0.55) within the 15
training sessions.  The subsequent analyses are based on the eight subjects (four
from each category) who learned the discrimination successfully (mean DR on final
training session = 0.65).
The results of Test 2 are shown in Figure 3.8; the columns represent the response
rates during Session 1 (unshaded columns) and Session 2 (shaded columns), with
the mean response rates shown by the line graph.  The overall pattern was similar
to the results of Experiments 3 & 5 (most responding to the positive Prototypes,
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and least to the negative Further exemplars).  There was, however, a slight trend in
Session 2 for the positive Further exemplars to be responded to at a higher rate
than the positive Prototypes.
The first analysis of the response rates was conducted by means of an ANOVA,
with category as a between-subject factor and contingency (i.e. positive or
negative stimulus), test session, and stimulus type as three within-subject factors.
This revealed a significant effect of reward contingency (F(1,6) = 10.46) but no
other effects or interactions (largest F(1,6) = 2.91).  Thus the birds were
discriminating reliably between the positive and negative test stimuli during Test 2.
Analyses of the response rates to the positive and negative stimuli were carried out
by means of separate ANOVAs, each with test session and  stimulus type as the
two within-subjects factors. Neither analysis revealed any significant effects or
interactions (largest F(1,9) = 2.95; εG = 0.63).
Discussion
The aim of the Phase 1 training was to produce a negative prototype effect, i.e. an
inhibitory gradient around the negative Prototypes.  This effect, if produced by the
training regime, would presumably be manifest as lower response rates to the
Prototypes than to the other test exemplars during the two Test 1 sessions, but not
during the pre-test session.  There was no suggestion of any such result in the data.
The analysis of the Test 2 sessions revealed no significant interaction between the
effects of stimulus type and session, and therefore the trend towards the positive
peak shift in the second of these sessions can be disregarded.  Thus, although the
birds were able to discriminate between the positive and negative stimuli, there was
no tendency for the positive Further exemplars to be responded to at a greater rate
than the positive Prototypes.  These animals, although having been trained on, and
having learned at least as reliably, the same discrimination as that learned by the
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subjects in Experiments 1 & 2, failed to show the positive peak shift found in those
studies.  Combined with the results of Experiment 5, this suggests that one effect
of the inhibitory pre-training used in these experiments is the abolition of the
positive peak shift.
The explanation offered for the abolition of the positive peak shift in Experiment 3
was that excitatory pre-training on the 12 stimuli from the positive category
produced a pattern of responding across the positive test stimuli  (a ‘prototype
effect’) that masked the development of a peak shift.  No significant pattern of
responding was found across the negative test stimuli as a result of the pre-training
in either Experiment 5 or 6, and thus it is unlikely that a pattern of generalised
inhibition across the positive test stimuli was produced by this training.
It is of course possible that the Phase 1 pre-training did result in U-shaped
inhibitory gradients, although these were too ‘shallow’ to be detected by the test
trials involving the negative test stimuli, or were masked by floor effects.
However, these gradients should have been in the same direction as the positive
peak shift, with the positive Prototype eliciting less generalised inhibition than the
positive Further exemplar.  Thus the explanation offered for the lack of positive
peak shift in Experiment 3, i.e. that pre-training on one category produced a
prototype effect which was sufficient to mask the positive peak shift, is clearly
insufficient to account for the results from Experiments 5 & 6.
Guttman (1959) found a peak shift following training on a VI 60-sec | VI 300-sec
schedule, but subsequent studies (Terrace, 1968; Weisman, 1969) failed to find a
peak shift, or inhibitory gradients, in the majority of subjects following training on
these schedules when the S+ and S- were previously trained on equal VI 300-sec
schedules.  Training on equal VI 60-sec schedules before discrimination training,
so that there was a ‘downshift’ in reward on the S-, rather than an ‘upshift’ in
reward on the S+, did produce both the positive peak shift and inhibitory gradients
around the S-.
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The results of Experiments 5 & 6 can, in some sense, be considered as
complementary  to these findings; pre-training conditions in Phase 1 were such that
all ‘wedge stimuli’ were rewarded on a lean (VI 180-sec) schedule, and the
introduction of the positive training set on the richer (VI 30-sec) schedule can be
regarded as an ‘upshift’ in reinforcement.  It has been established that such an
increase in reinforcement to the S+ does not reliably produce the peak shift
(Terrace, 1968).  However, there was a slight ‘downshift’ in the reward
contingency for the negative stimuli in Experiment 6, although it may well have
been marginal in comparison to the ‘upshift’ that was introduced with the positive
training set. This suggestion fails to account for the results from Experiment 3,
however;  in that procedure there was a clear ‘downshift’ with the introduction of
the negative training set, and yet this was not sufficient  to produce a positive peak
shift.
Terrace (1968) found the positive peak shift was likely to emerge after certain
regimes of multiple VI schedule training, but not following other, similar regimes;
Weisman (1969) subsequently found that extra-dimensional training using those
regimes in which Terrace had found the peak shift were also likely to produce U-
shaped inhibitory gradients around the S-, whereas these gradients were not found
following training on the regimes that had failed to produce a positive peak shift in
Terrace’s (1968) study.
Terrace and Weisman argue that the critical requirement for both these effects to
emerge is that the S- should acquire inhibitory control over responding.  The
circumstances that produce this state of affairs were characterised by Weisman
(1969) as those in which the organism learns not to respond to the S-; he
distinguished this from the effect of another form of discrimination learning,
Terrace’s (1963) ‘errorless’ discrimination learning procedure, where the organism
merely learns to respond to the S+, and learns nothing about the consequences of
responding to the S-.
The idea that such ‘errorless’ learning does not produce inhibitory control by the
S- has not gone unchallenged.  However, consideration of this question is not
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required here; although Phase 2 training could be regarded in this way, the
circumstances that Terrace and Weisman have argued are required for generating
inhibitory control by the negative training stimuli certainly did occur in the Phase 1
sessions of Experiments 5 & 6, during which there was a reduction in responding
to the negative stimuli5.
The discriminatory performance at the end of Phase 2  in both studies was also
similar to that found in previous Experiments.  Any argument that the negative
training stimuli were less ‘inhibitory’ as a result of their pre-training must also
account for the maintenance of good discrimination performance between the
positive and negative stimuli.  Without any inhibitory control by the negative
stimuli, a greater degree of generalised excitation from the positive stimuli, and
hence poorer discrimination performance, would be anticipated.
Can a simple explanation be found for why training on either of the two categories
(and hence contingencies) prior to discrimination training fails to produce the peak
shift?  One such potential explanation can be made if one considers the peak shift
to be a consequence of error-correction within a simple learning system, based on
Pavlovian associations between elements of the positive and negative stimuli and
the representation of reward.  This explanation, and a direct connectionist
implementation of such an analysis, will be discussed in the next chapter.
                                               
5
 The decrease in responding to the negative stimuli in Phase 1 of both Experiments 5 & 6 was
accompanied by a slight  increase in responding to the positive stimuli.  Increases in responding to S+
following a decrease in responding to  S- was first described by Pavlov (1927), and has since been
labelled ‘behavioural contrast’ (e.g. Reynolds, 1961; Terrace 1968; see Honig & Urcuioli, 1981, for
review).  According to Terrace (1969), the changes in response rate to the negative and positive stimuli
could thus  represent a cause and a symptom  of inhibitory stimulus control by the negative stimuli.
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Chapter 4                               An Associative Model of the Peak Shift
Although the peak shift has often been explained in terms of an interaction between
excitatory and inhibitory generalisation gradients of the type suggested by Spence
(1937), it is possible to explain it in terms of the elements of the stimuli entering
into independent associations with reward (Blough, 1975). This type of account is
relatively similar to the earlier accounts, as most elements of the S- become
inhibitory, and most elements of the S+ become excitatory, and the advantage for
stimuli shifted a small distance from the S+ arises from a greater reduction in the
number of inhibitory elements from S- than of excitatory elements from S+.
However, this type of analysis is not equivalent to the ‘interacting gradients’
account:  the amount of generalised excitation and inhibition a novel stimulus will
elicit is not merely dependent upon the proportion of elements it shares with the
S+ and S-, but also upon which elements.  A model was constructed, based upon
this type of analysis, in order to determine whether the results of Experiments 1-6
can be incorporated within an elemental account of discrimination and
categorisation learning.
4.1 Description of the Model
The model is a single layer connectionist network, in which associative
connections between ‘feature units’ and an ‘output unit’ are varied according to a
simple error-correcting procedure. A much simplified schematic of the model is
shown in Figure 4.1 (A). An earlier version of this model has been reported by
Mackintosh (1995) which can account for much of the data described in the
previous experiments.  The stimuli are represented as a pattern of activation across
the feature units, in a manner similar to that described by Shanks (1991).
This produces more similar representations for stimuli that are more physically
similar. The reinforcement of responding to the stimuli is represented by ‘external’
activation of the ‘output unit’.  The ‘output unit’ is also internally activated via the
plastic connections between itself and the currently active ‘feature units’.  On any
given trial, the strengths of these connections are varied in such a way as to reduce
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the difference between the internal and external activations of the output unit.  The
strengths of the connections in the model are altered according to a variant of the
delta rule, or LMS rule (Widrow & Hoff, 1960), which is itself formally equivalent
to the model of Pavlovian conditioning proposed by Rescorla and Wagner (1972).
The internal activation of the output unit represents the degree to which the model
‘anticipates’ reinforcement, given the activation of the feature units, i.e. the
presentation of a stimulus. The value of the activation of the output unit can in turn
be used to predict response rates, with response rate being a (monotonic) function
of activation; greater responding is predicted in response to stimuli that produce a
larger activation of the output unit.  The account of the learning during
discrimination training implemented by this model is very similar to a simple model
of human categorisation learning constructed by Shanks (1991), and also to the
previous modelling work reported in Mackintosh (1995).  There are however some
additional ideas incorporated within this model that are worth noting.
1)  The first major difference is in the way in which stimuli are represented within
this model.  Although the basic representation of dimensional variation is the
activation of neighbouring populations of ‘feature detectors’ (with the stimuli
thus being regarded as composed of overlapping sets of elements), there are
additional feature units that represent elements which are common to stimuli
irrespective of the dimensions along which they vary.  In this way the wedge
stimuli are all represented not only as a combination of length and angle, but
also as having other properties (e.g. solid black on a white background) which
are also capable of mediating generalisation.
 
2)  The model implements the concept of a gradual reduction in associability of
elements that have been frequently presented: a mechanism proposed by
McLaren et al (1989; following Wagner, 1981). They have shown that this
mechanism can account for both latent inhibition (the retardation of learning
about a CS following non-reinforced pre-exposure, see Lubow, 1973),  and
perceptual learning (enhanced discriminibility of familiar stimuli e.g. McLaren,
et al, 1994b; Aitken et al 1996). In this way, unexpected outcomes following a
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partially novel stimulus will result in more ‘learning’ accruing to those elements
that are novel than to those that are familiar.  In order to implement this idea,
each feature unit is given an associability, which is reduced slightly whenever
that unit is activated.
 
3)  The ‘learning’ that occurs on a given trial is divided amongst the active feature
units according to their associabilities.  The feature units can be regarded as
‘competing’ for the learning, with the connections from units representing the
most associable (i.e. least familiar) elements being altered most.
4.2 Operation of the Model
On each learning trial the internal activation of the output unit is given by  ∑Wi . γi,
where Wi is the weight (or strength) of the connection between an active feature
unit i (of salience γi) and the output unit.  The outcome of the trial (reinforcement
or non-reinforcement) determines the external (teaching) activation of the output
unit, λ.
The ‘error’ present in the network on any trial is therefore given by (λ - ∑Wi).
The network learns according to the rule:
δ Wi = γ i . αi . β . (λ - ∑Wi) Equation 1
Where:
 δ Wi is the weight change of the connection between unit i and the output unit,
 γi is the salience of unit i,
αi is the net associability of unit i,
and β is the salience of the outcome.
For simplicity γi was set to 1 for active units and zero for non-active units,
β was set to 1 for reinforcement, and 0.5 for non-reinforcement,
and λ was set to 1 for reinforcement, and 0 for non-reinforcement.
This allows Equation 1 to be simplified, resulting in
δ Wi = αi (1- ∑Wi) Equation 2
for reinforced trials, and
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δ Wi = - 0.5 . αi . ∑Wi Equation 3
for non-reinforced trials.
The associability of any unit is diminished by a factor r with each presentation, and
all the active units ‘compete’ for learning. Thus the associability (ain) of an active
unit i, for the nth trial on which it is present is given by:
ain =  (1-r) . ai (n-1) Equation 4
The net associability of the unit i, on a trial when the total associability of all
features present is ∑ai , is calculated by:
αi = ai / ∑ai Equation 5
ai  started at 1 for first presentation of feature i, and the rate of decrease, r, was set
at 0.001 for all feature units.
4.3 Representation of Stimuli
150 feature units were used, each with a variable strength connection to the output
unit which was altered according to the rules described above.  Each stimulus
presented to the model was represented by activation of a subset of these units,
with more similar stimuli activating more overlapping subsets of units.  The units
were divided into three sets of 50 units: one set which represented the length of a
wedge stimulus, and another which represented the angle (labelled L & A
respectively) and one set of non-dimensional units (X). These non-dimensional
units were added to allow the model to produce both generalisation and
discrimination between the wedges and other ‘non-wedge’ stimuli.
The variation between wedge stimuli is represented in the network by activation of
subsets of dimensional units, depending upon the length and angle of each wedge.
The coding system used for representing the dimensional attributes of length and
angle is taken from a model of human categorisation used by Shanks (1991).  Each
wedge stimulus activated 15 units of the L & A units, according to its value along
the relevant dimension.  Adjacent values of length or angle activated adjacent,
overlapping populations of L & A units.  The coding of the lowest seven values on
the length dimension (in terms of the activation of 21 of the L units) is illustrated
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in Figure 4.1 (B).  The remaining 29 L units were not activated by presentation of
wedge stimuli with these values of radial length.  The encoding of the angle of
each wedge stimulus by the A units was achieved using the same logic.
Each stimulus also activated some of the X units. These units are divided into 3
classes - ‘wedge’ (of which there were 30), ‘non-wedge’ (15) and ‘common’ (5).
These were activated as follows:
‘Wedge’ units were activated on every wedge trial (these mediate generalisation
between wedges irrespective of length and angle).
‘Non wedge’ units were activated only on trials where a wedge stimulus was not
presented, and thus only when extra-dimensional discriminations were
modelled (Experiment 7d).  Activation of these units represented the
features of the non-wedge stimuli that the wedges do not share.
‘Common’ units were activated on every trial. These elements mediated
generalisation between the wedges and the extra-dimensional stimuli (thus
they are only functionally distinct from the ‘wedge’ X elements when there
are extra-dimensional stimuli presented to the network during a
simulation).
The width of coding of dimensional values, in terms of how many L & A units
each wedge stimulus will activate, and the number of X units in the classes
‘common’, ‘wedge’, and ‘non-wedge’, are all independent free parameters of the
model.  The values of these parameters were chosen somewhat arbitrarily; no full
parameterisation or optimisation of the model has been undertaken.  However, the
model has been found to make several predictions that are robust to moderate
variations of all of these parameters, and is presented merely as a demonstration
that a simple ‘elemental’ associationist theory can both explain and predict all the
findings presented in Chapters 2 & 3.
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4.4  Experiment 7: Simulation of Experiments 1-6
Simulation 1
Training Procedure
The first result that this model must account for is the peak shift effect found in
Experiments 1 & 2, and by Bennett and Mackintosh (1992).  Starting with all
associabilities set to 1, and all connection strengths set to zero, the model was
presented with a series of discrimination trials.  In each block of trials, the stimuli
from the training sets of categories 1 & 2 were presented once each, in a
randomised order, with the outcome of every trial on which a category 1 stimulus
was presented being positive (λ = 1; β = 1), and the outcome of each category 2
trial being negative (λ = 0; β = 0.5).  The model was trained in this way for 200
blocks.
At the end of each training block, the activation of the output unit produced by
each of the eight test exemplars used in Experiments 1 & 2 (five from category 1;
three from category 2) was measured.  The measurement of the activation of the
output unit was done independently of the training of the network; no changes to
any of the connection weights was made.
Results
The model successfully learned the discrimination, with the mean squared error
between predicted outcome and received outcome on each trial falling consistently
block by block. After the 53rd  training block, the output activation level elicited by
the category 1 (positive) ‘F’ Further exemplar exceeded that elicited by the
category 1 Prototype, and this difference increased over the following blocks; the
numerical difference between the activations produced by the ‘F’ exemplar and
Prototype of category 1 occurred during the 134th block.  Although in subsequent
blocks the difference between the response to the two stimuli reduced slowly, the
advantage for the ‘F’ exemplar over the Prototype was maintained throughout the
remainder of the 200 training blocks.
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The activation of the output unit produced by presenting the pattern of activity
corresponding to the eight test after 50, 100, 150 and 200 blocks of training are
shown in Figure 4.2.  Performance on the test stimuli could be regarded as
‘asymptotic’ by the end of the 200 blocks, with the activation of the output unit
elicited by four out of the five category 1 test exemplars being greater than 1.
After 100 and 150 blocks of training, the activation elicited by both the ‘FF’ and
‘F’ Further exemplars was greater than that elicited by the Prototype, which
elicited more activation than the ‘FFF’ Further exemplar.  The positive Closer
exemplar elicited least activation of the category 1 test exemplars.  Throughout all
training blocks, the category 2 test exemplars decreased in activation elicited with
movement away from the category boundary.  Thus the negative Closer exemplar
elicited greater activation of the output unit that the negative Prototype, which in
turn elicited greater activation that the negative Further exemplar.
Discussion
The results of this simulation show that a model of this kind, with stimuli
represented as overlapping patterns of activity among a population of ‘feature
detector’ style units, and a simple Rescorla-Wagner or LMS learning algorithm can
predict the robust peak shift result found by Bennett and Mackintosh (1992), and
in Experiments 1 & 2.  The advantage for Further exemplars over the Prototypes,
in terms of more differential activation of the output unit, and hence of more
differential expectation of reward and responding, occurs early in training, and
does not change when the performance reaches asymptotic levels6.
                                               
6
 Extended overtraining of the model beyond 200 blocks of training trials resulted in an abolition of the
peak shift; the positive prototype elicited a greater activation of the output unit than any other stimulus.
Such an abolition of the peak shift following extended discrimination training has been reported by
Terrace (1966).
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The next simulation was conducted to determine whether the model, with
parameters unchanged from those used in the previous simulation, could predict
the prototype effect found in Experiment 4.
Simulation 2
Training Procedure
The model was trained on a series of blocks of trials, using the stimuli from the
category 1 training set.  Each block consisted of a single presentation of each of
the category 1 training stimuli, with the outcome of each trial being positive
(λ = 1; β = 1).  The starting values of all connections strengths and associabilities
were as in the previous simulation.
At the end of each block, the activation elicited by the three category 1 test
exemplars (Prototype, Closer and Further exemplars), equivalent to those used in
Experiment 4, was measured in the same way as in Simulation 1.
Results
The activation elicited by the three test exemplars increased steadily across each
training block, with that elicited by the Prototype exceeding that elicited by the
other test exemplars after every block.  Training continued for 200 blocks, as in
Simulation 1, at the end of which the activation elicited by the test exemplars was
changing very little during each block.  The activation levels of the output unit that
were produced by presentation of each of the three test exemplars after 50, 100
150 and 200 blocks of training are shown in Figure 4.3.
Discussion
The results of this simulation indicate that this model can account for the non-
discriminatory ‘prototype effect’; a greater expectation of reward, as indexed by a
higher activation of the output unit, was produced by presentation of the Prototype
relative to the other novel test exemplars.  This result is hardly surprising, as the
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operation of this type of LMS network is such that predictive or statistical
regularities between input units and output units are learned.  The prototype effect
represents nothing more than the greatest activation of the output unit being
produced by the activation of those feature units that are most often predictors of
reward.
Having established that the model is capable of predicting the prototype effect
following non-discriminatory training, and a peak shift following discriminatory
training, we can investigate whether this type of account can explain the failure to
find a peak shift when the discriminatory training is preceded by non-
discriminatory training on one of the two categories.
Simulation 3
Training Procedure
In order to simulate the results of Experiment 3, the model was given extensive
training with category 1 positive,  by means of a series of blocks identical to those
described in Simulation 2; various amounts of pre-training were given, between 50
and 200 blocks.  Following this training, 150 blocks of discrimination training
between the exemplars of category 1 and category 2 were given, with each
discrimination block being identical to those described in Simulation 1.
Results
Figure 4.4 shows the activation of the output unit produced by presentation of the
test exemplars of each category following discrimination training.  (The pattern
found following the original pre-training was, of course, as described in the
previous simulation, and illustrated in Figure 4.3).  The results of the simulation
using 200 pre-training blocks were highly similar to the results of Experiment 3:
the activation produced by presentation of the positive Prototype exceeded that
produced by the ‘F’ exemplar.
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This advantage for the Prototype over the Further exemplars was maintained
throughout the 150 blocks of discrimination training.  The activation levels
produced by each of the test exemplars was monitored throughout the
discrimination training, as before, and the pattern was identical at the end of every
block, with the positive Prototype producing more activation than the positive
Further exemplar, which in turn produced more activation than the positive Closer
exemplar.  The test exemplars from the negative category also showed a consistent
pattern throughout training, with the activation produced by each exemplar falling
with increasing distance from the category boundary.
The simulations with fewer pre-training blocks showed a graceful transition
between these results and those of Simulation 1.  7
Discussion
The results of this simulation demonstrate that this type of analysis can easily
account for the failure to find the positive peak shift in Experiment 3.  The
Prototype of category 1 consistently produced greater activation of the output unit
than the Further exemplar, regardless of the fact that the discrimination
performance of the model at the end of this simulation was as good as that found
at the end of Simulation 1.
The ability of this type of model to predict the absence of the peak shift in
Experiment 3 has been mentioned by Mackintosh (1995), and does not necessarily
add to the simple analysis offered previously of a ‘summation’ of the peak shift and
prototype effect.  However, this simple analysis cannot predict the results of
                                               
7
 The simulation using 50 blocks of pre-training resulted in a peak shift (as defined by greater activation
elicited by the Further exemplar than by the Prototype of category 1) emerging after 45 blocks, and
remaining throughout the remainder of the 150 training blocks, with the largest arithmetic difference
being recorded after the 111th block.  A similar pattern was found with 100 pre-training blocks: a peak
shift emerged after 48 blocks, and remained for the remaining training blocks, with the maximum
difference being recorded after 96 blocks.  The simulation with 150 training blocks showed a peak shift
after 60 discrimination blocks: this effect was short-lived however, reaching a numerical maximum after
84 blocks, and disappearing after 107 blocks.
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Experiments 5 & 6, where no positive peak shift was found following pre-training
with the negative category.  A final set of simulations was run in an attempt to
investigate whether this form of model could, in principle, account for the absence
of the positive peak shift under these circumstances.
Simulation 4a.
Training Procedure
In order to simulate the ‘inhibitory’ pre-training given in Phase 1 of Experiments
5 & 6, the model was trained on a discrimination between an ‘extra-dimensional’
stimulus (hereafter labelled the ‘white screen’ stimulus) and the category 2 training
set.  The white screen stimulus was represented in the model by activation of the
‘non-wedge’ and ‘common’ units from the X set of input units.  Autoshaping and
pre-training to the white screen was simulated in a similar manner to that used in
Simulation 3, with 200 blocks, each of 24 trials, with this stimulus presented as
‘positive’ (λ = 1; β = 1).
At the end of this pre-training, the Phase 1 discrimination was simulated in a series
of blocks similar to the training trials of Simulations 1 & 3, with the white screen
stimulus replacing the category 1 (positive) training stimuli.  In each of these
blocks the white screen stimulus was presented 12 times, with a positive outcome
(λ = 1; β = 1), and each exemplar from the training set of category 2 was
presented once, with a negative outcome (λ = 0; β = 0.5).  The 24 trials in each
block were presented in a randomised order. Following the 200 blocks of Phase 1,
the model was given 150 blocks of training on the discrimination between the two
categories in an identical manner to that given in Simulations 1 & 3.
Results
The results are shown in Figure 4.5 by the continuous lines; the upper panel shows
the results at the end of the Phase 1 training.  The results of this training procedure
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did not reflect the pattern of results obtained with pigeons in Experiments 5 & 6:
the model yielded an inhibitory gradient around the Prototype of category 2, with
this stimulus producing less activation of the output unit than the other test
exemplars. In Experiment 5 & 6, by contrast, Phase 1 training resulted in equal
response rates to all the test exemplars from the negative category.
The activation of the output unit elicited by the test stimuli of each category
following the Phase 2 discrimination blocks are shown in the lower panel of
Figure 4.5.  Greatest activation in the output unit was elicited by the positive
Further exemplar, similar to the peak shift result found in Simulation 1; as with the
simulation of Phase 1 training, these results were quite different from those found
in Experiments 5 & 6, where no peak shift was found.  These results will be
described in greater detail along with the results of Simulation 4b, below.
Discussion
The model thus seems unable to account for the empirical results of a ‘flat’
inhibitory gradient across the negative test exemplars following Phase 1, and the
subsequent abolition of the peak shift during discrimination training.  In order for
this flat inhibitory gradient following Phase 1 training to be reproduced in the
model, it is necessary to ensure that the inhibitory properties of the negative
category 2 stimuli generalise equally to all three test exemplars.  The only apparent
way to produce this pattern would be to ensure that the inhibitory conditioning in
Phase 1 accrues predominately to those features or elements of the stimuli that did
not vary along the length and angle dimensions, i.e. the ‘wedge’ X units, which are
the only part of the representation of wedge stimuli that all exemplars share.
If the salience, or the number, of the units representing the X elements were
greatly increased, these elements would then overshadow the learning which
otherwise accrues to those elements represented by the L & A units.  Such a
reconstruction of the model would presumably not affect the peak shift prediction
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found in Simulation 1: the X units are irrelevant in this discrimination, being
present equally often on positive and negative trials, and thus acquire little
associative strength.  However, these units do alter the model’s predictions
concerning the positive prototype effect found following reinforced training to
Category 1 stimuli only (Experiment 4).  If X units succeed in overshadowing
L & A units during inhibitory training, so as to produce a flat inhibitory gradient, it
is obvious that, by the same token, this overshadowing effect would produce a flat
excitatory gradient: a simulation conducted in the same manner as Simulation 2
would produce, if the X units overshadow the dimensional units, similar activation
levels to Further, Prototype and Closer exemplars, i.e. the Prototype effect would
be abolished.
If the model is to produce different effects following excitatory and inhibitory non-
discriminatory training, the stimuli must be represented in a different manner in the
two simulations. A further set of simulations was run, using a restricted
representation of the negative stimuli during Phase 1, in an attempt to ensure that
the inhibitory conditioning in Phase 1 accrued to the ‘wedge’ X units.  The
restricted representation of the category 2 exemplars was formed by activating the
‘wedge’ and ‘common’ units from the X population of units on each trial, but only
activating the L & A units that represent each given stimulus on a certain
proportion of trials, with an independent probability p on each trial.  Thus any unit
from the L  or A population of units, that would be a part of the full representation
of a given stimulus used in Simulations 1-3, was activated on only those trials on
which a stochastic variable for that unit (qi) was randomly sampled (in range 0 ≤
qi ≤ 1) such that qi < p.
The full representation used in all the simulations described above thus represents
the limiting case where p = 1, i.e. all the L & A units that made up the
representation of each stimulus were activated on all trials (along with the
‘common’ and ‘wedge’ X units) that the wedge was presented. A completely
restricted representation is achieved by the case where p = 0; in this case only
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those units from the X population would be activated on category 2 (negative)
trials.
On the face of it, this seems to be a wholly arbitrary solution, justified only by the
fact that it would allow the model to reproduce these empirical findings. Some
defence for the use of the restricted representation during Phase 1 can be made in
terms of ‘attentional processing’. The model is somewhat limited in scope, being
designed primarily to represent learning about the variation along the dimensions
of the category discrimination, and the addition of the p parameter used in the
following simulation could be regarded as including a representation of how likely
a given element was to be ‘attended to’.  Variation along the L or A dimensions is
not a factor in Phase 1 of Experiments 5 & 6, as all wedge stimuli during this
phase were non-reinforced.  It is plausible therefore to suppose that the subjects
would not attend to this source of variation.  This appears at first to be a weak
argument, however, as these elements are also irrelevant during excitatory non-
discriminatory training (Experiments 3 & 4; modelled in Simulations 2 & 3), but
excitatory gradients along these dimensions were still found.  Nonetheless, it may
not be wholly unjustified: there is some evidence to suggest that such attentional
selectivity might be more marked on negative trials.
Jenkins and Sainsbury (1970 ) reported that pigeons have great difficulty learning a
discrimination between two arrays of elements in which a single feature of a
stimulus is a predictor of non-reward (feature negative), yet can solve the identical
discrimination easily if the single feature is the predictor of reward (feature
positive). This finding can be explained as follows: first, the pigeons direct their
responding on negative trials to areas of the screen that do not contain a negative
feature (i.e. to positive features) due to the greater association between these areas
and reward; and second, behaviour only comes under control of those elements to
which responses are directed (Mackintosh, 1974).
The subjects in Experiments 5 & 6 had previously been autoshaped to stimuli
(either a cross on a white background, or just the plain white background) that
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share certain elements with the wedge stimuli.  Although the pigeons learned the
discrimination between the autoshaping stimulus and the ‘wedge’ stimuli easily,
they may have been directing more of their responding on the negative trials to
those parts of the screen outside of the wedge stimuli, i.e. the white areas of the
screen.  These areas of the screen were more similar to the display used on positive
trials, and thus presumably had greater associative strength than the area of the
screen that contained the wedge stimulus.  If responding was less likely to be
directed at the centre of the screen on negative trials, then the elements specific to
each individual wedge stimulus could have acquired less inhibitory control over
responding.  Thus this type of analysis does provide one way of justifying the use
of the ‘restricted’ (p < 1) representation in the simulation of the extra-dimensional
discriminations of Experiments 5 & 6, but not in other simulations.
Simulation 4b
Training Procedure
Initial training to the white screen stimulus was conducted exactly as described in
Simulation 4a, followed by a series of 200 Phase 1 discrimination blocks with the
restricted representations described above used for the category 2 stimuli.  The
degree of restriction of the representation of the wedge exemplars, i.e. the value of
p, was kept constant throughout Phase 1 discrimination; a variety of simulations
were run, with different values of p.  Other than the change in representation of the
negative stimuli, Phase 1 blocks were identical to those described in Simulation 4a.
Following the Phase 1 discrimination a series of 150 Phase 2 discrimination blocks
were run, using the full representations (i.e. p = 1); representations containing all
appropriate L & A units were used for both positive and negative wedge stimuli.
All details of the Phase 2 discrimination blocks were thus identical to those in
Simulations 1, 3 & 4a.
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Results
Figure 4.5 (upper panel) shows the output unit activation levels produced by
presentation of the Prototype, Closer and Further exemplar of category 2
following Phase 1 training.  The results of the simulation of Phase 1 in which a
completely restricted (p = 0) representation, i.e. Phase 1 training in which all of the
inhibitory learning accrues to the X units, is shown by the unshaded columns.  No
inhibitory gradient is found, as the units allowed to acquire associative strength are
activated equally by all exemplars.
Subsequent Phase 2 discrimination training resulted in the final levels of activation
shown by the unshaded columns in the lower panel of Figure 4.5.  The arithmetic
difference between the model’s response to the category 1 Prototype and Further
exemplar increased for the first 24 blocks of Phase 2 training, then decreased
slightly until the 104th block, after which it increased steadily. At no point during
Phase 2 discrimination was a ‘peak shift’ pattern found; the output elicited by the
Prototype was greatest of all 6 test exemplars at the end of each block.
The results following Phase 1 training in which a full  (p = 1) representation was
used (Simulation 4a) are shown by the continuous lines in the upper panel of
Figure 4.5. As noted above, an inhibitory gradient was found; lower activation of
the output unit was produced by the Prototype of the negative category than by
the other two test exemplars.
During the subsequent 150 blocks of Phase 2 discrimination training in
Simulation 4a, there was greater activation elicited by the positive Further
exemplar than by the positive Prototype.  This peak shift pattern was present from
the first Phase 2 training block, increased to a maximum arithmetic difference after
60 blocks, and (although reduced) was present following all subsequent Phase 2
discrimination blocks.
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Intermediate values of p produced overall results between those found with p set
to 0 or 1.  The dashed lines in the lower panel of Figure 4.5 show the results of
using an partly restricted representation (p = 0.5) during Phase 1,8 and then
training on 150 Phase 2 blocks.  An advantage for the positive F exemplar over the
Prototype was found following every block of Phase 2 training (following p = 0.5
Phase 1 training); this advantage was largest after 73 blocks, and had reduced to
almost zero by the final Phase 2 block.
Discussion
The model, owing to the way it encodes stimuli, is only capable of producing flat
inhibitory gradients following a simulation of the Phase 1 (extra-dimensional)
discrimination by ensuring that the inhibitory control will generalise equally along
the dimensions; this is brought about by means of a post-hoc ‘tweak’ to ensure that
any inhibition accrues only to the ‘wedge’ X units.  However, following such a
modification, the model produced not only these the ‘flat’ inhibitory gradients, but
also the result found at the end of Phase 2 in Experiments 5 & 6;  inhibitory pre-
training that resulted in a ‘flat’ inhibitory gradient within the model abolished the
positive peak shift in a subsequent discrimination.  When the inhibitory learning
was not controlled in this way, the model predicted an inhibitory gradient
following Phase 1, and the positive peak shift following the Phase 2 training.  This
is an interesting prediction in the light of the studies by Terrace (1968) and
Weisman (1969), which found that the positive peak shift occurred only following
training procedures which also produced inhibitory U-shaped gradients around the
S-.
                                               
8
 It is not clear exactly how to interpret the results of Phase 1 training using intermediate values of p: if a
restricted representation is used for the Phase 1 test, varying the values of p between 1 and 0, produced
flatter and flatter gradients following Phase 1 training.  If the ‘full’ representation was used for the Phase
1 test, however, an inhibitory gradient considerably steeper than that found with p = 1 (Simulation 4a)
resulted from training with p = 0.5.  The reason for this is clearly that incremental inhibitory associations
that may accrue to L or A elements on one learning trial may not be activated on a subsequent trial, and
thus a greater degree of inhibitory conditioning will actually occur. The comparison of Phase 1 test
results using intermediate values of p with those results from simulations where p = 1 and p = 0 was not,
therefore, undertaken.
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4.5 Evaluation of the model
The model can account for the order of all the test results from Experiments 1-6,
although no attempt is made to produce a quantitative account of response rates
across the test stimuli seen in these experiments.  The model can be regarded as an
implementation of an ‘associationist elemental’ account, which makes only the
simplest assumptions about the nature of stimulus representation, and the
mechanism of generalisation.  The one exception to this is in the simulation of the
inhibitory pre-training in Simulation 4b, where the representation of the negative
stimuli was altered in order to produce the flat inhibitory gradients found in
Experiments 5 & 6.  The model does, however, make the appropriate prediction
once this manipulation is made, in terms of a failure of subsequent discrimination
training to produce the positive peak shift.
The simplicity of the model could also be a weakness: the likelihood of a subject
actually experiencing the reward contingency of a given stimulus will depend upon
the rate of responding during the presentation of that stimulus.  No account is
taken of possible instrumental components of the subjects’ responding in the
model; it is, in effect, a purely Pavlovian analysis.  However, as the empirical
procedures being modelled involved pigeon subjects trained on a VI schedule
(known to maintain response rates that are approximately independent of
instrumental factors; see Mackintosh, 1974) a Pavlovian analysis is presumably
appropriate.
How does the model compare to other accounts and analyses of the peak shift?
Initially, the account of the peak shift seems to be very similar to the ideas of
interacting gradients of excitation and inhibition first put forward by Spence
(1937).  The positive peak shift, according to the present analysis, occurs because
the shifted stimulus contains a set of elements that have a greater net association
with reward, as a result of activating more excitatory and/or less inhibitory
connections with the representation of the reward.  According to Spence, it occurs
because the generalisation of excitation from S+ to the shifted stimulus is very
much greater than is generalisation from S-.  Is there really any substantive
difference between the two accounts?
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The shape of generalisation gradients is critical in Spence’s analysis, yet much less
so for the elemental theories (in which generalisation gradients are considered
emergent phenomena, rather than underlying processes).  The model uses a
representation that would give rise, all things being equal, to approximately linear
generalisation gradients.  Such gradients, according to Spence’s analysis do not
yield a peak shift (see Chapter 1).  Why does this difference in prediction arise?  In
the elemental theory, the degree of generalisation depends not only on the
proportion of elements that the two stimuli share, but also upon which elements of
S+ have acquired the greatest associative value.  The result of the type of learning
rule used in the simulations, i.e. the Rescorla-Wagner or LMS rule, is that those
elements of S+ that are not shared with S- acquire the greatest associative
strength; it is these elements that S+ shares with the shifted stimulus.  Pearce’s
(1987) configural theory, which is in some repects a modern version of Spence’s
(1937) analysis (see Pearce, 1994a) would actually have problems here, since
generalisation from AX+ to BX depends solely on the proportion of common
elements, rather than upon whether it was A or X elements of AX+ that acquired
associative strength.
The effects of pre-training could differentiate between the two accounts.  If
generalised excitation and inhibition are due solely to the similarity between the
novel stimuli and those that have acquired associative strength, it is not clear how
the order of the acquisition of this associative strength can influence the pattern of
post-discrimination gradients: a novel stimulus would still generalise the same
amounts of excitation and inhibition from the trained stimuli. The form of
representation and learning used in this model is subtly different, however. If
generalisation is considered as being mediated by those elements that two stimuli
have in common, rather than purely in terms of ‘similarity’, or in terms of the
amount of activation of established representations the novel stimulus elicits,
different patterns can be predicted according to which elements within the pre-
trained stimuli that the novel stimuli shares.
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The nature of associative learning, as characterised by Rescorla and Wagner
(1972), and implemented by the learning algorithms contained in this model, is to
produce learning about those elements that are most ‘causally effective’ in
predicting the occurrence or non-occurrence of an outcome. In this way, the
Further exemplar can be described as being responded to at a greater rate than the
Prototype not just because it contains less elements that are shared by the negative
stimuli, but also because it contains those elements that are most effective
predictors of reward during the discrimination.  The positive pre-training used in
Experiment 3 is then regarded as influencing the peak shift by establishing those
elements that are contained in the Prototype as the ‘best predictors’ of reward, and
this learning prevents the Further exemplar’s elements gaining much associative
strength during discrimination training.  These elements are still the best predictors
of reward during this discrimination, but very little ‘excitatory’ learning needs to
take place during the discrimination phase, as reward is already predicted on
positive trials.
Analysed in this way, the results of Experiment 3 (as well as Experiments 5 & 6)
can be regarded as a combination of overshadowing and blocking. The most
common (prototypical) elements overshadow ‘Further’ and ‘Closer’ elements
during the pre-training, producing the ‘prototype effect.’  During discrimination
training, reward is then predicted well on positive trials, and thus little learning
occurs about those elements that represent positive stimuli.  Although ‘Further’
elements are now better predictors of reward than ‘Prototypical’ elements, this
learning is blocked by the earlier learning.
Although by no means a complete account of categorisation learning in pigeons,
this model does indicate that the peak shift found following a simple categorisation
task can be explained with recourse to nothing more sophisticated that the rules of
association suggested by Rescorla and Wagner (1972).  The model does not give a
quantitative account of response rates, yet it does give a qualitative account of the
results of Experiments 1-6, and thus shows that the simple account of stimulus
representation and associative learning that it implements can not only account for
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the peak shift following discrimination, but also for the different results found after
pre-training.
The presentation of this model is intended merely as a proof by example that the
seemingly disparate results reported above following discriminatory and non-
discriminatory training, and their effects when presented in successive conjunction,
can be accounted for within a simple unitary framework based on assumptions that
are neither novel nor particularly contentious.  There is no detailed comparison
between this model and possible implementations of other explanatory
frameworks, such as that based on ‘configural’ or instance representations
proposed by Spence (1937), and more recently Pearce (1987, 1994b), yet it does
seem, as argued above, that these accounts may have some difficulty in accounting
for these results.  It is somewhat beyond the scope of this work to contrast and
evaluate all the differing theoretical accounts of the peak shift, and thus no attempt
is made to convince the reader that this is the only explanation for the results of
Experiments 1-6;  my aim is the presumably somewhat simpler task of convincing
the reader that the analysis presented and implemented within this chapter provides
an adequate explanation.
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Chapter 5                                            Categorisation in Humans
5.1 Preliminary Results
Aitken (1992, reference note 1), using stimuli similar to those used in the pigeon
categorisation procedures described above, investigated performance on a two-
choice categorisation procedure with human subjects.  The two categories were
again made up of distortions of two prototypes, which were ‘butterfly’ shapes as
illustrated in Figure 5.1. Each butterfly shape was constructed by taking a wedge
stimulus, similar to those used with pigeons, and a second, identical, wedge which
was rotated through 180°. The wedges were placed so that their ‘points’ were
touching in the centre of the screen.  The categories were made up in the same way
as the categories in Experiments 1-6, with each exemplar being formed by varying
either the length or the internal angle of the component wedges.
The subjects were asked to sort the training exemplars according to which of the
two categories each stimulus was taken from.  The categorisation response was
made by pressing one of two (‘left’ or ‘right’) keys on a computer keyboard, and
subjects were given feedback after each response. Two groups of subjects were
run, using slightly different training stimuli; the subjects in one group were given
training exemplars which ‘overlapped’ on both length and angle, whereas those in
the other group were trained on stimuli chosen so that there was no overlap
between the categories, in a similar manner to Experiment 2.  After four
presentations of each of the training exemplars, the subjects were tested on their
ability to categorise the Prototypes of each category (which had not been
presented during training), as well as a novel Closer and Further exemplar from
each category.  The subjects were given no feedback during the test trials.
Throughout both training and test trial blocks, the subjects were requested to
respond as accurately as possible, and given up to 2 sec to make a response.
The results of this study are shown in Figure 5.2.  Subjects in both conditions were
found to categorise the Further exemplars significantly more accurately than the
Prototypes, which were in turn categorised more accurately than the Closer
exemplars.  A similar pattern was found in the reaction time data, with responding
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being more rapid to the Further exemplars than to the Prototypes, and responding
to the Closer exemplars being slowest of the three. The overall pattern was thus
one of superior performance to exemplars further from the category boundary, and
as such is very similar to the results found with pigeons on a similar task
(Experiment 1, above).  Can these results be interpreted as a form of peak shift,
i.e. in terms of more ‘net associative strength’ generalising to the Further
exemplars than to the Prototypes?
Although the pattern of results was consistent with such an explanation, there is an
alternative explanation for these data.  If the subjects were solving the task by
learning a rule of the form: ‘short and fat’ shapes belong to one category,  ‘long
and thin’ to the other, then an advantage for the Further exemplars over the
Prototypes could be explained because the former are ‘better’ examples of the rule
than the latter.  During an interview conducted after completion of the test session,
the subjects were asked: ‘Did you use any conscious strategies in learning the
categories, or in responding to the stimuli?’.  In response to this question, 80% of
the subjects reported a strategy based on the length, angle or both length and angle
of the stimuli. This is consistent with the subjects having solved the categorisation
task on the basis of inducing, and applying, a simple cognitive strategy or ‘rule’.
The distinction between this type of explanation, and the associative or ‘peak shift’
explanation offered for the results of Experiment 1, can be characterised simply:
according to the associative account it was the Further exemplars, rather than the
Prototypes, that contained those elements or features most strongly associated
with one response rather than the other;  the ‘rule induction’ account, by contrast,
states that the Further exemplars were simply better instances of ‘short and fat’, or
‘long and thin’ stimuli.  Although they may sound alike, and although both are
equally able to account for the data found by Aitken (1992), these two accounts
can be differentiated by investigation of what happens with even greater movement
from the category boundary.
An account in associationist terms, i.e. in terms of the peak shift, predicts that the
advantage for the Further exemplars over the Prototype would only be present for
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‘near’ Further exemplars (as found in Experiment 2, above); Further exemplars
that were very far from the category boundary would not have greater net
associative strength than the Prototype.  The ‘rule induction’ account, by contrast,
does not predict that the advantage for ‘near’ Further exemplars over the
Prototype would disappear for ‘distant’ Further exemplars; this type of account
predicts a monotonic increase in performance with movement away from the
category boundary.  The first experimental work undertaken with human subjects
was therefore a replication of Aitken (1992), with testing on both ‘near’ and
‘distant’ Further exemplars.
5.2 Rule Learning versus the Peak Shift
Experiment 8
Apparatus
The experiment was run on an Apple Macintosh Plus computer using an
interpreted program in MSBasic.  Stimuli were displayed on the screen, and
responses made to the keyboard.  Recording and timing of the responses were
carried out by the program.
Stimuli
The stimuli generated by the computer were of the type shown in Figure 5.1,
similar to those used by Aitken (1992), and displayed as black lines against a white
background.  They were divided into two categories, with the construction of the
categories following the same logic as the construction of the categories used in
Experiments 1-6, above. The training stimuli for each category were 12 distortions
of the Prototype of that category, with three stimuli differing from the Prototype in
each of four directions: longer or shorter radial line, narrower or wider internal
angle. The length and angle of the component wedges for the stimuli in each
category were as illustrated in Figure 2.7, with the scaling on the Macintosh screen
such that 100 units = 33mm. Thus the Prototype from category 1 had an internal
angle of 53°, and radial length of 7.6mm [23 units], giving a total length of
15.2mm [46 units]. Five test exemplars from each category were used: the
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Prototype, a Closer exemplar, and three Further exemplars labelled ‘F’, ‘FF’ and
‘FFF’ as above.
Subjects
The subjects were 15 undergraduate students of the University of Cambridge, eight
male, and seven female, who were paid for participation in the experiment.
Procedure
Instructions were given to the subjects by means of an instruction sheet, and also
explained verbally to ensure that these was no misunderstanding.  The instructions
were as follows:
“In this experiment, shapes will appear on the screen, which you must identify as
belonging to one of two categories.  On each trial, a fixation point ‘+’ will appear in
the centre of the screen. This will be replaced by a shape. You must press one of the
keys  ( ‘X’ or ‘.’ ) corresponding to the category that you believe the shape to belong
to.  On the first few trials you will have to guess.
The experiment will be divided into six blocks of trials.  For the first four blocks, you
will receive a feedback message (‘correct’ or ‘error’) after each trial, enabling you
to learn which category each shape belongs to.  The final two blocks are test blocks
which differ from the previous blocks.  On these two blocks you will receive no
feedback message after responding.
If you press an invalid key (one other than one of the two marked keys), anticipate
the probe  (press a key before the shape appears), or take more than two seconds to
respond, the computer will tell you so and move on to the next trial.  The time limit
should not be a problem, as you will have ample time in which to respond.
As you become accustomed to the task, please try to go a little faster.  On the last
two test blocks, please try to respond as quickly as you can to each trial, without
going so quickly that you think it is causing you to make mistakes.
The experiment should not take longer than 20 minutes. If you have any questions
about what is expected of you in this experiment, please ask.”
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Following the instructions, the subjects pressed the spacebar to begin, which
started the first block of trials.  The first four blocks of trials were training blocks,
containing each member of the training set once, in a randomised order, giving 24
trials in each block.  Each trial started with a fixation point ‘+’ displayed in the
centre of the screen for 1-sec.  If any response was made to the keyboard during
this period, the computer displayed a message (“You anticipated the probe”)  for
1-sec in the centre of the screen, and the trial was terminated.  The training
stimulus appeared in place of the fixation point at the end of this 1-sec period, and
remained on the screen until the subject made a response to the keyboard, for a
maximum of two seconds.
If the response made was the appropriate one, that is the ‘.’ key for stimuli from
category 1, or the ‘x’ key for stimuli from category 2, the message “correct” was
displayed.  If the response made was with the inappropriate key (e.g. ‘x’ for stimuli
from category 1), the message “error” was displayed in the centre of the screen,
and a ‘beep’ was sounded.  If no response was made within the 2-sec period, or a
response to a key other than ‘x’ or ‘.’ was made, a message (“Timeout” or “You
pressed an invalid key”, as appropriate) was displayed.  The message remained on
the screen for 1-sec, after which the fixation point reappeared, and the next trial
started.  After each block of 24 trials was completed, a message “Press spacebar to
begin next block” was displayed, and the next block began as soon as the spacebar
was pressed.  At the end of the fourth training block, the message “Press spacebar
to begin test blocks” appeared.
The test blocks each consisted of 20 trials, with each of the 10 test stimuli
occurring once during the first 10, and again during the last 10 trials of each block,
in a random order.  The test trials followed exactly the same procedure as the
training trials, except that the messages “correct” and “error” were not displayed,
and no beep was sounded following a mistake. The screen stayed blank for 1-sec
after a valid response, after which time the fixation point appeared and the next
trial began.  The second test block started as soon as the subject responded to the
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message “Press spacebar for final block”, which appeared at the end of the first
test block.
Results
Figure. 5.3 shows the performance of the subjects on the test blocks. Two
measures are shown, namely mean reaction time and response accuracy, as a
function of test stimulus type, combining the data from the two categories. As can
be seen, performance increased in accuracy and speed the further the test stimuli
were from the category boundary;  there was no suggestion of a peak in
performance at the ‘F’ or ‘FF’ stimuli.  Statistical analyses of these data was
undertaken by means of two ANOVAs, both with stimulus type as the only within-
subject factor, on the proportion correct and mean reaction time scores.
The analysis of response accuracy revealed a significant main effect of stimulus
type (F(3,30) = 16.26; εG = 0.53). Planned comparisons of the mean response
accuracy to the different stimuli revealed that there was significantly more accurate
responding to the Prototypes than to the Closer exemplars (F(1,14) = 12.51), with
a marginal difference between the ‘F’ exemplars and the Prototypes
(F(1,14) = 3.18; p < 0.10).  The increase in response accuracy from the ‘F’ to the
‘FFF’ exemplars was found to be significant (F(1,14) = 4.70), as predicted by the
‘rule induction’ account.
The analysis of the speed of responding also revealed a significant effect of
stimulus type (F(3,42) = 16.97; εH = 0.75).  Planned comparisons between the
mean reaction times to the different stimuli revealed significantly faster responding
to the ‘F’ exemplars than to the Prototypes (F(1,14) = 7.21), but no difference in
between the speed of responses to the Prototypes and the Closer exemplars
(F < 1).  The continued improvement in performance with greater movement away
from the category boundary from the ‘F’ to ‘FFF’ exemplar, as predicted by the
‘rule induction’ account, was significant (F(1,14) = 10.91).
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Discussion
These results, in terms of the response accuracy and reaction time to the original
Prototypes, Closer  and ‘F’ exemplars, are similar in pattern to the results of
Aitken (1992). The replication of greater response accuracy to the ‘F’ exemplars
than to the Prototypes was only marginally significant, however, although the ‘F’
exemplars were responded to significantly faster than the Prototypes. This may be
due to the change in emphasis in the instructions given to the subjects in this task;
the subjects in the previous study were requested to respond as accurately, rather
than as quickly, as possible.  The pattern of results across the ‘F’, ‘FF’, and ‘FFF’
exemplars was one of superior performance with an increase in distance from the
category boundary, with no evidence of any peak in responding beyond which
categorisation performance deteriorated.  These results are therefore more
consistent with a cognitive ‘rule-governed’ explanation than an ‘associative’
account.
It is always possible to argue that the test stimuli used were not far enough from
the category boundary, and that a decline in speed and accuracy would have been
obtained with even more distant test stimuli.  Although it may be difficult to reject
this possibility, I did undertake a small-scale study, similar to Experiment 8, in
which test exemplars even further from the category boundary were presented. The
training stimuli and procedures were identical to those of Experiment 8, and eight
subjects were then tested on Prototypes, Closer exemplars, and two different types
of Further exemplars.  One was the ‘FFF’ exemplar of each category used in
Experiment 8; the other was a ‘FFFF’ exemplar from each category which was
twice as great a distortion of the Prototype (in terms of distance along the length
and angle axes in Figure 2.7) as the ‘FFF’ exemplar.
 Table 5.1: Results of small scale study using very distant test exemplars
FFFF FFF Prototype Closer
% Correct 100.0 100.0 92.5 70.0
Mean RT (ms) 610.5 613.0 1023.4 1091.4
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The results of this study are shown in Table 5.1.  Although no significant
difference was found between the responding to the two types of Further
exemplars, there was equally no suggestion of a decline in speed or accuracy of
responding with movement from the ‘FFF’ to the ‘FFFF’ test exemplars. Thus it
does not seem plausible that the failure of  the subjects in Experiment 8 to show a
‘peak’ in performance (cf. Experiment 2, above) was due to there being an
‘associative peak’ that was further from the category boundary than any of the test
stimuli that were used.
It would appear, therefore, that the processes underlying this cognitive or
‘strategic’ categorisation performance in human subjects are somewhat different
from those which produce the peak shift pattern found with pigeons.  As these
latter processes are well accounted for by ‘associative’ systems (such as that
presented in Chapter 4), does this mean that human subjects do not learn
associatively, or that their associative systems are quite different from those which
seem sufficient to explain categorisation by pigeons?  Neither of these strong
conclusions is justified.  It remains possible that different training procedures
would produce a quite different pattern of results - one better characterised in
terms of the peak shift than in terms of a ‘cognitive strategy’.
If human subjects are ever to produce a ‘peak shift’ pattern in categorisation
performance, it is presumably most likely to be under conditions where ‘strategic’
processes are unavailable or unhelpful.  One possibility would be to use a design in
which the contingencies between the categorical stimuli and the response
requirements are ‘hidden’ within another task.  Following several pilot studies, a
procedure was found in which subjects were able to learn these contingencies
without showing any evidence of ‘awareness’ of the underlying rule.  This
procedure involved subjects pressing a certain response key as rapidly as possible
whenever one of a set of signals was presented.  The subjects in this type of task
were able to experience the contingencies between the exemplars of the different
categories and different responses, and learn about these contingencies in a way
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that is perhaps best characterised as incidental or ‘implicit’ learning.  The results of
these experiments will be discussed in Chapter 6, below.
First, however, it is necessary to investigate what effects the various changes in
procedure, required in order to construct this new task, may have on the results of
the ‘explicit’ task described in Experiment 8. The following section presents a
series of replications of Experiment 8, using stimuli and procedures designed to be
as similar as possible to the implicit learning paradigms that were developed, but
without the final critical steps that produced significant learning of the
categorisation task without subjects being able to report any form of strategy
based upon whether stimuli were ‘long and thin’ or ‘short and fat’.
5.3 Strategy in Human Categorisation
Experiment 9a
Subjects
The subjects were 12 adults, eight of whom were undergraduate students, three
post-graduate students, and one post-doctoral researcher, all at the University of
Cambridge.  Ten of the subjects were male, and two female.  Three of the subjects
had previous experimental experience with both the apparatus and procedure,
following participation in Experiment 9b.
Apparatus
The experiment was run on an Acorn A500 RiscOS 3.11 machine, fitted with an
AKF18 monitor. The presentation of stimuli and recording of responses was
conducted automatically by the computer, using a program shell in Acorn Basic V.
The subjects were seated approximately 1m from the screen, with the keyboard
directly in front of them.
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Stimuli
All stimuli were presented as thin white lines, on a black background. The
categorical stimuli used were a ‘compressed’ training set for each category of
double wedges, constructed as illustrated by the triangle symbols in Figure 2.11.
The scale of the computer display was such that 100 units = 70mm, so that the
range of total lengths (i.e. the diameter of the double wedge stimuli) in the
category 1 ‘compressed’ training set was 30.1mm [2*21.5 units] to 34.3mm
[2*24.5 units].  The five test stimuli (Closer exemplar, Prototype, and three
Further exemplars) were constructed according to the same logic as in
Experiment 8.  Two circles, each 10mm across, were situated 75mm to the left and
right of the centre of the screen.  These circles could fill, or ‘light up’ to become
white discs.
Procedure
The subjects were first read the following instructions:
“In this experiment, a series of shapes will appear on the screen, in between two
circles.  Each shape is associated with one of the two circles.  On each trial you must
press one of two keys, ‘z’ or ‘?’, corresponding to which of the two circles (left or
right) you believe to be associated with the shape.
After you press one of these keys, the correct circle will ‘fill’ or ‘light up’.  If you
pressed the correct key, the computer will move immediately on to the next trial.  If
you pressed the other (incorrect) key, the correct circle will still light up, and the
computer will sound a ‘beep’ before moving on to the next trial.
If you press an invalid key (a key other than ‘?’ or ‘z’), anticipate the signal (press a
key before the shape appears), or fail to respond within 2 seconds, the computer will
display a message telling you so, before moving on to the next trial. The time-out of
two seconds should not be a problem, as this will give you ample time to respond.
As you have no information to begin with about the shapes, you will have to guess on
the first few trials.  Please concentrate on learning which circle is associated with
each shape on the early training trials.  Once you become more confident, please try
to respond as quickly as you can, without going so quickly that you feel that it is
causing you to make mistakes.
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There will be five blocks of trials: The first four blocks are ‘training blocks’, during
which you should learn which circle is associated with each shape.  The final block
is a test block, which will be slightly different.  On test trials, neither of the circles
will light up, nor will the computer beep if you are wrong.  You should press
whichever circle you believe to be correct, on the basis of what you experienced
during the training blocks.
Each block will start with a message: ‘Press spacebar to start training block’, or
‘Press spacebar to start test block’.  The first trial will begin as soon as you press the
spacebar.  Please remember that you will get no feedback (the circle associated with
the shape will not light up, and the computer will not beep if you are wrong) on test
trials.
This experiment should last about 10 minutes. If you have any questions about what
will be required of you in this experiment, please ask now ”
Each training block consisted of 48 trials, made up of two presentations of each of
the stimuli from the training set of both categories, in a fully randomised order.  As
soon as the subject pressed the spacebar to begin a block, the first trial began.
Each trial started with the screen cleared except for the two response circles.  The
shape appeared after an variable interval in the range 250-500ms, and remained on
screen until the subject made a response to the keyboard, for a maximum of 2-sec.
Once a valid response was recorded, the appropriate response light (left-hand light
for stimuli from category 1, right-hand light for stimuli from category 2) came on
for 200ms. At the offset of this period the screen cleared and the next trial was
started. Figure 5.4 illustrates the display immediately following a valid response to
a category 1 wedge stimulus.
If the response made was incorrect (e.g. pressing the ‘?’ key to a stimulus from
category 1, before the left-hand response light had appeared), the computer
sounded a ‘beep’ as the light appeared.  In this way the subject was given feedback
both in terms of a ‘beep’ following an incorrect response, and a signal light
appearing on the side of the correct response.
As in Experiment 8, a response to a key other than ‘z’ or ‘?’, a response before the
appearance of the wedge stimulus, or a failure to respond within two seconds of
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the wedge appearing resulted in the termination of the trial, and a message (“You
pressed an invalid key”, “You anticipated the signal” or “You did not respond in
time”) was displayed for 1-sec.
The test block was 50 trials long, consisting of five presentations of each of the
test stimuli.  The order of these 50 trials was completely randomised.  Test trials
were similar to training trials, with the removal of the feedback signals.  Thus
following either an incorrect or a correct response, the screen remained unchanged
for 0.2 sec before clearing, and no beep was sounded.
Results
One subject reported that they had become unsure which category of wedge was
associated with which circle during the test block, and believed that they had
‘switched’ responses during this block.  As their response accuracy was lower than
chance on many of the stimulus pairs during the test block, compared to a group
mean above 90% accuracy, the data from this subject was excluded. The remaining
analyses are based on the data from the remaining 11 subjects only.
The results from these subjects’ test performance, in terms of both response
accuracy and mean reaction time to each of the five pairs of test stimuli are shown
in Figure 5.5.  The pattern is one of better categorisation performance, in terms of
greater response speed and accuracy, with greater distance from the category
boundary, with the furthest (‘FFF’) exemplars being the most quickly and
accurately responded to.
Preliminary analyses of these data was conducted via two separate ANOVAs, on
the mean reaction time and the mean response accuracy to each of the five pairs of
test stimuli, with stimulus type as the only (within-subject) factor.  Analysis of the
response accuracy revealed a significant main  effect of stimulus type
(F(2,18) = 24.24; εG = 0.44).  A planned comparison between the response
accuracy to the Prototypes and that to the Closer exemplars revealed that the
Prototypes were significantly more accurately categorised (F(1,10) = 22.76).
However, comparisons between the response accuracy to each of the three Further
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exemplars revealed no significant differences in accuracy of responding to these
stimuli (largest F(1,10) = 2.22;  p > 0.15).  The increase in response accuracy
beyond the Prototypes was non-significant for both the ‘F’ and ‘FF’ exemplars,
and only marginal for the ‘FFF’ exemplars (F(1,10) = 3.38;  p < 0.1).
Analysis of the mean reaction times to the five test stimulus pairs also revealed a
significant main effect of stimulus type (F(3,30) = 8.21; εH = 0.75 ).  A planned
comparison revealed that the Prototypes were responded to significantly more
quickly than the Closer exemplars (F(1,10) = 6.25).  Other comparisons revealed
that the ‘FFF’ exemplars were responded to significantly more rapidly than the
Prototypes (F(1,10) = 5.02), although responding to the ‘FF’ and ‘F’ exemplars
was only marginally faster than to the Prototypes (F(1,10) = 4.01; p < 0.08 and
F(1,10) = 2.16; p < 0.15 respectively).  Comparisons between the reaction times to
the three different Further exemplars revealed no significant differences (largest
F(1,10) = 1.65).
These analyses indicate that the change in training procedure, and the use of the
more compressed training sets, did not seriously affect the pattern, of steadily
increasing categorisation performance with increase in distance from the category
boundary, found in Experiment 8.  A fuller discussion and analysis of these data
will be undertaken in conjunction with the data collected using the same procedure
with a new set of training and test stimuli.
Experiment 9b
Subjects
The subjects were 12 adults, three of whom were undergraduate students, six post-
graduate students and two post-doctoral researchers, all from the University of
Cambridge. Eight of the subjects were male, and four female. Three of the subjects
had previous experimental experience with both the apparatus and procedure,
following participation in Experiment 9a.
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Apparatus
The apparatus was exactly as described in Experiment 9a
Stimuli
The stimuli used in this experiment were two categories of ‘star’ shapes, varying in
both the length of the points and the angle of rotation, and the response lights used
in Experiment 9a. Each star stimulus was a symmetrical four-pointed star, which
was derived directly from a wedge stimulus, in a way illustrated in Figure 5.5.  The
four points were each 90° apart, with the point in the upper right quadrant
corresponding to the highest point of the wedge stimulus from which it was
derived.  Thus the star stimulus derived from the Prototype wedge stimulus of
category 1 (which has an internal angle of 53°, and a radial line length of 23 units
[16.1mm]) had its four outer points 23 units away from the centre of the screen,
and was rotated 53° anticlockwise from the horizontal and vertical axes.  The four
‘inner’ points of each star stimulus were 6 units [4.2mm] away from the centre of
the screen, and midway between (and thus rotated 45° from) each adjacent pair of
the four outer points.
By deriving a star stimulus from each of the wedge stimuli used in Experiment 9a,
two categories of stars were obtained, each consisting of 12 training stimuli and
five test stimuli.  In exactly the same way as with the wedge stimuli, these five test
stimuli were made up of the Prototype of the category, along with one Closer
exemplar and three Further exemplars (labelled ‘F’, ‘FF’ & ‘FFF’ as before).
Procedure
The procedure was exactly as described in Experiment 9a, with the star stimulus
for each trial replacing the wedge stimulus from which it was derived.
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Results
One subject reported that they believed they had confused which keys
corresponded to which category of stimuli during the test block.  Although the
mean response accuracy of this subject was above chance to all of the test stimuli,
and followed the same trend as the group means, it was decided to exclude their
data from the analysis, in order to be consistent with the exclusion of one subject’s
data  from the analysis of Experiment 9a.
The results from the remaining 11 subjects in this study, in terms of both mean
response accuracy and reaction time to each of the five pairs of test stimuli, are
shown in Figure 5.7.  Once again, the test stimuli further from the category
boundary tended to be responded to more quickly and more accurately than those
nearer to the other category.
As with Experiment 9a, preliminary analyses were conducted via separate
ANOVAs on the response accuracy, and reaction time, to each of the five test
stimulus pairs, each with stimulus type as the single within-subject factor. The
analysis of mean response accuracy revealed a significant main effect of stimulus
type (F(3,33) = 7.57; εH = 0.82). Planned comparisons revealed that the
Prototypes were responded to significantly more accurately than the Closer
exemplars (F(1,10) = 8.70), but there was no difference between the accuracy of
responding to the Prototypes and that to any of the Further exemplars, nor any
differences in the accuracy of responding between the various Further exemplars
(Fs < 1).
The analysis of reaction times to each of the test stimulus pairs also revealed a
significant main effect of stimulus type (F(1,14) = 5.48; εG = 0.36).  A planned
comparison between the mean reaction times revealed that responding to the
Prototypes was significantly faster than that to the Closer exemplars
(F(1,10) = 10.65).  No differences were found between the mean reaction times to
the different Further exemplars, (Fs < 1), nor between the speed of responding to
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the Prototypes and that to the ‘F’ or ‘FF’ exemplars (larger F = 1.24).  A marginal
difference between the reaction time to the ‘FFF’ exemplars and that to the
Prototypes was found (F = 3.04; p < 0.12).
These data are similar to those from Experiment 9a, in terms of increasing
response accuracy, and speed, with increasing distance from the category
boundary.  In order for the combined data from both parts of Experiment 9 to be
compared by means of ANOVA, stimulus class (i.e. ‘wedge or star’) must be
included as a between-subject factor. The six subjects who contributed data to
both parts of this Experiment present a problem for this analysis, as the non-
independent data from these subjects cannot be included in both levels of a
between-subject factor.  As a result, the second set of data to be collected for each
of these subjects was excluded, leaving eight subjects (for whom the procedure
was novel) in each condition.
The data from these sixteen subjects are shown in Figure 5.8; the pattern was, once
again, one of better performance, on both measures, with increasing distance from
the category boundary. These data were analysed by means of two separate
ANOVAs, conducted on mean reaction time and response accuracy, each with
stimulus type (in terms of distance from the category boundary) as a within-subject
factor, and experiment (wedges or stars) as a between-subject factor.
The analysis of response accuracy revealed a significant main effect of stimulus
type (F(2,28) = 21.82; εG = 0.51), no effect of experiment (F < 1), and no
significant interaction between these factors (F(2,28) = 2.07; εG = 0.51). Planned
comparisons between the accuracy of responding across both conditions revealed
that the Prototypes were more accurately responded to than the Closer exemplars
(F(1,14) = 22.42), but no differences between the accuracy of responding to the
‘FFF’ exemplars and that to the Prototypes (Fs < 1).
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The analysis of mean reaction times to the different stimuli revealed a very similar
pattern, with a significant main effect of stimulus type (F(4,56) = 4.44), and no
significant effect of experiment, nor interaction between these factors (Fs < 1).  A
series of planned comparisons again  revealed significantly faster responding to the
Prototypes than to the Closer exemplars (F(1,14) = 8.11), but no significant
differences between the speed of responding to the ‘FFF’ exemplars and that to the
Prototypes (F(1,14) = 1.09).
Discussion
These results show much the same overall pattern as was found in Experiment 8.
Despite having experienced a smaller range of stimuli, subjects were able to
respond at least as accurately and rapidly to stimuli further from the category
boundary, and thus better instances of the long-thin or short-fat ‘rule’, than the
Prototypes.  Although the increase in performance, in terms of increased speed and
accuracy, across the Further exemplars was not significant, there is no tendency
within these studies for a peak of performance at the Prototypes, ‘F’ or ‘FF’
exemplars, with a subsequent decline to ‘FFF’; both measures indicate a monotonic
increase in performance with increased distance from the category boundary.
In all of the categorisation studies described above, the basic task of the subject
was  ‘predictive’:  they were required to predict which response would be correct
on the basis of each stimulus that was presented.  This is a different task to that
which is employed in the type of incidental learning paradigm developed below.  In
the incidental tasks, the subject was required to react to a response signal which
was signalled by the categorical stimulus. The deployment of cognitive strategies
was discouraged by time pressure, and the presence of ‘distracter’ trials on which
the required response could not be anticipated.  Experiment 10 was designed to
produce a task that was as similar as possible to the incidental learning paradigms,
but in such a way as to allow the subjects to generate, and employ, a ‘cognitive
strategy’ similar to that which appeared to be used by the subjects in Experiments
8 and 9.
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Experiment 10
Subjects
The subjects were 16 undergraduate students of the University of Cambridge,
seven of whom were female, and nine male.  The subjects were recruited via
advertising, and were paid for their participation.  The subjects were divided at
random into two groups, ‘star’ and ‘wedge’.
Apparatus
The apparatus was exactly as described in Experiment 9a
Stimuli
The stimuli were the star and wedge stimuli, and the response lights, that were
used in Experiments 9a and 9b, along with two types of control stimuli: ‘crosses’
and ‘hexagons’, examples of which are shown in Figure 5.9.  24 examples of these
stimuli were used; the parameters for each of these 48 stimuli are described in
Appendix I.
Procedure
The subjects were given the following instructions for the task, which were read
out by the experimenter.
“In this experiment, a series of shapes will appear on the screen, in between two
circles.  Occasionally, after certain shapes have appeared, one of these two circles
will ‘fill’ or ‘light up’. When the circle lights up, you must press one of two keys, ‘?’
or ‘z’, corresponding to which of the two lights (right or left) it was. Please use the
middle fingers of each hand to make the response.
You should be able to use the shapes that appear in the centre of the screen to
predict when a light is going to appear.  Some shapes may predict that the left-hand
circle will light up, and others may predict the right-hand circle will light up.  Other
shapes may never be followed by a light.
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If you press the correct key, the computer will move immediately on to the next trial.
If you press the other key, the computer will sound a ‘beep’ before moving on to the
next trial.  Please concentrate on making the correct response each time one of the
lights appears.
If you press an invalid key (a key other than ‘?’ or ‘z’), anticipate the signal ( press a
key before the light appears), or fail to respond within 2 seconds, the computer will
display a message telling you so, before moving on to the next trial. The ‘time-out’ of
two seconds should not be a problem, as this will give you ample time to respond.
There will be six blocks of trials: at the end of each block you will be told your mean
reaction time, and the number of mistakes you made.
Please try to go as quickly as you can, without making mistakes.  In each block, the
signals will appear slightly more quickly following the shapes than in the previous
block.  Nothing else about the experiment will change between the blocks.  The final
two blocks are test blocks, when the signals will appear very quickly.  Please
concentrate on responding as quickly and as accurately as you can in these two
blocks.
Each block will start with a message: ‘Press spacebar to start training block’, or
‘Press spacebar to start test block’.  The first trial will begin as soon as you press the
spacebar.
This experiment should last about 20 minutes. If you have any questions about what
will be required of you in this experiment - please ask now”
As soon as the subject pressed the spacebar to begin a block, the first trial began.
Each training block consisted of 192 trials, on each of which a ‘predictor shape’
appeared in the centre of the screen. These 192 trials consisted of two
presentations of each of the 24 exemplars of each stimulus type, in a random order
that was independently generated for each block.  The order was constrained to
prevent presentation of wedge or star stimuli on the first or second trial of each
block, or consecutive presentations of either two stars or two wedges.
Each trial started with the screen cleared except for the two response circles.  The
shape appeared after an variable interval in the range 150-300ms, and remained on
screen for 75ms.  At the offset of this display period, the screen cleared once more,
and the next trial began.  This procedure was the same on every trial not involving
a critical shape.  The critical shapes for subjects in the ‘star’ group were stars, for
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those in the ‘wedge’ group it was the wedge stimuli  On trials that did involve
presentation of a critical shape, the appropriate response light (left for stimuli from
category 1, right for stimuli from category 2) would appear.
The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between predictor shape and response light
was 75ms in the first training block, and reduced by 10ms each block, so that
throughout the fourth and final training block the SOA was 45ms. The trials
involving the other stimuli were not changed across the blocks; these shapes were
always presented for 75ms.  The response light and the critical stimulus remained
on the screen until the subject made a response to the keyboard, for a maximum of
2-sec. Once a response was recorded, the screen cleared and the next trial was
started. If the response made was incorrect, e.g. pressing the ‘?’ key after the left-
hand response light had appeared, the computer sounded a ‘beep’ as the screen
cleared. A response to a key other than ‘z’ or ‘?’, a response before the appearance
of the signal, or a failure to respond within two seconds of the response light
appearing resulted in the termination of the trial, and the relevant message (all such
messages were identical to those in Experiment 9) was displayed for 1-sec.
The two test blocks were each 196 trials long, consisting of 96 ‘cross’ and
‘hexagon’ presentations, as in the training blocks, and five presentations of each of
the 10 test exemplars of both the wedge and the star stimuli. The order of all 196
trials was randomised independently for each block, with the constraints on the
position of the wedge and star presentations being the same as those described for
the training blocks. The SOA between the test stimuli of each subjects ‘critical
shape’ and the response lights was 10ms throughout both test blocks; the
presentations of the ‘cross’, ‘hexagon’, and non-critical test stimuli lasted for
75ms, as in the training blocks.
After completing the second and final test block the subjects were asked three
questions:
1)  Were you able to tell on which trials a response signal would appear?
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2)  Were you confident that you knew, on most of these trials, on which side the response light
would appear?
 
3)  What information, or strategy, did you use to predict where and when the light would occur?
Results
Three subjects, one from the ‘star’ group and two from the ‘wedge’ group,
reported that they were unable to tell, on any trials, whether the response required
would be on the left or the right, although they did report being able to predict on
which trials a response signal would be given.  The remaining 13 subjects were all
able to report some knowledge of the categorisation rule, along the lines of  ‘long
wedges went to the right’ or ‘small stars predicted the left light’.
The test results of these 13 subjects are shown in Figure 5.10. As in Experiments 8
& 9, there was a trend for responding to be more accurate, and faster, for stimuli
further from the category boundary. The analysis of the test results were
conducted by means of two separate ANOVAs on the mean reaction time and
response accuracy to each of the five test stimulus pairs, each with group (‘star’ or
‘wedge’) as a between-subject factor, and stimulus type as a within-subject factor.
The analysis of the reaction time data revealed no significant effect of either
stimulus type or group, nor any interaction between these two factors (largest
F(1,11) = 1.57).  The analysis of response accuracy revealed a significant main
effect of stimulus type (F(4,43) = 6.32; εH = 0.99), but not of group (F < 1), with
a marginally significant interaction between these two factors (F(4,43) = 2.32;
p < 0.08).  Investigation of this interaction was conducted by means of a simple
effects analysis.  This analysis revealed a significant effect of stimulus type for both
group ‘star’ and group ‘wedge’ (smaller F(4,44) = 3.22).  The effect of group was
non-significant for all of the test stimulus pairs (largest F(1,11) = 1.05) other than
the ‘FF’ exemplars; the wedge stimuli of this pair were responded to marginally
more accurately than the corresponding star stimuli (F(1,11) = 4.25; p < 0.07).
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A set of planned comparisons revealed that the ‘FF’ exemplars were responded to
significantly more accurately than the Prototypes (F(1,11) = 8.45), and that the
Prototypes were in turn responded to significantly more accurately than the Closer
exemplars (F(1,11) = 8.21).  No significant difference was revealed between the
accuracy of responding to the Prototypes and that to the ‘F’ exemplars, nor
between the responding to the ‘F’ and to the ‘FFF’ exemplars (larger
F(1,11) = 1.15).
A combined analysis of the data collected in all three ‘explicit’ categorisation
experiments (Experiments 8-10) was conducted. Overall mean accuracy and
reaction time varied somewhat between these three experiments, presumably
because of differences in stimuli, instructions and task requirements. The data from
each subject was therefore scored relative to the overall mean performance on that
experiment (e.g. the mean Prototype RT for each subject in Experiment 8 was
divided by the mean RT across all test trials in Experiment 8), and the resulting
data are shown in Figure 5.11. The data were analysed by means of two separate
ANOVAs, each with experiment9 as a between-subject factor and stimulus type as
a within-subject factor.
The analysis of response accuracy revealed a significant effect of stimulus type
(F(2,93) = 37.26; εG = 0.57), and an interaction between stimulus type and
experiment (F(5,93) = 4.85; εG = 0.57).  Due to the nature of the transformation of
the data, no overall effect of experiment could be found, as the experiment group
means were all equal to 1.  Investigation of this interaction, by means of a simple
effects analysis, revealed a significant effect of experiment on the response
accuracy to the Closer and the ‘FFF’ exemplars (smaller F(2,41) = 3.24), and a
significant effect of stimulus type on response accuracy in Experiments 8 & 9
(smaller F(4,164) = 20.36), but not in Experiment 10 (F(4,164) = 1.28).  The
effect of experiment on the responding to the Closer and ‘FFF’ exemplars
                                               
9
 As the ‘star’ stimuli were not used in Experiment 8, data from subjects in Experiments 9 & 10 were
included in a single group; ‘star’ versus ‘wedge’ was not taken out as a factor.  The data from
Experiment 9 was that from the first session participated in only, i.e. those 16 subjects included in the
combined analyses reported in Experiment 9b.
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presumably arises from the change in training stimuli; the original ‘overlapping’
training set was used in Experiment 8, whereas the ‘compressed’ set was used in
Experiments 9 & 10.
Planned comparisons of the mean response accuracy to the different stimulus types
revealed that the ‘FFF’ exemplars were responded to significantly more accurately
than the ‘F’ exemplars, and that the Prototypes were responded to significantly
more accurately than the Closer exemplars (smaller F(1,41) = 4.59), with
marginally more accurate responding to the ‘F’ exemplars than to the Prototypes
(F(1,41) = 3.26; p < 0.08).
A very similar pattern was revealed by the analysis of reaction times, with a
significant effect of stimulus type (F(2,88) = 15.77; εG = 0.54), and an interaction
between stimulus type and experiment (F(4,88) = 5.63; εG = 0.54).  A simple
effects analysis revealed that the effect of stimulus type on reaction time was
significant only in Experiments 8 & 9 (smaller F(4,164) = 6.78), but not in
Experiment 10 (F < 1).  No effect of Experiment was found for any stimulus type
(largest F(2,41) = 2.02). Planned comparisons of mean reaction time revealed that
the ‘FFF’ exemplars were responded to significantly more rapidly than the ‘F’
exemplars, which were in turn were responded to significantly more rapidly than
the Prototypes, and that the Prototypes were responded to significantly more
rapidly than the Closer exemplars (smallest F(1,41) = 5.08).
Discussion
The performance of human subjects on a categorisation task involving stimuli
which vary along two perceptual dimensions was similar in all the experiments
reported within this chapter: response accuracy increased, and response latency
decreased, with increasing distance of novel test stimuli from the category
boundary.  Thus the categorisation of Further exemplars was superior to that of
the Prototypes, and improved with greater distance from the boundary. These
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results are clearly distinct from those found with pigeons (Experiment 2), in which
categorisation performance reached a peak at a point a little beyond the Prototypes
of the positive training stimuli, and decreased with further movement from the
category boundary.
The pattern found within this Chapter, of a monotonic increase in performance
with an increase in distance from the category boundary, was not altered by a
variety of manipulations of the design: changing the variability of the training
stimuli; substituting a pair of ‘correct response’ lights for the feedback messages;
changing the categorical stimuli from the original ‘wedge’ shapes to ‘stars’; and
changing the task from a ‘predictive’ categorisation task to a ‘reactive’ task based
on the categorical information, all produced similar patterns of responding.
Several explanations could be given for the difference between the results found in
this chapter, and those which were found with pigeons, including:
1)  The performance of humans in categorisation tasks (and thus the learning of
human categories and ‘verbal concepts’, if we accept these tasks as useful
laboratory analogues thereof) cannot be understood in terms of the simple
‘associative’ mechanisms that account for the performance of pigeons.
2)  The ways in which humans and pigeons represent the stimuli used in the two
types of task are dissimilar.  Thus, although the associative mechanisms believed
to underlie the categorisation behaviour of pigeons do also operate in humans,
the representations on which they are operating are dissimilar, producing
dissimilar patterns of results.
3)  When presented with a laboratory categorisation task, humans are capable of
applying a variety of cognitive strategies to control their behaviour.  Although
associative learning may play a part in human learning, in terms of learning
contingencies between different ‘events’ (be they distal stimuli, elements of
stimuli, or variation of some internal state), these processes are not at work in
this case.  A set of processes based on the subjects’ ‘symbolic’ knowledge,
which may not be best understood in ‘simple’ associative terms, is employed;
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subjects search for, and apply, a strategy which enables them to solve the task in
an abstract manner.
4)  The peak shift found in pigeons with this type of stimulus was a consequence of
the go/no-go categorisation task.  Thus, although the pigeons displayed a peak
shift, whereas the human subjects (who were making different responses to each
of the categories) did not, this does not necessarily indicate that the
‘knowledge’ that was underlying performance in the two species was
different10.
These are not intended as an exhaustive list of potential explanations for the
differences in results found with human and pigeon subjects. However, if human
subjects showed a peak shift on a categorisation task highly similar to that in
Experiment 10, constructed in such a way as to minimise both the incentive, and
opportunity, to develop and apply the type of ‘strategy’ suggested in item (3), this
explanation would clearly be the only candidate able to account for such a
combination of results. Two such studies are described in the following chapter.
                                               
10
 To illustrate: A network similar to  that presented in Chapter 4 with two output units was constructed by
Shanks (1991).  If, following training,  the associations between stimulus elements and the ‘left
response’ unit were similar to those underlying the peak shift in Experiment 7 (simulation 1), and a
symmetrical ‘opposite’ set of associations were formed with a ‘right response’ unit, it would be
reasonable to describe the ‘knowledge’ within this network as similar to that within the model presented
in Chapter 4.  As the choice of responses in the Shanks (1991) model is based upon the ratio of
activations elicited in the two response units by a novel stimulus, this model predicts a pattern of
monotonic increase in performance with increased distance from the category boundary.
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Chapter 6                                                Implicit Categorisation
6.1 Categorisation and Implicit Learning
The experiments reported in this chapter were designed to produce a
categorisation task for human subjects in which they would not use a ‘cognitive’
strategy.  This can be regarded as an attempt to generate what has been widely
referred to as ‘implicit learning’: a term used to describe situations in which
subjects learn information whilst seemingly ‘unaware’ of what they have learned
(e.g. Reber, 1967; see Berry & Dienes, 1993 for review).  Shanks and St. John
(1994) have argued that no clear demonstrations of ‘implicit learning’ have yet
been achieved; the dissociations that have been found on a variety of tasks where
evidence of learning is found on a performance test, in the absence of above-
chance performance on separate tests of awareness, do not, they argue, represent
evidence for the existence of a separate ‘implicit’ learning mechanism. Such
dissociations may arise from differences in sensitivity of the two types of test, or
from differences in the type of information that the tests are measuring.  Although
I shall use the term ‘implicit learning’ to describe the following experiments, I do
so initially in respect of the general paradigm only.  Investigation of whether the
learning that occurs during this type of training is ‘implicit’, in the sense of being
independent of any ‘awareness’ on the part of the subject will be undertaken in
Appendix II.
Experiment 11
Subjects
The subjects were six adults, three male and three female. Five of the subjects were
right-handed, and the other left-handed. Five of the subjects were undergraduate or
post-graduate students of Cambridge University or Anglia Polytechnic University.
The final subject was a graduate of a vocation Further Education course.  Subjects
were recruited by means of advertisement, and were paid £3:60 per hour for their
participation, plus a ‘bonus payment’ depending upon their performance.
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Apparatus
The experiment was run on an Acorn A500 RiscOS 3.11 machine fitted with a
Computer Concepts ColourCard Gold video driver, and AKF55 monitor. The
presentation of stimuli and recording of responses was conducted automatically by
the computer, using a program shell in Acorn Basic V.  The subjects were seated
at least 1m from the screen, with the keyboard directly in front of them.
Stimuli
The stimuli used in this experiment were of two main types: ‘predictor’ stimuli and
response signals.  All stimuli were presented in black against a white background.
The predictor stimuli used were of three types: wedge, star and cross; only the
wedge stimuli were actually predictive of the trail outcome. The wedge stimuli
were those that were used in Experiment 8, reproduced on the same scale as in
Experiments 9 & 10, such that 100 units = 70mm on the computer screen; thus the
Prototype of category 1 had a radial line length of 16.1mm [23 units], and an
internal angle of 57°. The 12 training exemplars of each category were used in the
training blocks, and the five test stimuli from each category in the test blocks. The
construction of the categories is illustrated in Figure 2.7.
The remaining predictor stimuli were two sets of 24 distracter stimuli: ‘cross’ and
‘star’ stimuli11.  The cross stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 10.
The star stimuli were constructed as illustrated in Figure 5.6, with the parameters
given in Appendix I.  A hollow square, 14mm across, appeared in place of a
predictor shape on the first six ‘warm-up’ trials of each block. The response signal
locations were marked by two black circles, 10mm in diameter, 75mm to the right
and left of the centre of the screen.  These stimuli remained on screen at all times
                                               
11
 For simplicity in discussing the design, the star stimuli will be described as 24 distinct exemplars.  Due
to the manner in which the star stimuli were constructed, however, each star exemplar was physically
identical to exactly one other star (see Appendix II), thus only 12 phsyically distinct stimuli were used.
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except when a feedback message was displayed.  A response signal was a black
disc, appearing in place of one of the two circles (equivalent to that circle ‘filling
in’).  The screen was thus highly similar to the display used in Experiments 9 & 10
(illustrated in Figure 5.4) although stimuli were presented as white-on-black, rather
than black-on-white, in this experiment.
Procedure
At the start of the first experimental session the subjects were given the
instructions for the task.  These were as follows:
“A series of shapes will appear in the centre of the screen, between two hollow
circles.  After each shape appears, one of the two circles will fill in.  I would like to
you respond by pressing the ‘.’ key every time the right circle fills in, or the ‘x’ key
when the left circle fills in.  Please try to respond as quickly as you can, without
making errors.
If you do make an error, the computer will sound a ‘beep’, but still move
immediately on to the next trial. After each error, please concentrate so that you do
not make an error on the next trial.  Faster and more accurate performance will be
rewarded by a larger bonus at the end of the experiment;  If you make more than 2
errors in a block, your bonus will be reduced.
If you make an error by responding before either circle has filled, respond with a key
other than ‘.’ or ‘x’, or fail to respond within two seconds, the computer will display
a message stating the error you made, before moving on to the next trial.
For best performance on this task, please try to fixate your eyes on the centre of the
screen, where the shapes appear, and try to rest during the breaks you will be given.
Each break will come at the end of a block; the computer will display your mean
reaction time and the number of errors you made during that block.  Please note
these down on the sheet provided so that you can monitor your performance as you
proceed.
The first six trials at the start of each block are warm-up trials, which do not count
towards your bonus; on these trials the shape appearing in the centre of the screen
will be a small square.”
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After being given these instructions, and any clarification that was required, the
subject was given a single training block, with the experimenter in the room. The
procedure of the training blocks is described in detail below. At the end of this
block, the subject was given a record sheet for the session.  This sheet contained
spaces in which each subject wrote their mean correct reaction time and number of
errors made during each block. The session then continued with ten further
training blocks, with the experimenter absent.  After each block, the subject noted
down the information (mean RT, errors) on the record sheet before continuing
with the next block.  At the end of the session, a bonus for fast and accurate
performance was calculated and told to the subject.
The bonus for each session started at £1, and was reduced by an amount according
to the mean reaction time, at a penalty of  0.175p per millisecond.  An additional
penalty of (5p *[errors-2])  was deducted on any block on which more than 2
errors were made; any block on which less than 2 errors were made increased the
bonus by 1p if only one error was made, or by 2p if no errors were made.
Training Blocks
Each training block consisted of 150 trials, the first six of which were warm-up
trials, on which the square stimulus was presented. The following 146 experimental
trials consisted of two presentations of each of the three sets of 24 ‘predictor’
stimuli in a random order that was independently generated for each block.  The
order was constrained to prevent presentation of the truly predictive ‘wedge’
stimuli in the first two trials following the warm-up stimuli, or consecutive
presentations of two  wedges.  The order of presentation of wedge stimuli was also
constrained such that the first 24 wedge trials contained each of the 24 training
stimuli, in a random order, and these stimuli were then presented a second time
during the final 24 wedge trials, again in an independent random order.  The order
of presentations of the 96 star and cross distracter stimuli was entirely
unconstrained.
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Each of the wedge stimuli was consistently followed by one of the two response
signals; the stimuli from category 1 were followed by a ‘left’ signal on both
occasions that they were presented during a block, whereas those from category 2
were followed by a ‘right’ signal.  Each star and cross stimulus was followed
equally often by a ‘left’ signal and by a ‘right’ signal.  For each individual star or
cross stimulus, the first presentation during a block was followed by either a left or
right response signal, selected at random; the second presentation was followed by
the opposite signal.
The session started with a press of the spacebar, and the two hollow circles
appeared on the screen. These were displayed at the start of each trial. The
predictor shape for the trial then appeared after a SOA that varied at random in the
range 250ms - 500ms. The response signal for the trial lit up after a further SOA of
250ms. The subject then had up to 2-sec to make a keyboard response. As soon as
they did, the screen cleared to just the two hollow circles and the next trial began.
If the subject made an incorrect response, i.e. the response that was not signalled,
the computer emitted a ‘beep’ as the screen cleared. If a response was made to a
key other than the two response keys, or was made before the signal, but after the
predictor shape, that trial was immediately terminated, and a message (‘You
pressed an invalid key’, or ‘You anticipated the signal’) was displayed for 1-sec
before the start of the next trial.  Similarly, if the subject failed to make a response
within 2-sec of the response signal, the computer displayed the message ‘You did
not respond in time’ for 1-sec before starting the next trial.  At the end of the 150
trials, the message ‘Block Over’ was displayed, along with the mean correct
reaction time (in ms) and the number of errors made, during the 144 experimental
trials; the subjects noted these down on the response sheet provided.
Training sessions continued, each consisting of 11 training blocks, with the
subjects sitting two sessions consecutively on each day, until a training criterion
was reached. All previous experiments, with both human and pigeon subjects, had
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produced a categorisation advantage for Further exemplars relative to Closer
exemplars at test.  It was not known how much training would be needed for
subjects to learn about the categorical contingencies between the wedge stimuli
and the response requirements; nor was it possible, in this paradigm, to use
percentage correct responses as a measure of performance to establish that
subjects had learned to categorise the stimuli. The ‘correct’ response could be
elicited purely by the response signal on each trial, and subjects were, by and large,
responding accurately on over 90% of the trials.
The criterion was therefore based upon faster and more accurate responding to
training exemplars further from the other category than to those closer to the other
category.  The twelve training stimuli from each category were made up of six
distortions of the Prototypes towards the other category (‘near’ training
exemplars), and six distortions away from the other category (‘far’ training
exemplars). Subjects were deemed to have reached criterion if they responded both
faster, and more accurately, to ‘far’ exemplar wedge trials than to ‘near’ exemplar
wedge trials in each of the two sessions in one experimental day.  A minimum of
seven, and a maximum of eleven, sessions of training were given.
Test Sessions
On the test day,  subjects were given two consecutive test sessions consisting of a
single training block followed by 10 test blocks.  The subjects were given no
indication that these test sessions differed in any way from the previous sessions.
The test blocks were similar to the training blocks, with the test exemplars from
the two categories of the wedge stimuli in place of the 24 training exemplars.
There were five presentations of each of the 10 test stimuli from each category,
rather than the 48 presentations of training exemplars.  In order to accommodate
the extra trials, one of each of the 48 presentations of cross and star stimuli from
the training blocks was omitted, at random.  The wedge stimuli were, as in the
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training blocks, followed by a left signal if they were from category 1, and a right
signal if they were from category 2. The star and cross stimuli trials were identical
to those in the training blocks, other than the excluded second presentation of a
single stimulus from both the cross and star sets.
Questionnaire
Immediately following the final test block of the second test session, the subjects
were given a series of tasks similar to the experiments described in the previous
chapter12. At the end of these categorisation tasks, the subjects were given a
questionnaire to determine their verbal knowledge of the contingencies in the
implicit learning task.
The subjects were read the following information and questions, and their answers
noted by the experimenter.
“This questionnaire refers to the reaction-time sessions that you experienced before
this final  test session.  Please try to base your answers on what you thought about
the reaction time task while you were doing it.
1)  Is there anything that you wish to report about  the task?
2)  Did you notice anything special about the task or the stimuli?
3)  Did you notice any relationship between the stimuli and the responses you made
in this task?
4)  Did you notice any difference between the final two sessions and the previous
ones?
5)  Some stimuli predicted which response (left or right) was required on a given
trial. Can you say which? Can you say which response went with which stimulus?
                                               
12
 The purpose of these tasks was to investigate ‘transfer’ of the learning from the implicit task to an
explicit task; the results were somewhat inconclusive, however, thus the procedures used are not
discussed here.  See Appendix II for more details.
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Results
Two response measures were used to evaluate performance on the ‘reaction time’
task: error rate and mean correct reaction time. Trials on which a subject had made
an anticipation error, failed to respond, or made an invalid response were
excluded. Error rates were thus calculated for each test stimulus as a percentage of
valid responses that were incorrect, e.g. the ‘wedge’ percentage error rate was
calculated by:
100 * incorrect responses to wedge stimuli / (correct responses to wedge stimuli + 
incorrect responses to wedge stimuli)
Three of the subjects reached the criterion of faster and more accurate responding
to the Further training exemplars than to the Closer training exemplars in both
sessions (the sixth and seventh) of the third experimental day.  One of these
subjects was tested the following day, and another after a 2 day break.  The third
subject was unable to participate for the following week, and was therefore given
two training sessions on the day after this break, and then tested the following day.
The remaining three subjects all received 5 days (11 sessions), after which they
were tested. None of these subjects had a break of more than a day between the
final training sessions and the test sessions.
The results of the training sessions, in terms of mean reaction times and percentage
error rates to the different types of stimuli,  are shown in Figure 6.1.  The data
from sessions 1-7 only are shown, as these sessions are those in which data was
collected from all 6 subjects. The mean reaction time to each type of stimulus fell
across the first seven sessions, with faster responding to the Further training
exemplars than that to either the control stimuli or to the Closer training
exemplars.  The error rates were low,  and similar for all sessions, with ‘far’ wedge
exemplars being responded to more accurately than ‘near’ wedge exemplars, which
were in turn responded to more accurately than the distracter stimuli.  Analysis of
the training data was undertaken by means of two separate ANOVAs, each with
session and stimulus type (star, cross, ‘close’ wedge or ‘far’ wedge) as within-
subject factors, conducted on the reaction time and percentage error rate data
shown in Figure 6.1
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The analysis of reaction time data revealed a significant effect of training session
(F(6,30) = 5.07), with no effect of stimulus type (F(1,6) = 2.38; εG = 0.40), nor
any interaction between these factors (F < 1).  The analysis of error rates, by
contrast, revealed a significant effect of stimulus type (F(3,15) = 27.43), with no
effect of session, nor any interaction between the two factors (larger F(2,8) = 1.19
εG = 0.25).  A planned comparison of the response accuracy to the different types
of training stimuli revealed no significant difference between the ‘close’ and ‘far’
wedges (F(1,5) = 2.89; p > 0.1).  A Scheffé test revealed no difference between
the accuracy of responding to the different types of control stimuli (F < 1).  A
further planned comparison did reveal, however, that the overall accuracy of
responding to wedge stimuli was more accurate than that to the control stimuli
(F(1,5) = 47.46).
The first analysis of the test data that was undertaken was to determine whether
error rates and reaction times to the test wedge stimuli were lower than those to
the control stimuli. The data used for this analysis were taken from the ten test
blocks of each of the two test sessions. The null hypothesis was therefore that the
reaction time and probability of an error on a trial was independent of whether the
response signal was preceded by a wedge, cross or star stimulus. As there was
considerable variability between subjects in terms of absolute error rates and
reaction times, the data for each stimulus type were calculated as a percentage of
‘baseline’ performance, calculated on responses to all trial types within the test
blocks (except warm-up trials).  These data are shown in Figure 6.2; analysis was
conducted by means of one-sample t-tests, comparing performance on wedge trials
with the H0 population mean (100%). Responding on wedge trials was found to be
significantly more accurate, and faster than the baseline performance across all
trials (smaller t (5) = 3.21).
I argued that the results of Experiments 8 & 9 indicated that the subjects in those
studies had abstracted a response ‘strategy’ or rule, which they were able to use to
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respond to novel stimuli.  In response to the questionnaire, none of the subjects in
this experiment reported having learned such a strategy or rule; three of the six
subjects stated (before Question 5 was given, which informed the subjects of the
rule) that they believed no such rule existed, a fourth stated that the warning
stimuli were ‘distracting’ and that the task would have been easier had they
remained constant, and the remaining subjects reported being unaware of the rule
during training and test sessions.  If ‘awareness’ of the rule was a necessary
condition for using it, and if in the absence of such a rule subjects represented the
stimuli in the same way as pigeons, the prediction that follows is that they should
show a peak shift, i.e. that their responding will be most accurate, and most rapid,
to the ‘F’ or perhaps ‘FF’ stimuli, and that accuracy and speed will be lower for
responding to the ‘FFF’ test stimuli.
The data from the mean reaction time to each of the different test stimuli are
shown in Figure 6.3.  The overall pattern was relatively similar to that found in
Experiments 8-10; movement away from the category boundary tended to produce
an increase in speed of responding - although the pattern of performance across the
Further exemplars varied somewhat across the two test sessions. The analysis of
the reaction time data was conducted using an ANOVA, with session and stimulus
type as within-subject factors, on the mean reaction time to each of the five types
of test stimulus. This analysis revealed a significant effect of stimulus type
(F(4,18) = 5.15; εH = 0.90), with no effect of session, and no significant interaction
between these factors (larger F(2,9) = 2.10; εG = 0.47).  Planned comparisons
revealed that the Prototypes were responded to more slowly than the ‘F’
exemplars (F(1,5) = 6.85), but there was no significant difference between the
speed of responding to the Closer exemplars and to the Prototypes, nor any
difference between reaction times to any of the Further exemplars (Fs < 1).
The mean error rates to each of the wedge test stimuli are shown in Figure 6.4.
Although the error rates were extremely low to the wedge stimuli (one subject
making only one error throughout both test sessions), the overall pattern was very
much that predicted by the peak shift account, with responding being most
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accurate to the ‘FF’ exemplars.  However, an ANOVA conducted on the response
accuracy data, with stimulus type and test session as within-subject factors
revealed no significant effects, nor any interaction between the factors (Fs< 1).
The prediction of the ‘associative account’ can be clearly stated: that responding
should be more accurate to ‘close’ Further exemplars (‘F’ and ‘FF’), than to the
‘FFF’ exemplars or to the Prototypes. Although these differences were present as
trends in the data, comparisons of the accuracy of responding to the ‘FF’
exemplars with that to the Prototypes and the ‘FFF’ exemplars, by means of
matched-sample t-tests, revealed no significant differences (ts < 1).
Discussion
The results of this study indicate that subjects, when presented with a task
containing contingencies between a subset of the stimuli and the different
responses, were able to learn something about these contingencies, and showed
transfer of this learning when tested with novel exemplars.  Although not
significant, the results of these transfer tests were moderately promising, with a
trend towards a peak shift in overall response accuracy.  No such pattern was
found in the reaction time data, however, with the possible exception of the data
from the first test session.
There are, however, certain problems of interpretation associated with the design
of the experiment.  As can be seen in  Figure 6.1, subjects responded more
accurately to the contingent wedge stimuli than to the control stimuli on the very
first training session.  It is possible, therefore,  that the wedge stimuli somehow
made the response signals more salient or discriminable than did the control
stimuli, and thus that the significantly superior performance found on the wedge
test trials may not have been the result of any learning process.
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Such trend as there was towards a peak shift during test trials could also have
arisen by some means other than the ‘associative’ account that was proposed for
the peak shift found with pigeons, above.  By the end of training, the subjects were
extremely familiar with the training exemplars.  As the ‘FFF’ exemplars were the
furthest from the category boundary, they must have been less similar to the
majority of the wedge training exemplars than the ‘F’ or ‘FF’ stimuli.  If novelty
resulted in less accurate, or slower, responding a ‘peak shift’ could arise from a
summation of two effects: the ‘category boundary’ effect, found in the studies in
the previous chapter, producing an advantage for Further exemplars over the
Prototypes, and the novelty of the ‘FFF’ exemplars producing an advantage for the
near Further exemplars over the distant Further exemplars.
A second study was therefore planned, in which the task was altered slightly.
Experiment 12 was conducted using a four-choice procedure that, it was hoped,
would produce higher error rates in the test sessions. The contingent training
stimuli used were the ‘compressed’ training stimuli used in Experiments 9 & 10,
counterbalanced by using both the wedge, and the star stimuli.  The amount of
training given to subjects was standardised to 7 sessions, and the ‘bonus’ for faster
and more accurate responding was replaced with a ‘score’;  many subjects in
Experiment 11 reported that the rather small increments in bonus they had
achieved were irrelevant as a motivating factor.  The display was also altered, from
black-on-white, to the white-on-black display used in Experiments 9 & 10, as some
subjects had reported discomfort following prolonged viewing of a bright screen.
Experiment 12
Subjects
The subjects were 11 adults, 3 male and 8 female, all of whom were right-handed.
Nine of the subjects were undergraduate students at the University of Cambridge,
one subject was in the final year of  a GCE ‘A’ level course at Hills Rd 6th form
College, Cambridge. The remaining subject had previously completed an ‘A’ level
course. Recruitment was via an advertisement, and subjects were paid £25 for
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participation in five experimental sessions of around one hour in length, held on
consecutive days.
Apparatus
The experiment was run on two Acorn 32-bit RISC computers.  Four of the
subjects were run on an Acorn A500 RiscOS 3.11 machine fitted with a Computer
Concepts ColourCard Gold video driver, and AKF55 monitor.  The remaining
subjects were run on a RiscPC 600 RiscOS 3.5 machine fitted with an AKF70
monitor. The presentation of stimuli and recording of responses was conducted
automatically by the computer, using a program shell in Acorn Basic V.  The
subjects were seated at least 1m from the screen, with the keyboard directly in
front of them.
Task Requirements
The task consisted of a series of four-choice reaction time trials.  On each trial a
predictor shape appeared in the centre of the screen, and was rapidly followed by
one of four response signals.   Each signal was associated with a different response
key. The subjects were instructed to make the appropriate response as quickly as
possible when the response signal appeared.  They were told to fixate on the centre
of the screen, where the shapes appeared, but were given no indication that the
shapes would give them information on which response would be required. The
trials were presented rapidly and divided into blocks of 200.  At the end of each
block subjects were given feedback by means of a numeric score, which increased
with faster and more accurate responding.
Stimuli
All stimuli were presented as white lines on a black background.  The predictor
shapes that appeared on experimental trials were divided into four types: hexagon,
cross, star and wedge; there were 24 of each type.  The 24 cross and hexagon
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stimuli where identical to those used in Experiment 10.  The wedge and star stimuli
were the ‘compressed’ groups described in Experiment 9a & 9b. The signals for
responding were four identical hollow white circles: the left and right response
signals were the same as those described in Experiment 9; the up and down signals
were situated 65mm above and below the centre of the screen.   A square stimulus,
14mm across, was once again used in place of a predictor shape on warm-up trails.
Figure 6.5 shows an example of a screen display on a ‘cross’ trial immediately after
the ‘up’ response had been signalled.
Contingencies
During the training and test blocks, different contingencies were set up between
each stimulus and  which of the response locations would be signalled during trials
on which it was presented. The response signalled on each warm-up trial was
random, so that there was no contingency between the square shape and any of the
response locations.  The hexagon stimuli and cross stimuli were always followed
by either an up or a down signal.  On no trials when an exemplar of these stimuli
was used was a left or a right response signalled.  Each separate hexagon and cross
stimulus was followed equally often by an up signal as by a down signal.
The wedge and star stimuli were always followed by a left signal or a right signal.
For half of the subjects (group wedge), the wedge stimuli were fully contingent,
whereas for the other half  (group star) the star stimuli were fully contingent.  Fully
contingent stimuli were followed only by a right signal or a left signal, depending
on whether the exemplar was from category one or category two.  Thus, for a
subject in the ‘wedge’ group, long thin wedges (from category two) were always
followed by a right signal, whereas short, fat wedges (from category one) were
always followed by a left signal.
The stimuli of the other type for each group were not fully contingent, but each
exemplar was followed equally often by both left and right signals, in a similar way
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to the up/down contingencies arranged for the hexagon and cross stimuli. These
contingencies are summarised in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Probe positions per stimulus in each training block of Experiment 12.
Control Wedges Stars
Hexagon Cross Category 1 Category 2 Category 1 Category 2
Right 0 0 0 2 1 1
Group Left 0 0 2 0 1 1
‘Wedge’ Up 1 1 0 0 0 0
Down 1 1 0 0 0 0
Right 0 0 1 1 0 2
Group Left 0 0 1 1 2 0
‘Stars’ Up 1 1 0 0 0 0
Down 1 1 0 0 0 0
N.B. There were 24 exemplars of types  hexagon & cross; 12 exemplars in each category of wedges and
stars.
Procedure
At the start of the first experimental session the subjects were given the
instructions for the task.  These were as follows:
“This experiment is investigating choice reaction time.  Your task is to make one of
four responses (key presses) following one of four different signals.  The signals will
be in the form of one of four circles lighting up.  On each trial, a simple shape will
appear in the centre of the screen, with four circles around it: above, below, left and
right.  One of these circles will fill, or light up.  Please press the key corresponding
to that position as fast as possible.  The keys are: ‘z’ for left, ‘x’ for up, ‘.’ for down
and ‘?’ for right.  Please respond with the first two fingers of each hand, resting
them on the response keys between trials.
After each response, the computer will proceed IMMEDIATELY on to the next trial.
If the response was incorrect, you will be informed by a ‘beep’ from the computer,
but the next trial will still follow immediately.  Please be careful to avoid a string of
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errors - after an error, make sure that you get the next trial correct.  If you make an
invalid response (i.e. a key other than one of the response keys, or no response
within 2 seconds), the computer will display a message for a second explaining the
mistake, and then proceed to the next trial.
At the end of every ‘block’ of 200 trials, you will get a chance to rest and regain
your concentration.  Take this time to ‘relax’ your eyes and arms before continuing.
The computer will display your average reaction time and number of mistakes at the
end of every block, along with a score.  This score indicates how well you are doing
in the session - faster and more accurate responding will result in a higher score.
Please keep note of these on the sheet provided after every block.
The first eight trials of every block are ‘warm-up’ trials, on which the shape in the
centre of the circles is a square:  these trials allow you to get going in every block,
and do not count towards your score.  Best performance will come if you concentrate
on the centre of the screen, where the shapes appear, as this will allow you to
respond quickly to all four screen locations.  Leaning forward too far will mean that
you cannot see all of the screen locations at the same time.”
After being given these instructions, and any clarification that was required, the
subject was given a single training block, with the experimenter in the room.  At
the end of this block, the subject was given a record sheet for the session.  This
sheet contained spaces in which each subject wrote their mean correct reaction
time and number of errors, along with the ‘score’ so far accumulated in the
session. The session then continued with seven further training blocks, with the
experimenter out of the experimental room.  The subject was instructed to write
the information (mean RT, errors and score so far) given after each block on the
sheet before continuing with the next block.
On the following three experimental days, two sessions identical to the first were
run consecutively, with a separate sheet of paper for recording the score etc. for
each session.  On the fifth and final experimental day, two sessions were run,
similar to those on the previous days.  Each of these sessions consisted of a single
training block, followed by seven test blocks.  The subjects were given no
indication that there was any difference between these sessions and those that
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occurred on the previous day.  Following the final test block of the second of these
sessions, the subjects were given a further set of tests (see Appendix II), and a
debriefing questionnaire to determine whether they were aware of the
contingencies during the training and test sessions.
Training Blocks
The first eight trials of each block were warm-up trials, on which the square
stimulus was presented. The following 192 experimental trials consisted of  two
presentations of each exemplar of each of the four types of stimulus, in a random
order that was independently generated for each block.  The order was constrained
to prevent presentation of a wedge or star stimulus on the first or second trial
following the warm-up trials, or consecutive presentations of either two stars or
two wedges.  The contingencies between predictor shape and response signal were
those described above. Each exemplar was presented exactly twice within the
block, in random order.   For the fully contingent stimuli,  both presentations were
followed by the same signal (left for category one, right for category two).   For
the other stimuli, the first presentation was followed by one of the two possible
response signals (e.g. up or down for a hexagon stimulus), selected at random, and
the second presentation of that exemplar was followed by the ‘opposite’ response
signal.
The session started with a press of the spacebar, and the four hollow circles
appeared on the screen. These were displayed at the start of each trial. The
predictor shape for the trial then appeared after a SOA that varied at random in the
range 250ms - 500ms. The response signal for the trial lit up after a further SOA of
250ms. The subject then had up to 2-sec to make a keyboard response. As soon as
they did, the screen cleared to just the four hollow circles and the next trial began.
If the subject made an incorrect response, that is one of the three responses that
was not signalled, the computer emitted a ‘beep’ as the screen cleared. If a
response other than one of  the four keys was made, or a response to the keyboard
after the predictor shape, but before the signal appeared, resulted in termination of
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that trial. A message, ‘You pressed an invalid key’, or ‘You anticipated the signal’
was displayed for 1-sec before the start of the next trial.  Likewise, if  the subject
failed to make a response within 2-sec of the response signal, the computer
displayed the message ‘You did not respond in time’ for 1-sec before starting the
next trial.
At the end of all 200 trials, the message ‘Block Over’ was displayed, along with
the mean correct RT (in ms), and the number of errors made, for the 192
experimental trials.  A ‘running score’ was also given.  This was calculated for
each block in two parts: a ‘speed score’ calculated by  (750 - RT)/ 10 and an
accuracy score given by (10 - NE), where NE is the number of errors made, and RT
is the mean reaction time, in ms, on trials where the correct response was made.
These scores were added, to give the score for the block. This score was added to
the cumulative score for the set of eight blocks.  It was this ‘running score’, along
with the mean RT and the number of errors made, that subjects were asked to note
down at the end of each block.
Test Blocks
The test blocks were similar to the training blocks, except for the presentations of
the star and wedge stimuli. There were 5 presentations of each of the 10 test
exemplars of each category, in place of the 48 training exemplar presentations. The
8 warm-up trials, and the 96 experimental trials on which the hexagon and cross
stimuli were presented were identical to those in the training blocks.  Thus the test
block involved 204, rather than 200 trials.  The trials were ordered in the same
manner as in the training blocks.
The contingencies remained the same for the exemplars from the fully contingent
stimulus group (which were thus always followed by the appropriate response
signal) and exemplars from the hexagon and cross groups. As there were five
presentations of each test exemplar from the non-contingent left/right group in
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each test block, rather than two of each training exemplar, it was not possible for
each non-contingent test exemplar to be followed equally often by the two possible
signals within a block.  Each test exemplar from this group was therefore followed
three times by one signal, and twice by the other, in a given block.  In order to
maintain equal contingencies with the two signals, the signal that had been paired
with an exemplar twice in one block, would be paired with that exemplar three
times in the next block.  All other details, including calculation of the ‘score’, were
identical to the training blocks.
Questionnaire
Following the final test block of the second test session, the subjects were given a
series of tasks intended to investigate the transfer of the learning in the incidental
paradigm to a series of ‘explicit’ tasks.  These will be discussed in Appendix II.
Immediately following the end of these tests, the subjects were read the following
information and questions, and their answers noted by the experimenter.
“This questionnaire refers to the nine reaction-time sessions that you experienced
before this brief test session.  Please try to base your answers on your impressions
of the reaction time task while you were doing it.
1)  Is there anything that you wish to say about the stimuli (the shapes in the centre of
the screen, or the four circles) or the task?
2)  Could you ever predict which of the lights was going to light up?
3)  If so, what helped you make those predictions?
4)  Did you notice anything about the shapes?
5)  Did you suspect the existence of any shape => light rules?
6)  Could you tell me those rules?
7)  Did you notice anything different about the two reaction time sessions today?
8)  Were you aware of the first (reaction time) task helping you in the final
(categorisation) task?
9)  The rules of the reaction time experiment were as follows:
The hexagon and cross stimuli predicted that it would be an up or down trial, but
not which.  The star and butterfly stimuli predicted that it would be a left or a right
trial, and sometimes which.  For some of the subjects, the butterflies could be used
to tell you whether it would be left or right, and for other subjects it was the stars.
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Were you aware of these rules at all?  Do you know (if not please guess) whether
you were a ‘butterfly or star’ subject?”
Results
The results of the training sessions, in terms of mean reaction time and error
frequency to the different types of stimuli, are shown in Figure 6.6.  The reaction
time to each type of stimulus decreased steadily across sessions whilst the error
rate remained more or less constant, with responding on left/right trials (open
symbols) being consistently faster and more accurate than either the up/down trails
(filled symbols).  Responding on the contingent left/right trials was more accurate
than that to the non-contingent left/right trials in every session, and faster in the
second and all subsequent sessions.
Analysis of the data from the training sessions was undertaken by means of two
ANOVAs conducted on the reaction time and percentage correct responses, each
with session and stimulus type (contingent, non-contingent left-right, cross or
hexagon) as within-subject factors. The analysis of reaction time revealed
significant effects of both factors, with a significant interaction between them
(smallest F(2,23) = 10.35; εG = 0.13).  A simple effects analysis conducted upon
this interaction revealed that the effect of stimulus type was significant for every
session, and that the effect of session was significant for each stimulus type
(smallest F(6,60) = 38.26).  Planned comparison of the reaction time to the
different stimuli revealed significantly faster responding to the contingent stimuli
than to the counterbalanced ‘left-right’ non-contingent stimuli, and that the non-
contingent left right stimuli were in turn responded to more rapidly than the up-
down control stimuli (smaller F(1,10) = 9.59). A difference between the speed of
responding to the different types of up-down trials was not anticipated a priori,
and was therefore investigated by means of the Scheffé test. This revealed
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significantly faster responding to the cross, than to the hexagon, control stimuli
(F(3,10) = 3.15; p < 0.08).13
Analysis of the accuracy of responding to the different types of training stimuli
revealed no significant effect of session (F < 1), but a significant effect of stimulus
type, and an interaction between these factors (smaller F(5,55) = 2.97; εG = 0.30).
A simple effects analysis of this interaction revealed a significant effect of session
on response accuracy to both types of left-right trial (smaller F(6,60) = 2.79), but
no effect of session on response accuracy to the up-down trials (Fs < 1).  The
effect of stimulus type was found to be significant for each session of training
(smallest F(3,30) = 3.40).  Planned comparisons of the response accuracy to the
different stimulus types revealed significantly more accurate responding to the
contingent than the non-contingent ‘left-right’ stimuli, which were in turn
significantly more accurate responded to than the ‘up-down’ control stimuli
(smaller F(1,10) = 5.69).  A comparison (again using the Scheffé test) between the
accuracy of the responding to the cross and hexagon stimuli revealed no significant
difference (F(3,10) = 1.17).
As the stimuli used on left-right trials were counterbalanced across subjects, the
only difference between the ‘contingent’ and ‘non-contingent’ trials was the
contingencies between the stimuli and the response lights. The superior
performance on the contingent trials, relative to the non-contingent left-right trials,
therefore indicates that the subjects had learned some form of knowledge about the
categorical contingencies.
Two of the subjects, one from each of the groups, indicated in the questionnaire
that they were aware of the relationships between the two categories of contingent
stimuli and the response lights, and were able thus  to use the predictor shapes to
                                               
13
 Due to the conservative nature of the Scheffé test, the significance levels of such contrasts can be
evaluated with reference to α = 0.1. See Howell (1992; p 364).
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anticipate which response light was going to appear on contingent trials. The test
data from these subjects were therefore analysed separately. Of the remaining
subjects, five were able to state that the star or wedge stimuli predicted left or right
responses, or that the cross or hexagon stimuli signalled up or down.  However,
none of these subjects reported having been aware of the relationship between the
two categories of contingent shapes and which of the left/right response lights
would appear; six of these nine ‘non-strategic’ subjects volunteered that they had
decided to try to ‘ignore’ the predictor shapes, or had tried (and failed) to use the
shapes to predict which of the lights would appear.  The responding of these nine
‘non-strategic’ subjects during the test blocks was first analysed in terms of the
percentage error rates calculated as in Experiment 11, above. Two of these
subjects (one from each of the two groups) showed higher error rates to the
contingent stimuli than to the control stimuli.  These two subjects were deemed
‘unsuccessful’ in learning about the relationship between the contingent stimuli and
response.
This leaves seven subjects who learned to respond more accurately to the
contingent than to the control stimuli, without any ‘explicit’ knowledge of the
contingencies. The accuracy of responding to the five types of control and
contingent stimuli by these seven subjects is shown in the left panel of Figure 6.7.
These data were analysed by means on an ANOVA, conducted on the percentage
error rate scores with stimulus type and contingency as within-subject factors, and
group (‘wedge’ or ‘star’) as a between-subject factor.  This revealed a significant
effect of contingency (F(1,5) = 22.26), but no overall effect of stimulus or group
(F < 1). Neither of the interactions involving stimulus type as a factor was
significant (larger F(4, 20) = 1.53), although the interaction between group and
contingency was found to be marginally significant (F(1,5) = 6.52; p < 0.06). A
simple effects analysis conduced on this interaction revealed no significant effects,
although the effect of contingency in the ‘stars’ condition  was marginally
significant (F(1,5) = 6.17; p < 0.06).
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The significant effect of contingency indicates that the subjects were able to
respond more accurately on trials where the response was predicted by means of
its consistent relationship with the preceding stimulus: this difference can only be
explained by the subjects having learned about these relationships.  The pattern of
responding across the contingent test stimuli was initially investigated by means of
a repeated-measures ANOVA, with stimulus type as the only factor; this revealed
no significant effect of stimulus type (F(2,12) = 2.84; εG = 0.49). The prediction of
the peak shift account is that the responding to the contingent stimuli will be more
accurate to ‘near’ Further exemplars than to either ‘distant’ Further exemplars or
to the Prototype; the overall pattern of responding to the contingent stimuli was
thus consistent with the peak shift, with responding being most accurate to the ‘F’
exemplar.  Comparisons of response accuracy, using two-tailed matched sample t-
tests, revealed significantly better performance to the ‘F’ exemplars than to either
the Prototype or the ‘FFF’ exemplars (smaller t(6) = 2.51).  No difference was
found between the accuracy of responding to the Prototypes and Closer exemplars
(t(6) = 1.04).  Figure 6.7 makes it clear that these seven subjects showed no
decline in accuracy of performance from ‘F’ to ‘FF’ and ‘FFF’ non-contingent
control stimuli; pairwise matched-sample t-tests revealed no differences between
the response accuracies to the non-contingent Further exemplars (largest
t(6) = 1.32).    The implication is that the novelty of the ‘FFF’ stimuli was not, by
itself, sufficient to produce any decline in performance.
Further confirmation that the ‘peak’ at ‘FF’ in response accuracy to the contingent
stimuli could not be accounted for in terms of ‘novelty’ effects can be seen in
Figure 6.8.  The graph shows an ‘error ratio’ calculated for each type of stimulus
to show the effect of contingency on responding to  each stimulus pair.
e.g. Prototype percentage error ratio = 100* (Epn - Epc)/(Epn + Epc), where
Epn = error rate to non-contingent Prototypes;
Epc = error rate to contingent Prototypes.
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The error ratio for the ‘F’ exemplars was the largest, indicating that the
contingency between the stimuli and the signalled responses had the greatest
proportional effect for ‘near’ Further exemplars, as is predicted by the peak shift
account. However, a one way  ANOVA conducted on the error ratios, revealed no
significant effect of stimulus type (F(2,12)=2.16; εG = 0.48).
The accuracy data from the two subjects who reported the use of a ‘strategy’ are
shown in Figure 6.7 by the lines marked with triangles.  An ANOVA, conducted
on the percentage error rates of these subjects, with contingency and stimulus type
as factors, revealed no effect of contingency (F(1,4) = 2.69). However, the pattern
across the contingent Further exemplars is consistent with the ‘strategic’ account
of the data presented in the previous chapter: responding was more accurate with
greater movement away from the category boundary. This pattern is confirmed by
the error ratio data, calculated in the same manner as for the successful subjects,
and shown in Figure 6.8 by the line marked with triangles; the largest error ratio,
and thus the greatest proportional increase in accuracy, was found for the most
distant (‘FFF’) exemplars. An ANOVA, conducted on the error ratio data from
these two subjects, with stimulus type as the only (within-subject) factor, revealed
no significant effect of stimulus type (F(1,1) = 5.51; εG = 0.25). The increase in
accuracy from the ‘FF’ to ‘FFF’ exemplar, as predicted by the ‘rule induction’
account was investigated by means of a matched sample t-test; this revealed a
marginally greater increase in accuracy for responding to contingent ‘FFF’
exemplars,  than to ‘FF’ exemplars, over their non-contingent counterparts
(t(1) = 6.87; one-tailed p < 0.05).
The accuracy data obtained from the two unsuccessful subjects are also shown in
Figure 6.6. An ANOVA was conducted on the percentage error rates from these
subjects, with stimulus type and contingency as (within-subject) factors.  This
revealed a marginal effect of contingency (F(1,1) = 60.34; p < 0.09), with no
effect of stimulus type, nor any interaction between these factors (larger
F(1,1) = 1.58; εG = 0.25). The overall pattern of accuracy data obtained from these
subjects is somewhat difficult to interpret, as they responded less accurately to the
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contingent than the non-contingent stimuli, and thus no further analyses of these
data were undertaken.
The mean reaction times to the different test exemplars for each of the three
groups of subjects (successful non-strategic, strategic and unsuccessful) are shown
in Figure 6.9.  As in Experiment 11, the pattern of these data was somewhat less
clear than that of the error rate data. The ‘successful’ subjects showed a pattern of
reaction time to the contingent stimuli consistent with a peak shift account, with
most rapid responding to the ‘FF’ exemplar.  However, the non-contingent ‘FF’
exemplars were also responded to more rapidly than the other Further exemplars.
The ‘strategic’ subjects showed a pattern of reaction times to the contingent
stimuli rather different from that found in previous Experiments, with responding
being slowest to the ‘FFF’ exemplars.  Finally, the ‘unsuccessful’ subjects showed
a tendency to respond more rapidly to the contingent stimuli than to the non-
contingent stimuli, despite the fact that their responding to the non-contingent
stimuli was more accurate.  The data from the three groups of subjects were
analysed by means of three separate ANOVAs, each with contingency and stimulus
type as factors.  None of these analyses revealed a significant effect of contingency
(largest F(1,1) = 4.02). Thus, although a trend was found within each group
(including the ‘unsuccessful’ subjects) for responding to the contingent stimuli to
be faster than that to the non-contingent stimuli, none of these trends were
statistically reliable.
The analysis of the reaction time data from the seven ‘non-strategic’ subjects did
however reveal a marginally significant interaction between contingency and
stimulus type (F(4,24) = 2.75; p < 0.06), and this was investigated by means of a
simple effects analysis.  This revealed a significant effect of stimulus type for the
contingent stimuli, and a significant effect of contingency on speed of responding
to both the ‘FF’ and ‘FFF’ exemplars (smallest F(4,24) = 2.98).  No effect of
stimulus type on reaction time was found for the non-contingent stimuli, nor any
effect of contingency on speed of responding to the Prototypes, Closer or ‘F’
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exemplars (largest F(1,6) = 2.79).  No difference between the reaction times to the
contingent ‘FF’ and ‘FFF’ exemplars was revealed (F < 1).
Discussion
The results of the seven ‘successful, non-strategic’ subjects make it clear that
people can learn a categorisation task, in the sense of using a distinction between
two categories of variable stimuli to predict a trial outcome, without apparently
any explicit knowledge of these contingencies.  And when they do so, their pattern
of responding to a series of test stimuli demonstrates a peak shift.  They responded
more accurately to Further exemplars than to the Prototypes of the two categories,
and this advantage was greater for ‘near’ Further exemplars than for ‘distant’
Further exemplars.  This result clearly parallels those results reported in Chapter 2
with pigeons and is, as was shown in Chapter 4, easily incorporated into a simple
associative account of categorisation learning.  The two subjects who reported
explicit knowledge of the critical contingencies at the end of the experiment
responded most accurately to the distant Further exemplars, just like the subjects in
Experiments 8-10, above. The implication is that subjects who learned to
categorise (or learned categorical information about) the contingent stimuli
without the use of a cognitive ‘rule’ or strategy did so by means of mechanisms
that produced a peak shift in response accuracy.  Those subjects who did become
aware of the categorisation ‘rule’ did not show this result, but rather that result
found in the ‘explicit tasks’ discussed in the previous chapter.
The reaction time data were somewhat less clear. The ‘successful’ subjects
responded as rapidly to distant Further exemplars as to near Further exemplars,
whereas the ‘strategic’ subjects showed a trend toward the peak shift, with the
‘FFF’ exemplars being responded to most slowly.  The reaction time data were
very variable, however, and these effects were neither large nor significant. And it
is important to note that the reaction time data for the seven ‘successful non-
strategic’ subjects do not contradict the interpretation of the accuracy data as
evidence of a peak shift.  They responded slightly more slowly to ‘FFF’ than to
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‘FF’ exemplars, rather than more rapidly: thus the decrease in accuracy at this
point cannot be attributed to any speed/accuracy trade-off.
Moreover, although not significant, the increase in RT shown by the two strategic
subjects at ‘FFF’ exemplars is reminiscent of other published results.  Nosofsky
(1991) presented subjects with an explicit categorisation task, in which the
categorisation rule was based upon variation along one of two perceptual
dimensions.  When subjects were subsequently tested on very ‘distant’ Further
exemplars, a good deal further from the category boundary than any of the training
exemplars, they responded less rapidly to these stimuli than other novel test stimuli
closer to the category boundary.  However, the subjects responded more
accurately to the distant Further exemplars than to any other test stimuli;  virtually
no errors at all were made in responding to these stimuli.   The results of
Nosofsky’s study, and of the strategic subjects in Experiment 12, could both be
characterised as the application of a cognitive ‘rule’; more accurate responding is
found at greater distances from the category boundary.  However, the speed with
which this rule is applied may plausibly be influenced by ‘novelty’;  application of
the rule to a relatively novel stimulus may be slower than the application to a
familiar stimulus.  Thus strategic responding to distant Further exemplars, although
extremely accurate, could plausibly be slower than that to the (more familiar) near
Further exemplars.
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Chapter 7                                                  General Conclusions
“Life is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises”   Samuel Butler
7.1 Summary of Experimental Results
The experiments presented in this thesis trained pigeons and humans to sort shapes
into two categories, based upon their variation along two perceptual dimensions.
In Chapter 2, pigeons trained on the categorisation task showed a peak shift in
responding to novel transfer items; categorisation performance on near Further
exemplars was superior to performance on the Prototypes or distant Further
exemplars.  This pattern of results is consistent with an account of categorisation
which assumes that learning consists of the formation of associations between the
categorised stimuli and the response, whether the stimuli are represented as a set of
elements (e.g. McLaren et al, 1989; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985; Knapp &
Anderson, 1984) or as discrete configural or ‘instance’ representations (e.g.
Spence, 1937; Pearce, 1987; Nosofsky,1984; Krushke, 1992).
The experiments reported in Chapter 3 found no evidence of this positive peak
shift when the subjects were pre-trained on one of the two categories.  The results
of these experiments should be interpreted with some caution.  In none of them
was there significant evidence of more responding to the Prototypes than to the
Further exemplars.  But it does seem reasonable to claim that the three
experiments, taken in conjunction with those in Chapter 2, provide evidence that
pre-training on a single category, whether positive (excitatory) or negative
(inhibitory), will abolish the peak shift on subsequent test: although the same
experimental design (in the absence of pre-training) was able to generate the effect,
and the test procedure was sensitive enough to reveal the effect when it had been
present, no trend toward the positive peak shift was found in three separate
experiments involving pre-training.
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This abolition of the peak shift is problematic for theories based upon ‘instance’
representations of stimuli (Spence, 1937; Pearce, 1987).  Such theories assume
that the amount of generalisation from training stimuli to novel exemplars is based
purely upon their similarity.  Any explanation of the locus of peak shift and
prototype effects found with the pre-training regimes used in Chapter 3 seems to
require the assumption that different features mediated different amounts of
generalised excitation and inhibition, i.e. produced different shaped ‘generalisation
gradients’.
As shown in Chapter 4, a simple implementation of Rescorla and Wagner’s (1972)
model of Pavlovian conditioning, with the stimuli represented as overlapping sets
of ‘elements’, is capable of accounting for both the prototype effect and the peak
shift in a similar way to the ‘configural’ theories.  The way in which behavioural
control (in terms of associative strength) accrues to individual elements in such a
model allows generalisation functions between two stimuli to change as a result of
experience, and thus for generalisation gradients to change shape. The most
predictive elements will overshadow other elements, thus gaining more associative
strength (and therefore mediating most generalisation).  Such an analysis not only
accounts for the abolition of the positive peak shift by pre-training with the
positive stimuli, but is also capable of accommodating the unexpected results of
Experiments 5 & 6, i.e. the abolition of the peak shift by inhibitory pre-training of
the negative stimuli.  The model is able to do this by assuming that pre-training
produces inhibitory control by common ‘wedge’ elements; this learning then
‘blocks’ the inhibitory conditioning that would otherwise have accrued to S-
elements during discrimination training.
The results of the experiments with human subjects in Chapter 5 showed a
somewhat different pattern of responding to novel stimuli that can be regarded as
evidence of an ability to abstract and apply a cognitive ‘rule’ or strategy.  This is
consistent with the notion that the human subjects, unlike pigeons, were able to
learn the ‘concept’ of long-thin versus short-fat, rather than merely learning the
appropriate response for each stimulus.  This finding (hereafter the ‘category
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boundary effect’), that responding was more accurate and more rapid with
increased distance from the category boundary, was found using a variety of
training and testing procedures, using both ‘wedge’ and ‘star’ stimuli.
By contrast, the results of Chapter 6 revealed that when human subjects were
exposed to the stimuli in a manner designed to minimise their opportunity to form
such a rule, they showed a pattern of responding similar to that found in pigeons,
i.e. a peak shift.  This could be taken as an indication that, in the absence of a
cognitive strategy, humans may learn to respond in what is best characterised as an
‘associative’ manner.
7.2 Theories of Categorisation by Animals
A model using ‘elemental’ representations, such as that presented in Chapter 4,
assumes that learning occurs by variation of independent associative strengths of
constituent elements.  A ‘configural’, or instance model, such as that proposed by
Pearce (1987), assumes that associative strength accrues to an ‘internal
representation’ of a complex stimulus which is fully activated only by the presence
of all elements comprising that stimulus.  One common criticism of the ‘instance’
theories is the large amount of memory capacity that is required for the
memorisation of instances.  Some independent evidence that an instance
memorisation process may be available to pigeons in discrimination tasks can be
found in categorisation tasks where the categories are made up of a large number
of unrelated photographs; Vaughn and Greene (1984) found that pigeons were
capable of solving such problems when 160 photos, assigned at random, were used
as the exemplars for each category.
Although the elemental account has been shown to be capable of accounting for
the results of Chapter 3, which are problematic for instance-based models, it is
known that such a simple single-layer error-correcting network is unable to learn a
variety of problems known to be soluble by both pigeons and humans (Minsky &
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Pappert, 1969). These problems can be characterised as ‘non-linear’ problems,
whose solution requires that the associative strength to a configural stimulus must
be something other than the algebraic sum of the associative strengths of the
component elements.  An ‘elemental’ framework can, however, be modified to
solve non-linear problems by assuming that configural stimuli represent ‘more than
the sum of their parts’: a configuration of discrete stimuli consists not only of those
elements that make up the constituent stimuli, but also of other ‘configural cue’
elements unique to the particular configuration (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
Nonetheless even with the use of configural cues, the Rescorla-Wagner model
cannot predict correctly the relative difficulties of various ‘negative patterning’
problems  (Pearce & Readhead, 1993).
One resolution of the conflicting evidence concerning the relative merits of
analyses using elemental and instance representations might be to allow that both
forms of representation can be set up.  Such a hybrid model might assume that
individual elements may acquire different ‘properties’ (salience, associability or
associative strength) through experience, thus allowing the prediction of
phenomena such as perceptual learning (e.g. McLaren et al, 1989), yet also allow
internal representations or ‘instances’ to acquire associative strength.  It does not
seem unreasonable to imagine that the learning process would eventually establish
a unitary representation of a set of elements that occurred together, that was
independent of the representation of each element in isolation.  Without some
rather precise specification of how such mechanisms operate, however, it is not
clear whether such a model would really provide a more useful theoretical analysis
of discrimination and categorisation than those models already constructed.  The
combination of both forms of representation in a parallel network could produce a
model more computationally powerful than either a ‘configural’ or ‘elemental’
analysis alone.  Such a model would therefore not necessarily be very useful even it
were capable of accounting for a wide range of empirical results; it is likely that
any predictions made would be highly sensitive to parameters such as the relative
associabilities of the direct (elemental) and indirect (configural) associations
between stimulus features and output units.  Without a great deal of precision in
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the specification of such a model, the ‘power’ arising from such a detailed
representation may also result in an associative system capable of learning to solve
problems which are not soluble by the animals whose learning and behaviour we
are attempting to understand.  It seems reasonable to suggest that a combined
‘hybrid’ analysis may be less valuable than the present distinct accounts of
elemental and configural processing, until the circumstances under which each type
of processing predominates have been more precisely determined.
7.3 Theories of Human Categorisation
The dissociations between performance on ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ categorisation
tasks have important implications for several theories of categorisation: Nosofsky’s
(1984) Generalised Context Model, arguably the most ‘successful’ current model
of human performance on categorisation tasks, seems unable to predict such a
difference.  Given that subjects received experience of identical exemplars in both
the implicit and explicit tasks, their representation of these exemplars in
psychological space should have been very similar.  No ‘stretching’ of dimensions
(which is assumed to be the result of experience of differential ‘relevance’ to the
categorisation problem) would be sufficient to accommodate both the ‘category
boundary effect’ found in Chapter 5 and the ‘peak shift’ results found in Chapter 6.
Similar difficulties arise for any attempt to account for these results within a single
connectionist framework of the type outlined in Chapter 1; the stimuli in the
implicit and explicit categorisation studies were identical, and should thus be
represented in similar ways.  One possibility is that the two separate results could
arise from a single connectionist model if the way in which the model ‘decided’ on
responses was different in the two cases.  If the speed and accuracy of a signalled
‘left’ response was assumed to be based solely upon the activation in a ‘left’ output
unit of a network similar to that described in Chapter 4, a peak shift would be
predicted.  However, if the likelihood of the left response on a non-signalled
(explicit) ‘left’ trial was based upon the ratio of two separate ‘left’ and ‘right’
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output units (as in the model presented by Shanks, 1991), similar associative
processes might predict a category boundary effect.
There are several reasons for discounting this explanation:
1)  There was no trend toward a peak shift in Experiment 10, which used signalled
responses in exactly the same manner as the experiments in Chapter 6.
Likewise, those subjects in Experiment 12 who were seemingly aware of the
categorical rule, showed no trend toward a peak shift in response accuracy; on
the contrary, they showed a (marginal) category boundary effect.
2)  Although the application of a ‘ratio rule’ would, in the simplest case, predict a
category boundary effect, this prediction is abolished if any degree of ‘noise’ is
assumed within the associative system. To illustrate:
Taking A1  as the activation of a ‘category 1’ output unit, and A2 as the activation
of a ‘category 2’ output unit, a simple ratio rule would predict that the probability
of a category 1 response, P1, will be given by:
P1 = A1/(A1+A2)
If a sufficiently distant Further exemplar of category 1 is presented, then
activations will be elicited such that A1 > A2, with both A1 and A2 being small
(i.e. A1 ≈ 0; A2 ≈ 0).  This implies that P1 ⇒ 1; a ‘category boundary’ effect is
predicted.
However, if a small amount of noise, ε, is assumed to be present in the system:
P1 = ε+A1/(A1+A2+2ε)
In this case, the same small values of A1 and A2 will result in P1 ⇒  0.5. This
implies a peak shift reduction in the probability of responding correctly to novel
distant Further exemplars.
3)  A final reason for looking for an interpretation of these results in terms of
something other than which ‘decision rule’ a network would use is the lack of
explanatory capacity such an account provides at the psychological level.  It is
not clear how a switch from a ‘ratio rule’ to an ‘absolute’ rule could be
interpreted in terms of the observed dissociation between subjects’ reports of
strategic and non-strategic responding.
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The simplest interpretation seems to be, therefore, that the results of the explicit
and implicit versions of the task cannot be meaningfully accommodated within a
single theory of categorisation. I have argued that these results may be best
interpreted in terms of the operation of two dissociable systems: a simple
associative system, capable of learning the ‘rule-appropriate’ behaviour for each of
the training stimuli (a mechanism that results in a decline in performance to novel
stimuli far from the category boundary, i.e. a peak shift), and a ‘strategic’ system
capable of abstracting and applying rules, responsible for producing ‘rule-
governed’ behaviour to both training stimuli and novel exemplars (i.e. performance
on novel stimuli improving with increased distance from the category boundary).
7.4 A Two-process Analysis of Human Performance
The explanation I have offered assumes, therefore, that human performance is best
understood as resembling a two-process system: a ‘cognitive’ system, which is able
to operate in a manner that approximates a symbolic logic system, and an
associative system, which is capable of detecting ‘stochastic regularities’ in the
external world.  Dissociation between different processing systems within human
cognition has a venerable tradition within psychology, with many different
distinctions having been drawn,  ranging from psychodynamic concepts of the id,
ego and superego (e.g. Freud, 1940); long-term and short-term (or ‘working’)
memory systems (e.g. Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley, 1986); episodic versus
semantic memory recall (e.g. Tulving, 1972); voluntary versus automatic
influences on memory tasks (Jacoby, 1994); and the distinctions discussed above
between ‘implicit’ and explicit learning (e.g. Reber, 1967; Berry & Dienes, 1993).
A simple piece of inductive reasoning suggests that, based on historical precedent,
such dissociations, once made, will always be contraindicated by later analyses.
Nonetheless, McLaren, Green and Mackintosh (1994a) have recently suggested a
‘hybrid’ model of human cognition, closely resembling the type of process
dissociation I outlined above.  If, as I have argued, categorisation problems based
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upon a ‘rule’ can be solved either by the learning of the ‘rule-appropriate’
behaviour to each exemplar (within an associative system), or by the abstraction
and application of the rule itself (within the proposed ‘cognitive’ system), a series
of predictions can be made  regarding when rule-governed, rather than rule-
appropriate, behaviour will be found in such tasks.
Several of these predictions are verified by the experimental evidence presented
above. Pigeons, who are presumed to have solely an associative capacity, tend to
produce ‘rule-appropriate’, rather than ‘rule-bound’ behaviour; human subjects, by
contrast, produce rule-bound behaviour when they are given an ‘explicit’ task, or
instructed to look for such a rule, yet produce the peak shift (‘rule-appropriate’
behaviour) when the task is presented in an ‘implicit learning’ paradigm.  Further
predictions of the ‘hybrid’ analysis are also borne out by categorisation studies:
rule-based behaviour has been shown to be less likely in circumstances where
subjects are presumably unable to utilise the ‘cognitive’ system by the use of a
secondary task during the learning stage (Smith & Shapiro, 1989); and rule
induction is more likely in unspeeded tasks than speeded learning tasks, and less
likely to be found in children (where the ‘cognitive’ system may be anticipated to
be less developed, or less dominant) than in adult subjects (Smith & Kelmer
Nelson, 1984).
So can such an analysis as I have put forward above provide the basis for a
‘general’ framework for the understanding of categorisation and conceptual
behaviour in humans and animals? I believe that it may, and that the resulting
framework could potentially provide accounts for a wide variety of seemingly
disparate empirical, and philosophical issues. Some of the predicates of such a
framework would be as follows:
1)  Everyday human linguistic ‘concepts’ (e.g. ‘chair’, ‘bush’) can be regarded as
the result of categorisation learning arising from an associative, rather than a
rule-induction, process.  Clearly some other concepts, such as scientific
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(‘mammal’), technical (‘claret’) or legal (‘negligence’) terminology are based
upon rules and / or definitions.
2)  In the absence of rule-induction processes, similar associative theories can
provide a wholly satisfactory account for both human and animal categorisation
learning.
3)  Both elemental and configural representations play a role in such learning.
4)  The human ‘cognitive’ system is capable, possibly as a result of linguistic
processes, of representing more complex relationships between stimuli, or
categories within the associative system, and processing these relationships in a
manner that may be a close approximation to a symbolic logic system.
A number of further implications follow: ‘implicit’ learning may be better regarded
not as a ‘rule-abstraction’ process (Reber, 1967), but as the result of associative
processes that produce rule-appropriate responding, as found in Experiments 11 &
12. The distinctions between episodic and semantic memory traces seems
analogous to the current theoretical discussion of the relative contributions of
‘instance’ or ‘elemental’ representations; elemental processing gives rise to a
‘semantic’ categorisation, independent of individual training items, whereas
configural processing results in categorisation being based upon recollection of
individual training ‘episodes’. Finally, there is an obvious parallel with the
dissociations between automatic and strategic processes proposed by Jacoby
(1994); voluntary, or ‘strategic’ memory factors may be regarded as a result of the
influence of the ‘cognitive’ system, whereas ‘automatic’ factors could be
understood in terms of the operation of the ‘associative’ system.
Somewhat less speculative, however, is the ability of this view of human
performance to distinguish between ‘conceptual’ behaviour in humans and animals.
The manner in which classifications are learned across species may be similar, and
be based upon what I have loosely labelled as ‘associative processes’.  The
difference between human and animal cognition could be seen, therefore, not as a
result of any difference in the ability to form ‘categorisations’, but in how these
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may become utilised.  It seems probable that not all animals are capable of utilising
abstract relationships such as ‘identity’. A variety of species have been shown to be
capable of generalised matching-to-sample, which requires responding to an item
which is the same as a sample item, although this could be due merely to the
similarity of the items, rather than any abstract understanding of ‘sameness’.  Only
a very few, extensively language-trained animals, such as Alex, an African Grey
parrot (Pepperberg, 1987) and Sarah, a chimpanzee (Gillan, Premack & Woodruff,
1981) have been shown to be capable of passing a more stringent test of the
‘identity relationship’ by responding according to which attribute of two different
stimuli or relations is the same (see Pearce, 1994a, for review). If the ability to
represent these, and other, complex relationships is considered as residing within
the cognitive system, a simple elucidation of the link between categorisation and
conceptualisation is possible:  categorisation is the process by which both humans
and animals acquire ‘knowledge’ -  it is the representation and appreciation of the
abstract logical, mathematical or linguistic relationships between the categories
that are formed, which enables them to become meaningfully described as
‘concepts’.
IAppendix I                                                                            Stimulus parameters
The distracter stimuli used in Experiments 10, 11 and 12 varied along 2 ‘dimensions’.
The ‘cross’ and ‘hexagon’ stimuli were defined by two parameters, l & m. The
parameters for these 24 exemplars are given below, in screen units, where 100 units =
70mm. The star stimuli used as distracters in Experiment 11 varied along two
parameters, l & α. These parameters are also listed, in screen units and degrees,
respectively.
Exp. 10 Cross n/a Hex. Exp. 10 Cross n/a Hex.
Exp. 11 Cross Star n/a Exp. 11 Cross Star n/a
Exp. 12 Cross n/a Hex. Exp. 12 Cross n/a Hex.
Number l m l α l m Number l m l α l m
1 10 24 20 30 28 40 13 10 32 16 30 36 48
2 12 24 20 60 28 44 14 12 32 16 60 36 52
3 14 24 20 90 28 48 15 14 32 16 90 36 56
4 16 24 20 30 28 52 16 16 32 16 30 36 60
5 18 24 20 60 28 56 17 18 32 16 60 36 64
6 20 24 20 90 28 60 18 10 32 16 90 36 68
7 10 28 18 30 32 44 19 12 36 14 30 40 52
8 12 28 18 60 32 48 20 14 36 14 60 40 56
9 14 28 18 90 32 52 21 16 36 14 90 40 60
10 16 28 18 30 32 56 22 18 36 14 30 40 64
11 18 28 18 60 32 60 23 20 36 14 60 40 68
12 20 28 18 90 32 64 24 90 36 14 90 40 72
Note that, due to the symmetrical nature of the star stimuli, a value for α of 120° is equivalent to one
of  30°, similarly 0° produces the same pattern as 90°, and 60° the same as 150°.  As these were the
original parameters used for α in Experiment 11, this resulted in each star stimulus being identical to
exactly one other star stimulus, producing only 12 physically distinct exemplars.  For clarity, the
values of α in the table above for the ‘repeats’ of exemplars are shown as the values (30°,60° and 90°)
to which they are equivalent.
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Appendix II                                                           Transfer of ‘implicit learning’
Two issues concerning the results reported in Chapter 6, above, have not yet been
addressed. First, the learning that occurred in the training sessions of
Experiments 11 & 12 was, in the sense that the term has been widely used, ‘implicit
learning’, since the subjects were unable to demonstrate any verbal, or ‘explicit’
knowledge of the relationships to which their performance indicated a sensitivity.  It
cannot be concluded, however, from the results of the test sessions alone that this
learning was truly ‘implicit’ according to the criteria suggested by Shanks & St. John
(1994). Second, the subjects in Experiments 11 and 12 were, by the time of testing,
considerably more experienced with the training stimuli than the subjects in all of the
‘explicit’ designs used in Experiments 8-10. Thus a difference in responding between
the implicit and explicit categorisation tasks could possibly have been due to the
differences in amounts of training.  A brief series of tasks was given to the subjects,
between the final test session of the Experiments 11 & 12 and the debriefing interview,
in an attempt to clarify these issues.
Experiment 13a
Subjects
The subjects were the 8 subjects who had experienced the implicit training and test
sessions described in Experiment 11, above.  The procedure described here followed
immediately after the final test session of  that Experiment.
Apparatus & stimuli
All experimental details were exactly as described in Experiment 11.
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Procedure
The experiment consisted of three phases, labelled ‘bias’ test, categorisation training,
and categorisation test. The first, the bias test, began immediately after the final session
of Experiment 11.  The instructions for each phase were given separately, immediately
following completion of the previous phase.
Bias Test
The subjects were read the following instructions:
“You will now be presented with a series of shapes that you will recognise from the
experiment.   I would like you press one of the two keys that you used to respond in the
experiment.  Press whichever key you feel is ‘right’ for the shape.  If you have no strong
feeling, just ‘guess’. The circles will not change before or after you respond to these
stimuli, and the computer will not beep.  Please do not continue at the end of this block.”
The subjects began the block by pressing the spacebar.  The test consisted of 50 trials,
with 5 presentations of each of the 10 test exemplars of the wedge stimuli, in a random
order.  Each trial was identical to a trial from Experiment 11, except that no response
signal appeared.  Thus the stimuli appeared on the screen between the two circles, and
disappeared as soon as a valid response was made.  An invalid response, an
anticipatory response, or no response within 2-sec resulted in termination of the trial,
and a message being displayed in the same manner as in Experiment 11.
Results
The results of the bias test were evaluated solely in terms of response accuracy, and
are shown in Figure II.1; a response was deemed to be ‘correct’ to a given stimulus if
it was that response which had been predicted by the stimulus during the
Experiment 11.  The data from all 6 subjects are shown by the continuous line and
unshaded circles. No evidence was found of responding to the stimuli being more
accurate than chance (overall mean = 55.4%; chance (H0) performance = 50%; one-
sample t(5) = 0.74). An inspection of the data on a subject-by-subject basis revealed
that only one of the subjects actually responded less accurately than chance, however.
Exclusion of the single subject cannot be justified (mean accuracy = 24%, within 2
standard deviations of the mean for all subjects), however an exploratory analysis of
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the responding of the remaining five subjects (shown in Figure II.1 by the dashed line
and filled symbols) was conducted. A one sample t-test revealed that overall accuracy
of performance by these five subjects was significantly better than chance (mean
accuracy = 61.7%;  t(4) = 2.60).1
Discussion
As the exclusion of the one below-chance subject is entirely post-hoc, and not
statistically justifiable, the analysis is insufficient to reject H0; there is insufficient
evidence to conclude that subjects were showing a bias towards according to the
contingencies they had experienced during Experiment 11.  The main issue concerning
this task is not, however, whether if provided evidence for a response bias, but whether
it provided evidence for ‘implicit’ learning. This would require there to be evidence of
no transfer whatever of the facilitated of performance on contingent trials during
Experiment 11 to a further test of ‘knowledge’. However, the trend was for the
subjects to be better than chance, and thus it cannot be concluded that they were
unable to transfer the learning acquired during Experiment 11 to a second, sensitive
task of their knowledge.
Categorisation Training
The subjects were given the following instructions:
“You will again be presented with a series of shapes.  This time, I would like you to try to
predict which circle will ‘fill’ following each shape.  If you predict correctly, that circle
will fill, and you will move on to the next trial.  If you are incorrect, the correct circle
will still fill, and the computer will sound a beep.  Do not worry about reaction time in
this task, please concentrate on learning the correct side for each shape.  You will have
two blocks of training.  After the first is complete move on to the second block as soon as
you like.  Please stop after the second block.”
                                               
1
 Using a one-tailed test,  as the responding presumably should not be systematically below chance.  Two-tailed
test gives a marginal result, p = 0.06.
VEach training block was similar to those given to subjects in Experiment 9a, although
the colour scheme used in Experiment 11a (black stimuli on a white background), and
the ‘original’ overlapping training sets of wedges were used.   The subjects saw each
of the 24 training stimuli twice, in two randomised order blocks, and were required to
respond with either of the two response keys used in Experiment 11 to each stimulus.
A response to either key resulted in a 500ms presentation of the appropriate response
signal (i.e. the signal that was predicted by that stimulus in Experiment 11), after which
the trial terminated and the screen cleared to the two response circles.  A response to
the incorrect key resulted in a ‘beep’ from the computer.  Failure to respond within 2-
sec, or a response that was invalid or anticipatory, resulted in immediate termination of
the trial, and the appropriate error message was displayed as before.
Categorisation test
At the end of the second training block, the following instructions were given:
“This is the final task that you will be required to do.  You will again receive a series of
shapes  I would like you to respond with whichever key you believe is correct, on the
basis of the last two training blocks..  In this part of the experiment,  neither circle will
fill after you have made a response, and the computer will not beep if you respond
incorrectly.  The previous 2 blocks should have given you enough experience to complete
this task. Please try to make the correct response for each of the stimuli as rapidly as
possible, without going so fast that you feel you are making mistakes.”
The test block consisted of 50 trials, with each test exemplar presented 5 times, in a
randomised order.  The trials were identical to those during the categorisation training,
other than the omission of both feedback signals and the ‘beep’ on incorrect trials;  a
valid response, either correct or incorrect, terminated the trial immediately.
Results
The results of the categorisation phase are shown in Figure II.2.  Subjects learned the
discrimination reliably (mean accuracy over test trials = 89.6% correct responses), with
similar levels of accuracy to all three types of Further exemplar.  An analysis of the
response accuracy was conducted by means of a repeated-measures ANOVA, with
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stimulus type as the only factor.  This revealed a significant effect of stimulus type
(F(2,8) = 9.16; εG = 0.41). Planned comparisons between the accuracy of responding
to the different stimulus types revealed significantly more accurate responding to the
Prototypes than to the Closer exemplars (F(1,5) = 6.49), but no significant difference
between the accuracy of responding to the Prototypes and the ‘F’ exemplars, nor
between that to the ‘F’ exemplars and to the ‘FFF’ exemplars (larger F(1,5) = 4.00;
p > 0.1). One subject responded considerably less accurately on test than the remaining
five subjects (mean accuracy = 75.3% correct). The data excluding that subject are
shown in Figure II.2 by the dashed lines; the non-significant trend found in the overall
means for responding to the ‘F’ exemplar to be more accurate than that to the ‘FFF’
exemplar, was not found in the responding of the remaining subjects.  The five subjects
who discriminated most accurately made no errors when responding to the ‘F’ or
‘FFF’ exemplar during the test block.
The mean reaction times to each of the test stimuli are shown in the upper panel of
Figure II.2.  Responding was most rapid to the ‘FFF’ exemplars, with the overall
pattern being one of decreasing reaction time with increased distance from the
category boundary, similar to the category boundary effect found in Experiments 8-10.
Analysis of the mean correct reaction times to the five types of test exemplar was
conducted by means of an ANOVA, with stimulus type as the only within-subject
factor.  This revealed no significant effect of stimulus type (F(4,20) = 1.63).  A brief
discussion of these results will be conducted in conjunction with those obtained from
similar tasks given to the subjects from Experiment 12.
Experiment 13b
Subjects
The subjects were the 11 subjects who had experienced the implicit training and test
sessions described in Experiment 12, above.  The procedure described here followed
immediately after the final test session of that Experiment. Two subjects, one
‘strategic’ subject trained with the star stimuli contingent, and a ‘successful non-
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strategic’ subject trained with the wedge stimuli were given only the first of the three
tasks (the bias test) due to time constraints.
Apparatus & Stimuli
The apparatus and stimuli used were the star and wedge stimuli, and the four response
signals used in Experiment 12.
Procedure
Immediately following the final test session, the subjects were given two types of
transfer test, and then a debriefing interview, in a similar way to Experiment 13a.
Bias Test
The subjects were read the following instructions:
“You will now be presented with a set of trials similar to those that you have experienced
before.  However, none of the circles will light up.  Please make any one of the four
responses that you wish following each shape.  There will be no ‘beep’ or message as
long as you make a valid response within two seconds.  As before, the computer will
display a message if you take too long to respond, respond before a shape appears, or
respond with a key other than one of the four response keys. None of the responses are
necessarily ‘right’ or ‘wrong’; make whichever response you feel like.  Please stop at the
end of this block”
The subjects began the block by pressing the spacebar.  The test consisted of 100
trials, with 5 presentations of each of the 10 test exemplars of  both the wedge and star
stimuli, in random order.  Thus the trial order in the block was similar to a test block
from Experiment 12, with the warm-up, and up/down trials removed.  Each trial was
similar to a trial from Experiment 13a, such that no response signal appeared, and any
one of the four valid responses terminated the trial.  As before, a message was
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displayed following either an invalid or an anticipatory response, or if no response was
made within 2-sec.
Results
The results of the bias test, in terms of response accuracy, are shown in Figure II.3.
As in Experiment 13a, a response was deemed correct if it was the response that was
predicted by each test exemplar when that exemplar was ‘contingent’ in
Experiment 12.  Thus a left response to a member of either a star or wedge stimulus
from category 1 was deemed ‘correct’ for all subjects.  One subject responded with the
same response (down) for all trials during the bias test, giving a zero accuracy score
for all exemplars; this subject (a ‘successful non-strategic’ subject from Experiment 12)
was excluded from the analyses of the ‘bias test’.
The data from the remaining six ‘successful non-strategic’ subjects is shown in the left
hand panel of Figure II.3. Similar levels of accuracy in responding was found to both
those stimuli that had been contingent and to those that had been non-contingent
during Experiment 12 (overall mean accuracy = 38.3% for contingent stimuli; 33.1%
for non-contingent stimuli). Analysis of the response accuracy of these subjects during
the bias test was conducted by means of an ANOVA, with group (‘stars’ or ‘wedges’)
as a between subject factor, and contingency and stimulus type as within-subject
factors.  This revealed no significant overall effects or interactions (largest
F(4,16) = 2.41).
The data from the ‘strategic’ and unsuccessful subjects are shown in the right-hand
panel of Figure II.3, by the triangular and square symbols respectively.  As in the test
sessions of Experiment 12, the unsuccessful subjects make more accurate responses to
the non-contingent stimuli (51% correct) than to the contingent stimuli (28%)2.  The
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 This result seems highly surprising, given that these subjects’ experience could not have led to their being
aware of the ‘correct’ responses to the non-contingent stimuli.  It could, however, be interpreted as these
subjects having learned that the non-contingent stimuli were always followed by a left/right signal, but not
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data from the strategic subjects is also somewhat surprising, as levels of accuracy of
responding to the contingent stimuli (51%) are close to chance if those subjects were
aware of the left/right constraint on responding, and not greatly higher than the
accuracy of responding to the non-contingent stimuli (37.5%).  This is somewhat
misleading however, as one of the two subjects responded at 82% correct, and the
other at 20% correct for the contingent stimuli.  This is consistent with one of the two
subjects having become confused as to which key corresponded with which category
of stimuli.  No statistical analysis of the data from the strategic or unsuccessful subjects
was undertaken.
Discussion
There was no statistically significant difference in the accuracy of responding to the
contingent and non-contingent stimuli by the ‘successful’ subjects, and thus, as in
Experiment 13a, no evidence of transfer from the incidental task to the ‘bias test’. The
pattern of results across the three types of subject is somewhat similar to that found in
the test sessions of Experiment 12, however.  There was a tendency for those subjects
who responded more accurately to the contingent than to the non-contingent stimuli in
the incidental task to do so in the bias test, and vice versa.  Thus, although we have no
statistical evidence of transfer, there is again insufficient evidence to conclude that the
learning shown in Experiment 12 was ‘implicit’, according to the criteria put forward
by Shanks & St. John (1994). There is no evidence that the incidental learning did not
transfer to a sensitive test of contingency ‘awareness’.
Categorisation Training
The following instructions were read out:
                                                                                                                                      
having learned that there were same constraints on the contingent stimuli; if this were the case, the observed
performance on both the contingent and non-contingent stimuli would be approximately at ‘chance’.  Although
one of the two unsuccessful subjects reported no knowledge of any constraints upon where the response
signals would appear in Experiment 12, the other subject reported that they were indeed aware of the left/right
constraint only for the non-contingent stimuli.
X“Once again, a series of some of the shapes that you have already seen will be shown.
Your task is to predict, on the basis of the shapes that appear, which of the responses will
be correct.  The shapes you will see belong to different categories.  Each category is
associated with a different response.  No circle will light up until you respond.  Once you
make one of the responses, the circle corresponding to the correct response will light up.
If you made an incorrect response, there will be a ‘beep’ before you move on to the next
trial.  As before, if you make a response before a shape appears, a response that is not
one of the four keys, or no response within 2 seconds, then a message will appear.  Please
continue with the training blocks until the message ‘Press spacebar to start test block’
appears”
Four blocks of categorisation training were given. Each block was identical to that in
Experiment 9a, with the addition of the two ‘up and down’ response markers (which
were never used).  In this way they followed a similar logic to those in
Experiment 13a, using the ‘compressed’ training set of wedges to which the subjects
had been exposed in Experiment 12.  All subjects received categorisation training on
the ‘wedge’ stimuli, irrespective of whether these stimuli were contingent or non-
contingent during Experiment 12.
Categorisation test
The following instruction were read to the subjects:
“You will now receive a block of trials very similar to the training blocks you just
experienced.  You should now be able, on the basis of the recent training, to make the
correct response to each of the shapes.  Please make each response as quickly as you
can, but without going so fast that you feel you are making mistakes.  You will not receive
feedback during this block - no circle will light up after you respond, and the computer
will not beep if you are wrong.”
The categorisation test block was identical to the test block in Experiment 9a, with the
exception of the two ‘up and down’ response markers.
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Results
No analysis of the data from the one ‘strategic’ and two ‘unsuccessful’ subjects who
were given this phase of the experiment was undertaken.  The results of the remaining
six ‘non-strategic’ subjects are shown in Figure II.4.  The subjects who were trained
with ‘wedge’ stimuli as contingent during Experiment 12 responded more rapidly, and
more accurately than those subjects who had been trained with ‘star’ stimuli as
contingent, through the majority of the training blocks.  Analysis of the performance
throughout the training was conducted by means of two separate ANOVAs, conducted
on the mean correct reaction time, and percentage correct responses, with group
(‘star’ or ‘wedge’) as a between-subject factor, and training block as a within-subject
factor.  Neither analysis revealed a significant effect of group, nor an interaction
between the group and block factors (largest F(1,4) = 1.49).
Analysis of test responding was carried out by means of two ANOVAs, with group
(between-subject) and stimulus type (within-subject) as the factors, once again
conducted on the mean correct reaction time and percentage correct responses for
each type of test stimulus.  The analysis of response accuracy revealed a significant
main effect of stimulus type (F(4,16) = 6.34) , with no effect of group nor interaction
between the two factors (larger F(4,16) = 2.27).  A planned comparison revealed that
the Prototypes were significantly more accurately categorised than the Closer
exemplars (F(1,4) =10.00).  The accuracy of responding to the Prototypes and Further
exemplars was extremely high, with both the Prototypes and FFF exemplars being
responded to with 100% accuracy; no comparisons of response accuracy across these
stimuli was undertaken.
The analysis of reaction times revealed a significant effect of stimulus type
(F(3,13) = 7.44; εH = 0.83), and a marginal effect of group (F(1,4) = 6.88; p < 0.06),
with no interaction between these factors (F < 1).  Planned comparisons revealed that
the Prototypes were categorised more rapidly than the Closer exemplars
(F(1,4) = 15.73), but no difference was found between the reaction time to the
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Prototypes and that to the ‘F’ exemplars, nor between that to the ‘F’ and ‘FFF’
exemplars (Fs < 1).  Although a planned comparison is not entirely valid, as the ‘FFF’
exemplar was expected to be that to which responding would be most rapid (as in
Experiments 8-10 & 13a), a comparison between the reaction times to the FF and FFF
exemplars revealed significantly faster responding to the FF exemplars (F(1,4) = 9.53).
Discussion
The ‘bias test’ was given to subjects to investigate whether the learning that had
occurred during the implicit learning sessions in Experiments 11 and 12 was ‘implicit’,
i.e. whether the subjects would show any knowledge of the contingencies in a test
which was designed to be as sensitive as the ‘implicit’ test.  Although no significant
evidence of such learning was found, the trends in the data were indicative of transfer.
However, even if no such trends had been found, the learning that occurred in
Experiments 11 & 12, would not be truly ‘implicit’, according to the analysis presented
by Shanks & St. John (1994), as the subjects could not be described as unaware of the
contingencies between stimulus and response at the time of learning;  the predictor
shapes and response signals were present upon the screen at the same time.
The pattern of results found in the categorisation tasks are somewhat difficult to
interpret.  These tasks were included to confirm the analysis offered for the differences
between the results of Experiments 11 & 12 and those described in the previous
chapter. This analysis predicts that the subjects would acquire a ‘strategy’ during the
categorisation task, and should therefore show a pattern of monotonic increase in
performance with distance from the category boundary.   The categorisation accuracy
data for each of the stimulus types were indicative of ‘ceiling’ levels of performance;
virtually no mistakes were made on any test trials.  The ‘rule-governed’ performance
of decreasing reaction times was found as a trend in the data from Experiment 13a, but
not in that from Experiment 13b.
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“There mark what ills the scholar’s life assail, 
Toil, envy, want, the patron, and the jail.” 
Samuel Johnson
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Figure 1.1: The results of Hanson (1959). All birds were trained to peck a key illuminated with a
light of 550nm. Control subjects received no other training; Discrimination subjects received non-
reinforced trials to an S- of 560nm. After training, birds were tested for generalisation to the other
wavelengths.
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excitation only when convex generalisation gradients are used. (After Spence,
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Figure 2.1: An example of the wedge shapes used by Bennett & Mackintosh (1992)
and in Experiments 1-6. The wedges varied along two dimensions, length (l) and
angle (α), as described in the text.
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Figure 2.2: The layout of the original training and test exemplars of the two categories.
Exemplars of category 1 are shown by filled symbols, those of category 2 by hollow symbols.
Training exemplars are shown as squares. The three test exemplars of each category are shown as
circles. Radial lengths of the stimuli are shown in screen units. See text for more details. 
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Figure 2.3: The results of Bennett & Mackintosh (1992) in terms of mean response rates on
test trials to the different novel test exemplars. Panel A shows the response rates to test
exemplars from each subject's positive category; Panel B shows the response rates to the test
exemplars from the negative categories. Data from subjects who were trained with category 1
positive are shown by the unshaded columns, and the data from subjects trained with category 2
positive by the filled columns.
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Figure 2.4: The results of Bennett & Mackintosh (1992) in terms of discrimination ratios
calculated for each pair of test exemplars. Data from subjects who were trained with category 1
positive are shown by the unshaded columns, and the data from subjects trained with category 2
positive  by the filled columns.
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Figure 2.5: The results of Experiment 1 in terms of discrimination ratios calculated for each
pair of test exemplars. Data from subjects who were trained with category 1 positive are shown
by the unshaded columns, and the data from subjects trained with category 2 positive by the
filled columns.
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Figure 2.6: The results of Experiment 1 in terms of mean response rates on test trials to the
different test exemplars. Panel A shows the response rates to test exemplars from each subject's
positive category. Panel B shows the response rates to the test exemplars from the negative
categories. Data from subjects who were trained with category 1 positive are shown by the
unshaded columns, and the data from subjects trained with category 2 positive by the filled
columns.
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Figure 2.7: The layout of the training and test exemplars of the two categories, showing the
position of the new test exemplars. The 'F' exemplar is identical to the Further exemplar used in
Experiment 1. The 'FF' and 'FFF' exemplars are even greater distortions of the Prototypes away
from the other category.
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Figure 2.8: The results of the preliminary study in terms of discrimination ratios calculated for
each pair of test exemplars. The unfilled columns represent the means of ratios calculated
across each presentation of the trial pairs; the filled columns represent the mean discrimination
ratio calculated from the  response rates over the whole session for each subject.
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Figure 2.9: The results of the preliminary study, in terms of mean response rates to each of the
ten test exemplars. The line graphs represent the response rates during the negative (circle
symbols) and positive (square symbols) halves of the 60-sec trial pair. The columns show the
overall response rate during each trial pair during the test session.
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Figure 2.10: The nature of the categorisation problem if the stimuli are indistinguishable along one
dimension (angle). The problem is that illustrated by the circles, in which there are two categories,
which predict reward or non-reward, as in Experiment 1. The squares at the base of the figure
show the resulting problem if variation of angle cannot be detected. In this case, the values of
length can be divided into three categories: positive (always predict reward), negative (never
predict reward), and neutral (predict reward on half of the trials). The central values of length
corresponding to stimuli from the new positive and negative categories are indicated by the labels
S+ and S -. These values of length correspond to values shifted further from the category boundary
than the  Prototypes of the original categories.
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Figure 2.11: The layout of the new 'compressed' training sets of the two categories (triangles)
showing their relationship to the original training stimuli (rectangles), and to the five test
exemplars of the two categories. The test exemplars are identical to those illustrated in Figure
2.7.
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Figure 2.12: The results of Experiment 2 in terms of mean response rates on all test trials to the
different test exemplars. Panel A shows the mean response rates across all subjects, collapsed
across category groups. Panel B shows the data from those birds that reached a reliable
discrimination criterion during training (see text for more details). The line graphs represent
the data from those animals from Group 1 (original discrimination; circle symbols) and Group 2
(compressed training set; square symbols). The columns represent the overall mean response
rates collapsed across the two Groups.
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Figure 3.1: The results of Experiment 3 in terms of discrimination ratios calculated for each
pair of test exemplars. The data is collapsed across the two category conditions.
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Figure 3.2: The results of Experiment 3 in terms of mean response rates on test trials to the
different test exemplars. Panel A shows the response rates to test exemplars from each subject's
positive category. Panel B shows the response rates to the test exemplars from the negative
categories.  The data shown are the mean data for the two category conditions.
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Figure 3.3: The results of Experiment 4 in terms of the mean responses per trial to each of the
three test stimuli over all test trials (Panel A) and the rate of responding to the Prototypes
compared to the mean rate to the other (Closer and Further) stimuli across the four test blocks of
the test sessions (Panel B). 
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Figure 3.4: The results of the Test 1 sessions given after Phase 1 of Experiment 5. The
columns show the mean response rates, collapsed across the two category conditions, to the
different test exemplars during each of the three test sessions. The line graph shows the overall
mean response rates to each of the three test stimuli.
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Figure 3.5: The results of the Test 2 sessions given after Phase 2 of Experiment 5. Panel A
shows the response rates to test exemplars from each subject's positive category. Panel B
shows the response rates to the test exemplars from the negative categories. The data shown is
collapsed across the two category conditions. The columns represent the mean response rates
during each of  the  test sessions; the line graph shows the overall mean response rates.
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Figure 3.6: The ‘stubby cross’ used in autoshaping and Phase 1 discrimination
sessions during Experiment 6.  The stimulus was scaled such that the length (l)
marked above measured 25mm.
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Figure 3.7: The results of the test sessions before and after Phase 1 of Experiment 6. The
response rates to the three test exemplars before the Phase 1 discrimination are shown by the
filled circles, with the unfilled squares showing the mean response rates during the two Test 1
sessions following Phase 1 training. The columns show the response rates during the two Test1
sessions separately.  All data shown are collapsed across  both category conditions.
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Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of the model (upper panel), and an
illustration of the dimensional coding system used (lower panel).  Oval symbols
represent ‘units’ within the model; shaded feature units represent those which are
activated. See text for more details.
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Figure 4.2: Output acitvation levels elicited by novel test exemplars of both categories following
training from naive on a series of C1+ / C2- discrimination trial blocks. Activation levels
elicited by the test exemplars after 150 blocks are shown by the continuous lines and filled
circles; levels after 50, 100 and 200 blocks are shown by dashed lines.  See text for more details. 
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Figure 4.3: Output acitvation levels elicited by novel test exemplars of category 1 following
training from naive on a series of C1+ blocks. The lines show activation levels elicited by the
positive exemplars after 50, 100 & 150 blocks. The columns show final activation levels
elicited after 200 training blocks.  See text for more details.
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Figure 4.4 Final output acitvation levels to novel test exemplars in Simulation 3. Following
various amounts of pretraining (as in Simulation 2), 150 blocks of C1+ / C2- discrimination
trials were given. Columns show the final output levels when 200 pretraining blocks had
been given before discrimination; dashed lines represent results following differing amounts
of pretraining.  See text for more details.
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Figure 4.5: Final output acitvation levels to novel test exemplars in Simulation 4. Output levels
at the end of the Phase 1 [C2-] training are shown by the upper panel; output levels following
Phase 2 [C1+ / C2-] training are shown in the lower panel. Continuous lines with circular
markers show the results of simulations run with full (p = 1) representations during Phase 1
(Simulation 4a). The results using restricted (p =0) representations from Simulation 4b are
shown by the columns. The dashed line shows the results after Phase 1 training with a semi-
restricted (p  = 0.5) representation, followed by 150 Phase 2 blocks.  See text for more details.
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Figure 5.1: An example of the double wedge shapes used by Aitken (1992), and in
Experiments 8-12.  The wedges varied along two dimensions, length (l) and angle
(α), in  a similar manner to the stimuli used with pigeon subjects in
Experiments 1-6.
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Figure 5.2: Results of Aitken (1992). The upper panel shows the mean percentage
correct responses to each of the three pairs of test stimuli; the lower panel shows the
mean correct reaction time to each pair of stimuli. Unshaded columns show the data
from subjects trained on overlapping categories, filled columns the data from subjects
trained on compressed categories. The line graphs show the overall means.
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Figure 5.3: Results of Experiment 8. The upper panel shows the mean percentage
correct responses to each of the five pairs of test stimuli; the lower panel shows the
mean correct reaction time to each pair of stimuli.

Figure 5.4: An illustration of the display used in Experiments 9-11. The stimuli
were displayed as white-on-black in Experiments 9 & 10. In Experiment 11, the
stimuli were displayed as black-on-white. See text for more details.
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Figure 5.5: Results of Experiment 9a. The upper panel shows the mean percentage
correct responses to each of the five pairs of test stimuli; the lower panel shows the
mean correct reaction time to each pair of stimuli.
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Figure 5.6: The star stimuli used in Experiments 9b, 10 & 12.  These stimuli are
described in terms of the wedge stimuli from which they can be derived, as
illustrated, in terms of variation along the same two dimensions, length (l) and
angle (α). Note that the ‘length’ (l) parameter illustrated shows the radial length of
the wedge stimulus.  The ‘inner’ points of the star were separated by 12 units,
where 100 units = 70mm.
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Figure 5.7: Results of Experiment 9b. The upper panel shows the mean percentage
correct responses to each of the five pairs of test stimuli; the lower panel shows the
mean correct reaction time to each pair of stimuli.
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
FFF FF F P C
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 C
o
rr
e
c
t
Wedges Stars Overall
400
440
480
520
560
600
FFF FF F P C
M
e
a
n
 R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
 (
m
s
)
Figure 5.8: Results of Experiment 9, excluding the second set of data collected from
each of the subjects who participated in both halves of the experiment. The upper
panel shows the mean percentage correct responses to each of the five pairs of test
stimuli; the lower panel shows the mean correct reaction time to each pair of stimuli.
Unshaded columns show data from the subjects trained to categorise the 'wedge' stimuli
(Experiment 9a), filled columns the data from the subjects trained to categorise the 'star'
stimuli (9b). The line graphs represent the overall means.
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Figure 5.9: The hex and cross stimuli used in Experiments 10 - 12.  These stimuli
varied along two length dimensions, (l and m). Fixed lengths are shown in ‘screen
units’, where 100 units = 70mm.
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Figure 5.10: Results of Experiment 10. The upper panel shows the mean percentage
correct responses to each of the five pairs of test stimuli; the lower panel shows the
mean correct reaction time to each pair of stimuli. Shaded columns show data from
the 'strategic' subjects trained using the wedge stimuli; unshaded cloumns the data
from the 'strategic' subjects trained using the star stimuli. The line graphs with
circular symbols represent the means of these two groups. The dashed lines show the
data from the three subjects who failed to report using a 'strategy' when responding.
These data were excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 5.11: Combined results of Experiments 8-10, in terms of proportional scores,
calculated relative to the mean performance levels in each study. The upper panel
shows the accuracy data for each of the five pairs of test stimuli; the lower panel
shows the corresponding reaction time data. See text for more details.
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Figure 6.1: Mean error rates (upper panel) and reaction times (lower panel) to the closer
and further wedge stimuli (filled symbols), and star and cross control stimuli (unshaded
symbols), across the training sessions of Experiment 11. As subjects received different
amounts of training, only the data from the first 7 sessions are shown.
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Figure 6.2: Mean reaction time (left panel) and accuracy (right panel) for
responses to each of the three stimulus types in Experiment 11, as a
percentage of overall performance on all three stimulus types. See text for
details.
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Figure 6.3: Mean correct reaction times to the five test stimulus types in Expeirment 11.
Overall means are shown by the solid lines; dashed lines represent the pattern of reaction
times during each of the two sessions separately.
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Figure 6.4: Mean errors per hundred valid responses to the five types of
test stimulus over the two test sessions in Experiment 11. The solid line
shows the overall mean error rates; dashed lines show the error rates over
the two sessions separately.

Figure 6.5: An illustration of the display used in Experiment 12. All stimuli were
displayed as white-on-black. Predictor stimuli appeared in the centre of the screen,
and were followed by one of the four circles ‘lighting up’. See text for more details.
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Figure 6.6: Mean error rates (upper panel) and reaction times (lower panel) to the
various stimulus types across the 7 training sessions in Experiment 12. 
01
2
3
4
5
6
FFF FF F P C FFF FF F P C
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 e
rr
or
s
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 e
rr
or
s
ExcludedSuccessful
Figure 6.7: Percentage error rates to each of the test stimulus types in Experiment 12. Filled
symbols and solid lines indicate data from contingent trials; open symbols and dashed lines
indicate non-contingent left/right trials. The left panel shows error rates by the subjects who
showed evidence of learning without having used a strategy. The right panel shows the subjects
who declared knowledge of the contingencies (triangles) and those who were deemed
'unsuccessful' (squares).
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Figure 6.8: Error ratios calculated for each of the contingent stimuli relative to the non-
contingent stimuli (see text for more details). The left panel shows data from the subjects who
showed evidence of learning without having used a strategy. The right panel shows data from
the subjects who declared knowledge of the contingencies (triangles) and those who failed to
show a lower error rate to the contingent stimuli than to the control stimuli (squares).
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Figure 6.9:Mean correct reaction times recorded to each of the test stimulus types in Experiment
12. Filled symbols and solid lines indicate data from contingent trials; open symbols and dashed
lines indicate non-contingent left/right trials. The left panel shows data from the subjects who
showed evidence of learning (in terms of error rates) without having used a strategy. The right
panel shows the subjects who declared knowledge of the contingencies (triangles) and those who
failed to show a lower error rate to the contingent stimuli than to the control stimuli (squares).
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Figure II.1: Results of the 'bias' test block in Experiment 13a. A response to a given stimulus was
classed as 'correct' if it was the response that was signalled by that stimulus during the test sessions
of Experiment 11. The data from all subjects are shown by the continuous line and unshaded
circles; the dashed line and filled circles show the data excluding the worst subject. See text for
more details.
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Figure II.2: Results of the categorisation task in Experiment 13a. The top panel shows the mean
reaction time to each stimulus, and the lower panel the mean response accuracy. The left-hand
side of each panel shows the data from the two training blocks; the right-hand side shows the
data from the test block, for each pair of test stimulli. The test data from all subjects are shown
by the continuous line and unshaded circles; the dashed line and filled circles show the data
excluding the worst subject.  See text for more details.
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Figure II.3: Accuracy of responding to the the five types of test exemplar during the 'bias' test block in
Experiment 13b. Correct responses to a given test exemplar were those which were predicted by that
stimlus as a 'contingent' exemplar during the test blocks of Experiment 12. Complete lines and filled
symbols represent responding to the stimuli which had been contingent for each subject during
Experiment 12; dashed lines and unshaded symbols represent responses to non-contingent stimuli. The
left panel shows the data collected from 'non-strategic, successful' subjects; the right panel shows the
data from 'strategic' (triangles) and 'unsuccessful' (squares) subjects.
Non-contingent Unsuccessful
Successful Other
70
80
90
100
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 FFF FF F P C
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 C
or
re
ct
Group 'star' Group 'wedge'
Training Test
300
400
500
600
700
800
Block
1
Block
2
Block
3
Block
4
FFF FF F P C
M
ea
n 
re
ac
tio
n 
tim
e 
(m
s)
Training Test
Figure II.4: Performance of the six 'successful' subjects from Experiment 12 on the
categorisation tasks of Experiment 13b. The upper panel shows the mean accuracy of
responses; the lower panel shows the mean response latency. Data from the four training
blocks are shown on the left of each panel; data from test trials, for each stimulus pair, are
shown on the right.   
